In Washington, great power competition has become the dominant frame for US foreign policy analysis, and there is a tendency to use it to interpret every major geopolitical event. So it is understandable that some have tried to frame the war in Iran as having a China angle. In this case, however, that framing is misleading. This war is not about China, and attempts to make it so obscure more than they clarify.
China is not a decisive actor in this conflict. It did not shape the conditions that led to escalation, it is not a military participant, and it lacks either the leverage or the willingness to impose outcomes on the primary belligerents. The drivers of this war lie in US decision-making, Israeli strategic calculations, and Iranian responses. Efforts to retrofit China into this equation say more about lazy thinking in Washington than about realities on the ground.
That is not to say that China is absent. It is present, but in a way that is consistent, limited, and largely predictable.
Beijing’s diplomatic behavior since the outbreak of the war reflects a familiar pattern. Chinese officials have engaged in active but conventional diplomacy: shuttle diplomacy by Zhai Jun, Beijing’s special envoy to the Middle East; telephone diplomacy by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, engaging with nearly all of his regional counterparts; and measured statements through its permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Its influence—real or imagined—in convincing Iran to participate in the peace talks in Islamabad clearly was not enough to tone down Tehran’s maximalist negotiating strategy. All of this has signaled engagement, but none of it amounts to decisive action. China is behaving like a normal external power with interests in the region, not like a crisis manager shaping outcomes.
A familiar set of points
An intervention that drew attention was the China-Pakistan “Five-Point Plan to end the Middle East War,” announced in Beijing on March 31. The five points—an immediate cease-fire, a start to peace talks, an end to attacks on non-military targets, the safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, and respect for the UN Charter—were pretty standard stuff for Beijing. They reflect a long-standing set of diplomatic principles that shape much of China’s approach to the Middle East.
If you look at the seven multi-point plans that China has released at different moments since 2013 in response to other regional conflicts, you see a consistent pattern including calls for cease-fires, insistence on dialogue, respect for sovereignty, opposition to the use of force, and support for UN-led processes. Each of these plans has had remarkably consistent language and priorities. None of them has contributed to resolving the problems they were designed for.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-iran-war-is-not-about-china/