| Apr 13, 2026, 6:09 PM (14 hours ago) | |||
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Wang Yi’s Pyongyang Visit: Kim Jong Un Signals Renewed Efforts to Improve Ties but Alignment Still Lacking
- By: Rachel Minyoung Lee
- April 13, 2026
Notably, North Korea’s summary report of the Ninth Party Congress made no mention of China or Russia, a contrast to the Eighth Party Congress report in 2021. Kim Jong Un’s recent speech to the parliament stressed the need to “improve and strengthen, from a developmental point of view,” relations with friendly countries “in line with the requirements of the new era,” without specifying those countries either. That said, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s April 9-10 visit to Pyongyang—his first since September 2019—was a particularly useful data point for gauging North Korea’s calculus toward its great-power neighbor.
North Korea’s official account of Kim’s talks with Wang was the most forward-leaning on bilateral cooperation and mutual support of any readout of his meetings with Chinese officials or letters to President Xi Jinping since Pyongyang began rebuilding its frayed ties with Beijing in September 2025. This represented a rather abrupt turn, given that Pyongyang leadership has remained largely distant from China despite that summit and an uptick in business activity between the two sides, including North Korea’s curt report on Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui’s meeting with Wang a day before the Kim-Wang talks.
While the positive signal from Kim himself suggests Pyongyang will likely make renewed efforts to improve ties, there are two potential constraining factors going forward: there was no mention of alignment on issues beyond the bilateral domain in the Kim-Wang meeting readout, and Pyongyang’s still-strong relationship with Russia, which apparently has weighed on its ties with China, may continue to do so.
Kim’s Unusually Strong Nod to Bilateral Ties
According to Pyongyang’s readout of the Kim-Wang talks:
Comrade Kim Jong Un said that it is important for the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] and China to further intensify the visits and contacts at different levels and boost mutual support and cooperation for the protection of the common interests and the multi-faceted and sustained development of the bilateral relations, in view of the present international geopolitical situation and the long-term strategic interests of the two countries. [Emphasis added by the author.]
What stands out is Kim’s call for bolstering bilateral exchange “at different levels,” an expansion of scope from the “high-level visits” discussed during his September 2025 summit with Xi and his talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang the following month. Kim’s emphasis on the “sustained development” of bilateral ties and the two countries’ “long-term strategic interests” may reflect the country’s five-year China policy adopted at the Ninth Party Congress.
The readout elaborated as follows:
Affirming that it is the steadfast stand of the WPK and the DPRK government to place the greatest value on, give top priority to and further develop the DPRK-China friendly relations with socialism as their core, Comrade Kim Jong Un said that the WPK and the DPRK government would fully support all the internal and external policies of the Chinese party and government for realizing the territorial integrity of the country on the basis of the “one-China” principle and building a fair and just multi-polar world. [Emphasis added by the author.]
Kim used unusually strong language to emphasize the value and priority of North Korea-China relations, invoking the two countries’ historical socialist bond in the same breath. Consistent with his pledge to deepen cooperation with China, yet rare in both its scope and specificity, Kim said North Korea would “fully support all” Chinese domestic and foreign policies—echoing, if less forcefully, his vows to “unconditionally support all” Russian policies—and even publicly endorsed the one-China policy by name. This was not a policy departure: North Korea has backed this policy in the past. Kim Jong Un himself endorsed China’s position on Taiwan at his 2025 summit with Xi, though North Korea’s own readout was more circumspect, stopping at Kim’s support for China’s efforts to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. What is notable is that Pyongyang this time explicitly attributed the policy to the top leader, something it was last observed doing in September 2001, following then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Pyongyang.[1]
Kim’s framing of the sustained development of bilateral ties within the current geopolitical context, and his pledge to support China’s foreign policy, are consistent with the agreement reached the previous day between Choe and Wang to boost “support and cooperation between the external policy organs of the two countries.
Abrupt Turn
The unusually positive language in Pyongyang’s Kim-Wang meeting readout comes across as abrupt. Until Kim’s meeting with Wang, the North Korean leadership largely remained distant toward China, even after Kim’s 2025 summit with Xi, their first in more than six years. North Korea’s handling of the Kim-Xi summit and subsequent bilateral diplomatic interactions included some positive references to the relationship but lacked the alignment language and warmth found in reports from before fall 2023, when signs of strain became clear. Kim’s diplomatic correspondence with Xi shortly before his meeting with Wang—his early-March reply and his late-March reply to Xi on his reelection to the top Workers’ Party and State Affairs Commission posts—were both restrained compared to some of his past letters to Xi.
North Korea’s report on the Chinese foreign minister’s talks with Choe Son Hui just one day earlier highlights the stark contrast on either side of the Kim-Wang talks. The report remained cool beneath the customary diplomatic platitudes. Though it said both sides agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation and support, it conspicuously omitted any reference to a broader consensus—unlike the North Korean readout of the Choe-Wang talks in September 2025, which stated that the two officials “exchanged in-depth opinions related to international and regional issues and reached a full consensus of views on them.” Choe’s letter to Wang a few days later watered down that language, referring only to an “important consensus of views” on bilateral issues, though even this acknowledged some measure of agreement.
Kim’s late-March letter to Xi may have been a harbinger of this shift: for the first time, he used the “important agreement [중요합의; chungyo habui]” formulation in reference to their 2025 summit, possibly to better align Pyongyang’s language with China’s “important consensus [중요공동인식; chungyo kongdong insik]” formula. Previously, the North had avoided applying this terminology to its own officials, with only Choe Son Hui going as far as referring to an “agreement [합의]” between the two leaders.
So, Is All Well? Not So Fast.
It is premature, however, to read that abrupt shift as a full restoration of the relationship to its pre-fall 2023 state. Despite Kim’s unusually positive language on bilateral ties, the focus remained on cooperation and support. Broader signs of policy alignment and warmth were absent, consistent with the pattern that followed the 2025 Kim-Xi summit.
As with the 2025 Kim-Xi summit readout, North Korea reported that Kim and Wang each “expressed” their views on “regional and international” issues, without elaboration or the alignment language that appeared in some of North Korea’s 2018-2019 Kim-Xi summit coverage. Moreover, while the readout cited Wang’s reference to “the important common understanding” reached at the Kim-Xi summit, it omitted any mention of Kim using the same language, even though he had done so in his recent letter to Xi.[2] By contrast, North Korea reported in June 2025 that Kim and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu reached a “complete consensus of views” on a wide range of issues. Kim also told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov the following month that “the two countries share the same views on all strategic issues.”
The contrast extended beyond substance to tone: the readout was dry and devoid of personal warmth toward Xi or the bilateral relationship. Kim asked Wang to convey his “greetings to Comrade Xi”—without any reinforcing adjectives before “greetings” or Xi’s name—despite Wang having delivered Xi’s “warm greetings” to Kim. This contrasts notably with Kim conveying “friendly greetings to the esteemed Comrade Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin” through Lavrov. Although Kim has begun to address Xi as “Respected Comrade” or “Esteemed Comrade,” that carries a far more formal tone than his January 2026 letter to Putin, which opened with “My closest comrade,” and added: “I regard the friendly relations with you as the most precious ones and pride.” Kim’s pledge to prioritize “DPRK-China friendly relations,” while significant, also paled against his characterization of North Korea-Russia ties as “the sincerest alliance.”
Russia still appears to be North Korea’s preferred partner, though Kim’s elevation of Pyongyang-Beijing relations to “top priority” may signal a recalibration. While closer ties with Moscow may not have been solely responsible for the fraying of Pyongyang-Beijing relations, the two trends coincided, and if the Pyongyang-Moscow relationship remains strong, the North may have limited incentive to fully rehabilitate relations with China.
Conclusion
Wang Yi’s visit to Pyongyang has fueled speculation that it was timed to a summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping scheduled for next month, and that the two countries were coordinating positions on issues of mutual interest, perhaps even laying the groundwork for a Trump-Kim meeting.
Yet at the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Jong Un called for US recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status as a prerequisite for any potential engagement. Under these circumstances, how much common ground Kim and Wang found on key issues, or how much of a role China can play in US-North Korea relations, remains questionable.
The more consequential question is whether the abrupt change in Kim’s attitude toward China reflects a shift in foreign policy priorities, one that would make good on his pledge to Wang to give Beijing “top priority.” If so, that raises questions about the future of North Korea-Russia relations. The October 2025 groundbreaking ceremony for the Kursk memorial museum made a considerable splash, with Kim extolling the bilateral alliance. How North Korea portrays Russia at the completion ceremony, scheduled for mid-April, may offer an early indicator of how far Kim is willing to rebalance toward Beijing.
- [1]
In a “detailed report” on Jiang’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea said Kim Jong Il “expressed support to the cause of the Chinese party and government to achieve the complete reunification of the country on the principle of ‘One China’” during his talks with him. “Detailed report on President Jiang Zemin’s official goodwill visit to DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), September 6, 2001, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2001/200109/news09/06.htm#5.
- [2]
According to the Chinese official news agency’s report on this meeting, Kim Jong Un “expressed his pleasure in seeing the important consensus”—or what North Korea calls “important agreement”—from his summit with Xi being implemented. “China willing to work with DPRK to promote practical cooperation: Chinese FM,” Xinhua, April 10, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260410/9d0d693e80534d6a96e65ce34cfcdfa6/c.html.