You Can't Dictate Terms When You Haven’t Won
But that's precisely what the Trump administration tried to do in the Islamabad talks
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The Islamabad talks failed for a simple reason: the Trump administration thought Iran was at its mercy. But after a negotiation session that ran from Saturday evening into early Sunday, JD Vance—who led the American delegation—called it quits and headed home.
“The bad news,” Vance said, “is that we have not reached an agreement. And I think that’s bad news for Iran much more than it’s bad news for the US. So, we go back to the US, having not come to an agreement…[T]hey have chosen not to accept our terms.”
Like his boss, who kept repeating during the talks that he had defeated Iran, Vance apparently believes that Iran, as the president loves to say, holds “no cards” because the Israeli-American bombing campaign inflicted such massive damage. It certainly did. But a lopsided advantage in firepower does not necessarily translate into a strategic victory—the achievement of objectives. In this instance, it most certainly has not.
Iran Held the Stronger Hand
Consider where things stood when the April 8 ceasefire took effect.
The war Trump and Netanyahu launched on February 28 had failed to produce “regime change” in Iran. The president’s claim that he has achieved that goal because new Iranian leaders have replaced those who were killed is ludicrous. Imagine that Trump were to follow up his firing of Pam Bondi by also dismissing Pete Hegseth and Kash Patel. Would that qualify as regime change? Of course not. The Islamic Republic has been battered but remains standing and refuses to surrender.
The current Iranian leadership is more hardline than its predecessor. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular its recently appointed commander-in-chief, Ahmad Vahidi, who took office after Mohammad Pakpour was killed in the early days of this war. The IRGC brass now wields far more power in Iranian politics than it did when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—who died in the same Israeli strike that killed Pakpour—was alive.
Khamenei’s word was final in all matters. But his son and successor, Mojtaba, lacks the authority and stature of his father. Khamenei, Sr., forbade the building of nuclear weapons, but the hardliners may now have more leeway—ironic considering that Trump and Netanyahu’s primary goal in starting this war, or so they claimed, was to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. That outcome had in fact been secured by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Netanyahu campaigned against relentlessly and from which Trump withdrew in 2018.
Khamenei’s death and the war for the Islamic Republic’s survival have together boosted the power of the IRGC in general, its most militant leaders in particular. Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has even less authority than before the February 28 war. Pragmatists within Iran’s political elite have either been killed (Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister) or vilified for advocating compromise, as Javad Zarif, another former foreign minister, did recently in Foreign Affairs.
Among the influential figures in Iran’s political order now is parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a decades-long IRGC officer and one-time Air Force commander, who led Iran’s delegation to the Islamabad talks. But even he will face tough opposition from Vahidi—who denounced Ghalibaf’s handshake with Vance in Islamabad—and other senior IRGC officers regarding concessions on nuclear enrichment and Iran’s missile stocks.
Not only has the Islamic Republic survived, it performed far better during the war than almost anyone had expected. Its drones and missiles did huge damage to American military bases, even forcing an evacuation of many troops and dependents. Those attacks repeatedly struck the Gulf monarchies’ energy infrastructure, causing shutdowns and export declines.
Iran penetrated Israel’s vaunted air defenses, striking many important targets. Normal life in Israel ground to a halt amid wailing air raid sirens and dashes to bomb shelters.
Iran did not deplete its inventory of drones and missiles; in the first two weeks alone, it launched almost as many as it was thought to possess in total. Israel and the US, albeit to a lesser degree, started running low on interceptors.
Iran established control of the Strait of Hormuz, effectively setting up a toll booth and levying a $2 million per-trip fee on tankers through side deals with individual countries. Tehran also began earning far more from oil exports once the war led prices to skyrocket.
The war triggered a global economic crisis. The price of oil, diesel, petrochemicals, urea, and ammonia (essential for nitrogen-based fertilizer), aluminum, and helium (critical for semiconductor production) soared. American consumer prices increased by nearly one percent month-on-month by the end of March, the biggest jump in four years, and consumer confidence reached the lowest level since 1952. All this as Trump’s poll numbers are cratering, and mid-term elections loom.
Misjudging Iran
Taken together, these realities demonstrate that by the time the Islamabad talks were announced Iran had fought the combination of the world’s sole military superpower and one of its most powerful armies to a standoff. Vance nevertheless believed that the US could turn up, dictate terms to Iran, and then complain that “they did not accept our terms.” What he sought was not negotiation, but capitulation, which, if you keep in mind the bullet points above, was delusional. One American demand was that Iran agree to zero uranium enrichment—something it has always rejected on the grounds that it is entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, subject to IAEA inspections, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even the 2015 JCPOA (signed by Iran, the US, and a few other countries) allowed for enrichment up to 3.67 percent.
The zero-enrichment demand alone would have ensured the collapse of the talks, although they also foundered for other reasons. One was the terms for reopening the Strait: Iran insisted on maintaining control. The other was limiting the number and range of Iran’s ballistic missiles, something on which Iran was by then probably even less willing to give ground after having been attacked by Israel and the US—while talks on Iran’s nuclear program were ongoing—twice in less than one year.
It’s also stunning that Vance and his team seemed to think that there was any chance of reaching a deal for a permanent end to the war after one day of negotiations. It took two years of talks to finalize the JCPOA. The agenda of the Islamabad talks was far more ambitious and complex. Aside from Iran’s nuclear program, it included the terms for a permanent peace, the arrangements for reopening the Strait, Iran’s demand for a non-aggression agreement and wartime reparations, ending Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, and reducing its drone and missile inventory.
Now What?
The ceasefire doesn’t end until April 22, and neither side has said it won’t return to the bargaining table. Vance’s abrupt departure might have been a calculated move to pressure Iran. The same holds for Trump’s line, delivered as the talks were continuing, that he didn’t care whether the negotiations produced a deal because Iran had been demolished and the US had won. (He may be rehearsing that narrative as part of an exit strategy or to pressure Iran.)
One possibility, therefore, is that after some posturing by both sides, the talks will resume and the ceasefire will be extended to enable their continuation. Trump will doubtless say, as he did in announcing this ceasefire and backing away from his threat to eviscerate Iran’s civilization, that he magnanimously granted a request from Pakistan’s president. A renewed diplomatic effort may prove fruitless, especially if the Trump administration continues to seek a Carthaginian Peace—terms forced upon an annihilated adversary. But at least war will be averted as long as talks continue.
A second scenario is a continuing crisis that might include episodes of gunfire but would stop short of full-scale war. Trump may have already set the stage for this by ordering the US Navy to block all ships headed to and from Iran. That will require wresting control of the Strait from Iran, which will resist and has the means to do so, including numerous high-speed missile boats (such as the recently-revealed Heydar-110), underwater drones, and mobile anti-ship missiles. A prolonged struggle over the Strait will require more than warships; eventually, Trump would have to send ground troops to achieve sustainable control. No one can foresee the outcome if Iran resists the blockade. Yet given the adaptability and resilience Iran has demonstrated during the war it would be unwise to dismiss as bluster the warning of Mohsen Rezaee, a former IRGC commander-in-chief, that Iran has “significant untapped capabilities” at its disposal.
Even if the US asserts control over the Strait, Iran could take potshots at commercial vessels, raise the risks of passage, and bring even approved traffic to a halt. Either way, the price of energy and many other commodities will skyrocket again, and that will hardly work to Trump’s advantage. And what if Trump does manage to blockade the Strait and a Chinese tanker attempts a crossing? Will the US Navy intensify the crisis by forcing it to retreat, even though 38 percent of all the oil transported through the Strait heads to China?
The problem with postwar crises is that they can easily careen out of control and segue into full-on violence.
A third scenario: renewed war. Although one never knows with Trump, despite his bravado about a resounding victory, he seems to have realized that he has dug himself into a hole by starting this war—and that the longer the war continues, the deeper that hole will become. Besides, can he be any more confident about achieving strategic victory as opposed to inflicting more damage on Iran? (Those who keep harping on how severe Iran’s losses have been should keep in mind that in war, destruction isn’t an end in itself.) And how will a renewed price surge benefit him politically?
If the war does resume, the most likely catalyst may be Benjamin Netanyahu. Last Wednesday, in an address to the nation (delivered while Israel’s war in Lebanon was continuing), he insisted that there was still unfinished business in Iran and that the remaining goals would, if necessary, be achieved by “the resumption of fighting.” He still believes that the Islamic Republic can be brought down—that’s been among his main goals for decades—and may calculate that if Iran retaliates against an Israeli attack, as it surely will, and a full-blown war follows, Trump will face immense pressure from hardline pro-Israeli individuals, organizations, and movements (such as MAGA’s Evangelical Christians) to jump in and defend Israel.
Why don’t I venture any predictions? Because only fools would attempt to divine Donald Trump’s next move—on anything.
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© 2026 Rajan Menon
548 Market Street PMB 72296, San Francisco, CA 94104
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