China’s diplomacy succeeds even if it doesn’t bring Middle East peace
21 Apr 2026
China’s recent diplomatic efforts in the Middle East have led to speculation over whether its global strategy has shifted. There is consensus that China is stepping into a leadership role and trying to play peacemaker. Meanwhile, a few sceptics point out that the US-Israel war on Iran is not about China and has only exposed how thin Beijing’s influence is in the region. We’ve been here before.
In the last decade, with each moment of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, from Syria to Libya to Palestine, China has urged a consistent response: a cessation of hostilities followed by immediate negotiations to reduce tensions, either in an international forum or mediated by China.
With the exception of the 2023 Saudi-Iran normalisation agreement, none of these suggestions was seriously engaged with. But while China’s diplomatic record in the region is spotty and limited, its strategy might still be successful from Beijing’s perspective. Less than a week after the US-Iran ceasefire, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point plan for peace and stability in the Middle East during a meeting with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In a veiled criticism of American policy, Xi warned the world could not risk returning to “the law of the jungle”. The same day, China’s foreign ministry described the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the latest escalation, as “irresponsible and dangerous”. On Monday, during a call with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Xi said the waterway should remain open for normal passage and that “China advocates an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire”. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, attend a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on April 14. Photo: Pool via Reuters Although these statements are frank, they do not represent a new approach. Beijing has been clear in its support for de-escalation, diplomacy and a negotiated settlement in this and all other major conflicts in the region, as well as in its larger pattern of preferring non-coercive, behind-the-scenes diplomacy.
China has supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal – and Iran’s negotiations with the West on sanctions, which also limit China’s ability to openly do business in Iran. While it primarily blames US and Israeli violations of Iranian sovereignty, it has called for restraint from all parties and urged Iran to respect the “reasonable concerns” of its Gulf neighbours.
Multi-point plans from China are nothing new. Beijing has issued no less than seven other such plans for the Middle East since 2013, including four on Palestine and one on the Gulf released just weeks ago. The impact has been largely imperceptible, other than in positioning China as a supporter of a just, negotiated two-state settlement in Palestine. Especially on Palestine, China has been limited in its ability to bring unwilling parties to the negotiating table. For this reason, it had almost no real impact on negotiations with Israel to end the violence in Gaza; Israel was not willing to negotiate, and was not willing to involve China when it was. Even in situations where Chinese diplomacy did have a meaningful impact, it was largely through facilitation. The much-lauded 2023 Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement was concluded in Beijing with Chinese mediation, but was also the culmination of years of groundwork laid by Riyadh and Tehran. The process was locally driven: reportedly initiated by Saudi officials and driven by both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s calculation that reducing tensions would benefit both amid economic and political challenges.
On December 15, 2023, top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi meets Saudi and Iranian deputy foreign ministers Waleed Elkhereiji and Ali Bagheri Kani in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua On the Saudi side, there had been growing concern about Iranian aggression, especially after a 2019 drone attack on a Saudi oilfield and processing facility – and an implicit understanding that the United States was unable to prevent it. Drawing down tensions with Iran would give Saudi Arabia the space to develop and diversify its economy. Saudi officials seemed convinced that bringing in China would give Iran the incentive to stick with the deal, rather than cheat and potentially lose Chinese investment. For Iran, the deal came when its economy was in shambles, the country rocked by scandals and protests. Diplomatically isolated and struggling to attract Chinese funds, Tehran had every reason to want to reduce tensions with Riyadh.
This history reveals an important observation: China has only been able to play a role in the Middle East when its local partners are willing to play along, and when the US tolerates its presence. In the case of Iran, which was initially unwilling to talk after being attacked mid-negotiations, Chinese pressure to negotiate went unheeded for weeks, along with admonishments to open the Strait of Hormuz and refrain from attacking its neighbours.
The US was more than willing to negotiate but also extremely unlikely to accept China as a mediator. To the extent it may have played a role behind the scenes in the recent ceasefire as some have claimed, that role is likely to have been similar to its role in the past: a combination of diplomatic pressure, mediation initiatives and economic incentives, which largely went unheeded.
But this does not mean Chinese diplomacy should be seen as ineffective. Rather, it is remarkably effective in advancing China’s regional interests and differentiating it from the US. Although China is unlikely to play a decisive, even active, mediating role in the current conflict, it doesn’t have to. As US President Donald Trump pursues a unilateral course of illegal military aggression, it only needs to sit back and watch the US damage its own reputation and credibility.