Egypt: a beggar state
Summary: Egypt under President Sisi is a state in rapid decline unable to articulate a coherent foreign policy, reliant on handouts and increasingly incapable of having influence in an insecure and dangerous neighbourhood.
Further to our 27 April newsletter we are publishing Hossam el-Hamalawy’s assessment of Egypt’s declining role on the MENA stage, an edited version of his Substack 3Arabawy Egypt Security Sector Report. Hossam is a journalist and scholar-activist currently based in Germany. He was involved in the Egyptian labour movement and was one of the organisers of the 2011 revolution. He is the author of Counterrevolution in Egypt: Sisi’s New Republic published by Verso. Follow his writings on Substack and X
There is a widening gap between the Sisi regime’s rhetoric of leadership and the reality of its foreign policy. Cairo still speaks in the language of centrality, balance, and regional weight. But its actual behaviour reveals a country trapped in the ghost of an old role it can no longer materially sustain. Geography still makes Egypt relevant. Economic weakness prevents it from being decisive.
That gap is now visible in every major regional file. In the war on Iran Cairo may place phone calls and issue statements but it was Pakistan that moved into the diplomatic spotlight. In Gaza Egypt could not stop a genocidal war unfolding on its own border, could not impose costs on Israel and could not monopolise mediation. Qatar took the front seat, with Türkiye increasingly entering the picture as well. Cairo remained present because geography still matters. It was not present because Egyptian power had been restored.
The same pattern has shown up elsewhere. Egypt failed to stop the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. It failed to shape outcomes in Sudan. It failed to secure the Red Sea despite massive naval procurement. It failed to convert arms purchases into leverage. Billions spent on submarines, frigates and fighter jets did not tilt the balance in any regional conflict that directly affected Egyptian interests. That is because the army under Sisi is not structured for regional power projection. It is structured for domestic repression and regime preservation.
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Graffiti in Mansoura by Egyptian street artist Nemo (@egynemo)This is why militarised diplomacy has been such a disaster. A regime can flood the civil service and foreign ministry with security men, preach about national prestige and hold endless summits. None of that creates leverage if the state behind it is broke, dependent, and politically hollow. In fact, the more dependent the regime became on foreign cash, the narrower its room for manoeuvre grew.
The Gulf bailouts cannot continue forever. In reality, the old model is already wearing out. Saudi Arabia and the UAE still view the stability of the most populous Arab country as a strategic necessity. They do not want an implosion on their doorstep. But the era of blank checks is over. Gulf support has become far more transactional, more impatient and more tied to asset sales, commercial return and hard leverage. The patrons are not enthusiastic. They are managing risk because they still cannot find an alternative, for now, to this cash-hungry general sitting atop a fragile state.
If there is still genuine institutional enthusiasm for Sisi, it is more visible in Europe than in the US. The reason is simple: migration. European governments increasingly view Egypt less as a partner than as a wall against irregular migration. That bargain has helped shape Sisi’s foreign policy toward Europe. Cairo buys European arms. Cairo cracks down on boats heading north. Cairo polices borders and sells stability. In return, European capitals provide loans, investment packages, political indulgence and one rescue after another.
That logic also helps explain the kind of diplomats the regime values. The veteran diplomat and current Foreign Affairs Minister Badr Abdelatty’s career trajectory, centered on Europe-facing diplomacy and external financing channels, fits this political economy perfectly. Sis’s newly appointed presidential adviser, Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy, fits the same mold. His résumé is revealing: economics training, experience in economic affairs and international cooperation, ambassadorial postings in Germany and Austria, representation in Vienna’s multilateral institutions and senior UN roles. They are the credentials suited for a regime trying to secure more loans from its patrons.
That is where Egypt stands today. Its foreign policy is increasingly about monetising geography, selling itself as a gatekeeper, containing migration, courting donors and convincing outside powers that the alternative to continued support would be chaos. This may keep the regime alive. It will not restore Cairo’s status.
The sad truth is that a country with zero economic power will end up with crippled political weight. Debt dependency narrows diplomacy. Bailout politics destroys autonomy. Militarisation hollows out state capacity while pretending to embody strength. And a regime that survives by borrowing, taxing the poor, auctioning assets and selling stability to foreign patrons is not leading the region. It is managing decline inside it.
Egypt is not absent from the region’s decisive moments because others suddenly became stronger by accident. It is absent because it is a beggar state that spent over a decade squandering the material foundations of power at home then pretending that military pageantry and nostalgic rhetoric could conceal the consequences abroad.They cannot.
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