Allow me to explain something about military logistics which may shed some light on what is occurring here.⬇️
The US military doesn't ship food from CONUS to deployed forces if at all possible. It issues contracts to third party vendors to supply food in bulk for pickup or even delivery to deployed forces. In principle this is identical to how it's done in the military's own logistical backend in the United States - the Army isn't vertically integrated, it doesn't own its own farms (lol).* The military contracts with commercial vendors for delivery to such and such a base at such and such a time and quantity with payment from whatever fraction of the base population's BAS that hasn't yet disappeared into an O&M slush fund in a totally non-corrupt way. This is why when you're at a US Army facility in the Middle East you get weird Middle Eastern UHT milk boxes instead of familiar American ones. The more you know.
Anyways, right now the Navy is trying to sustain three carrier groups and one amphibious group in and around the Middle East. This comes out to around 30,000 sailors, which is an immense number of personnel to feed... in a region (particularly further south in the Arabian Sea) where bulk quantities of medically-acceptable rations cannot simply be magicked out of the air by waving a stack of US dollars around. Because, you see, those contractors we summoned with said stack of dollars then have to physically purchase said rations in bulk somewhere in the region and then deliver them to a US Navy replenishment ship docked somewhere else in the region and neither of those prospects is necessarily easy when you're in a sea region bordered by Iran (the actual enemy), Oman (functional but sympathizes with Iran), Yemen (no), Pakistan (functional but also sympathizes with Iran and is in easy range of Iranian weapons), Djibouti (tiny and vulnerable to missile attack from Yemen), and Somalia (lol no).
So realistically your options are India, Saudi Arabia and Kenya to source a grocery run out of. And India and Saudi Arabia are both still vulnerable to interdiction (India via that horde of un-accounted for Iranian midget subs in the inshore littoral and Saudi via Iranian missiles and the Bab al-Mandeb run), which means that logically Kenya is where it's safe to actually do this. Kenya is 3000km from the blockade station (a week's steaming one-way) and USN fleet replenishment ships aren't nearly as thick in the water as they used to be and moreover often need to remain close to the task force to resupply munitions and fuel for, y'know, the war rather than coming off-station to do a chow run because deployments got extended and pantries and freezers started looking really barren.
Connect the dots and it's quite obvious how US Navy chow lines in the Arabian Sea have gotten very grim lately - even without outright corruption on the American side of the transaction.
* The Navy actually owns a live oak forest to get timber to repair the USS Constitution with, but I digress. Although considering Hegseth's ongoing jihad against anything fun owned by the military I perhaps shouldn't be mentioning this and should instead incur the wrath of know-it-alls in the comments for strategic reasons.