Xi-Trump summit: why the Iran war could become fresh point of friction
Both China and the US stand to gain from reopening the Strait of Hormuz, but they view the crisis through different lenses
While both China and the US stand to benefit from the reopening of the strait and a permanent end to the war, Beijing and Washington have viewed the crisis through different lenses and sharply diverged over how to achieve their goals.
Washington, buoyed by America’s relative energy independence, may be betting China will be more vulnerable to Gulf energy disruptions. Beijing, meanwhile, may calculate that prolonged instability will weigh more heavily on the US and its allies.
Jesse Marks, founder of Rihla Research and Advisory, a Washington-based consultancy focused on the Middle East, said Trump might raise Iran with Xi and seek cooperation on elements of a future deal, including a possible mechanism for transferring or monitoring Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, but he would probably not receive an enthusiastic response.
“Xi will likely try to compartmentalise Iran and keep the summit focused on trade, technology and bilateral stabilisation,” Marks said.
“>From Beijing’s perspective, Trump’s most useful ‘gift’ is not a concession to China; it is de-escalation itself.”
Trump expected to receive a response by Friday night about a US proposal on a framework to end the war, but so far no outcome has been announced.
According to Axios, the one-page, 14-point memorandum would declare an end to hostilities and launch 30 days of talks on a detailed agreement. The naval blockade and shipping restrictions targeting the Strait of Hormuz would be eased during the 30-day period.
Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University, said reopening the Strait of Hormuz would directly help stabilise global oil prices and allow the world economy to “gradually emerge from the shadow of the Iran war”, a development crucial for China’s recovery from the conflict’s economic shocks.
China imported 5.4 million barrels of crude oil per day through the Strait of Hormuz in the first quarter of last year, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
“At the end of the day, only when the economy is stable can China-US relations be truly stable. I am concerned that if the conflict in Iran drags on, with US prices rising and domestic polarisation worsening, Trump, who needs to secure the midterm elections, might turn China into a target for intensified pressure,” Zhu said.
Soon after the US and Israel launched air strikes against Iran in late February, Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage through which about a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes. In response, the US imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports, resulting in an unprecedented disruption of the global energy supply chain.
According to shipping data provider Alphaliner, only two container ships have been detected transiting through the Strait of Hormuz since May 1.
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In the weeks before the summit, Washington has ramped up pressure on Beijing, sanctioning a Chinese refinery for buying Iranian crude from the Revolutionary Guards. It also sanctioned Chinese companies for allegedly aiding Iran’s weapons sector and providing images of military facilities operated by the US and its allies during the war.
A day later, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that China’s export economy would suffer more than the US from a shutdown, urging Beijing to use its influence on Iran.
Marks said Beijing had little interest in being locked into mediation between two actors it viewed as unpredictable.
Instead, Beijing could help provide diplomatic cover, support implementation at the United Nations, encourage Iranian compliance where Chinese interests were affected, and help create economic incentives for Iran to remain inside a negotiated framework, Marks added.
“But China will avoid owning the deal. Its preference will be to appear constructive without assuming responsibility for enforcement,” he said.
William Yang, a senior northeast Asia analyst at the International Crisis Group, noted that despite the US and China’s common ground on reopening the strait, their approaches diverged: the US continued its threat to bomb Iran, while Beijing juggled pushing Tehran to enter negotiations and decrying further escalation.
Deep mistrust remains a barrier for Beijing and Washington to agree on how to ease the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, according to Yang.
“China certainly has the incentive to use its relationship with Iran to push Tehran to enter another round of negotiation, but it also is sceptical about the US agreeing to conduct another round of negotiation without threatening to resume bombardment,” he said. He added the US was wary of what Bessent described as China’s role in “funding Iran’s war effort”.
Beijing has said the cause of the strait’s closure was “illegal military operations” by the US and Israel against Iran.
Ma Xiaolin, an international relations specialist at Zhejiang International Studies University, said Iran’s nuclear programme, rather than the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, was a primary factor in determining the end of the war.
“The US loves to play the blame game, but this is not an issue that could be resolved by pressure from outside, and at the end of the day, this is a game between the US and Iran.”
China has sought to insulate itself from the fallout of the war since it began. It has called for a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, even as its energy diversification and leadership in renewable energy have helped cushion the impact of the closure.
Dylan Loh, assistant professor of public policy and global affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the Strait of Hormuz was less a point of leverage and more “a test of endurance” between the two powers.
Loh said that no amount of green energy could insulate China from the inflationary shock of a closed waterway despite its massive strategic reserves and shift towards renewables. Meanwhile, the strategic strength of the US, which remained energy independent, was linked to the stability of its Asian allies, he added.
“Any attempt by one side to weaponise the transit of the other would backfire, as the resulting negative economic effects would erase any marginal strategic gain,” he said.