[Salon] China’s AI ascent leaves Trump a stark choice: escalate or relax chip controls?



China’s AI ascent leaves Trump a stark choice: escalate or relax chip controls?

Beijing and Washington are locked in an era-defining contest – and China’s rapid technological progress raises questions about limits of containment

SCMP
Illustration: Henry Wong
Ann Caoin ShanghaiandJi Siqiin Beijing
Published: 6:00am, 12 May 2026Updated: 9:34am, 12 May 2026

US President Donald Trump’s landmark visit to China comes as the US-Iran war disrupts global energy supplies, fuels economic uncertainty and adds fresh strain to Washington-Beijing ties. In this story, part of a series examining how rivalry, interdependence and geopolitical crises are reshaping the relationship between the two powers, we examine how artificial intelligence (AI), chip controls and competing technology ecosystems are redefining US-China rivalry.

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang was the undisputed centre of attention at a 1,000-guest banquet in the heart of Beijing in July last year, attended by Chinese government officials, diplomats, businesspeople and industrial leaders.

Barely managing a few bites of his dinner, he breezed through a marathon of media interviews and accepted a stream of selfie requests from guests. The rock star treatment even spilled into the hotel lobby when he left, where Huang patiently signed autographs for star-struck fans.

The excitement was clear and perhaps understandable: Huang had arrived in Beijing with news that Nvidia’s H20 chip had just been cleared for export to the Chinese market. A watered-down version of Nvidia’s cutting-edge AI chips, the H20 still outperformed many Chinese rivals and, with tech giants in the world’s second-largest economy locked into Nvidia’s ecosystem, it appeared Washington had all but secured the company’s long-held dominance.
But after Huang flew home, the momentum soon shifted. Beijing started an investigation into the H20 citing security concerns, leading to a de facto import ban, and kept the door shut months later when Washington permitted exports of the more advanced H200, one of the company’s most powerful accelerators for advanced AI models – though still not its strongest.
Then in April, DeepSeek, the company behind China’s most famous home-grown AI model, announced a pivot to using Huawei Technologies’ chips. It was the exact scenario Huang had warned of just six days earlier, calling it “a horrible outcome” for the US.

The developments underscore the rapid rise of China’s AI industry and its decreasing reliance on Nvidia’s technology, even as chips remain at the heart of the US-China rivalry.

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang waves to the crowd as he leaves during the China International Supply Chain Expo in Beijing on July 17, 2025. Photo: AFP
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang waves to the crowd as he leaves during the China International Supply Chain Expo in Beijing on July 17, 2025. Photo: AFP

Huang will not be accompanying US President Donald Trump on his trip to Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping this week, but the same question will loom over the talks: will the head of Nvidia finally manage to get what he wants?

A deal on semiconductors?

It is no secret that China and the United States are locked in a high-stakes stand-off over the future of AI – and Washington’s export controls on advanced chips are a crucial source of that friction. But analysts cautioned that the looming summit between President Xi Jinping and Trump was unlikely to produce any sweeping breakthrough.
Chips – along with Taiwan, the Iran war and other contentious issues – “will be managed, not resolved” at the meeting, said Han Shen Lin, China managing director for The Asia Group.

That view was widely shared by analysts, with some arguing that export controls had become embedded in the broader strategic rivalry, making them increasingly difficult to roll back.

Ker Gibbs, former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, said technology controls, semiconductors and AI were structural issues that were “too hard to negotiate and too deeply embedded in each country’s strategic priorities”.

Kent Kedl, managing partner at Blue Ocean Advisors, and Stephen Olson, a visiting senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, also underscored the likelihood of only a limited outcome to negotiations, expecting something closer to a “managed stabilisation”.
Complicating efforts to achieve a serious breakthrough, Washington has in recent weeks sought to strengthen its negotiating hand by increasing pressure on China’s tech sector. The proposed Match Act, which advanced in Congress last month, could force allied nations to mirror US semiconductor export curbs, while the Federal Communications ⁠Commission pushed a proposal to block Chinese labs from testing electronic devices for use in the US.

Laila Khawaja, research director at Gavekal Technologies, said there was little political appetite in Washington to roll back its export controls. If implemented in full or in part, the Match Act could deter China’s progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and substantially disrupt current capabilities, she warned, adding that Beijing was likely to use the summit to remind Washington that escalation carried costs.

FULL EVENT: China Future Tech Webinar | The US-China chip war

Against this backdrop, some analysts believe Beijing’s goal may be less about rolling back existing restrictions than preventing further curbs. Wang Dan, China director at Eurasia Group, said the latter would be a great deliverable for Beijing. “What’s even more important is that the existing export controls aren’t escalated,” Wang said.

The H200 divide

One of the most closely watched issues during the summit will be whether the two sides can finally reach an understanding on Nvidia’s H200, which could serve as a measure of how far both sides are willing to go in managing technological competition.
In December, Trump announced the AI chip could be sold to “approved customers”, provided that a 25 per cent revenue surcharge flowed to the US Treasury. But US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick recently told the Senate that China had still not made any purchases, despite Nvidia’s Huang previously stating that customers had placed orders.

“China is about 40 per cent of the world’s technology industry. To concede that market for the US technology industry is a disservice to our country,” Huang also warned last month, after repeatedly urging the US government to approve sales of the chip to China last year.

Analysts said the drawn-out regulatory process surrounding the H200 illustrates how the chip has become a bargaining chip for broader concessions.

Nick Marro, principal economist for Asia at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), said Beijing might continue to resist purchases of the H200 even after the Xi-Trump summit. The current stand-off, he added, had given it “a golden opportunity ... to champion its own domestic supplies”, particularly as local firms gradually closed the gap with overseas rivals.
But according to some analysts, Beijing’s long-term push for semiconductor self-sufficiency was at odds with the immediate computing demands of its rapidly growing AI sector.
As the semiconductor, AI and robotics industries expand rapidly, there is a massive need to boost computing power
Wang Dan, Eurasia Group

Khawaja of Gavekal said Beijing was forced to balance these two priorities and would eventually allow H200 imports, given rising demand and limited advanced chip capacity at home, although “how it frames the decision will depend on the summit”.

“A positive outcome could see it presented as part of an open, cooperative stance; otherwise, approvals may be granted quietly to meet practical demand without signalling concession,” she added.

Wang of Eurasia Group agreed, saying “AI is just too important” to China’s latest five-year plan. “As the semiconductor, AI and robotics industries expand rapidly, there is a massive need to boost computing power,” she said.

Tech war: has China cracked the code?

A year ago, many questioned whether Chinese AI chips could become more than emergency stopgaps for restricted US tech. Now, Beijing is building a commercially viable alternative AI stack that is less dependent on American goodwill.

That transition became clearer last month when DeepSeek released V4, a 1.6-trillion-parameter model that it said outperformed OpenAI’s GPT-5.2 in several coding benchmarks. Crucially, the technical report confirmed the AI model had been formally optimised on Huawei’s Ascend 950, a next-generation neural processing unit (NPU) designed for large-scale AI model training.

For the first time, one of DeepSeek’s top-tier AI models was no longer solely dependent on Nvidia hardware and, in some areas, ran more efficiently on Chinese chips.

“Jensen’s concern has become a reality,” said Lian Jye Su, chief analyst at research firm Omdia, citing DeepSeek V4’s adaptation to both Huawei chips and Huawei’s flagship Compute Architecture for Neural Networks (CANN) – widely viewed as China’s closest equivalent to Nvidia’s dominant CUDA software ecosystem.

Within 24 hours of DeepSeek V4’s launch, Huawei was joined by seven domestic chip vendors – including Cambricon Technologies, Moore Threads, Hygon Information Technology and Biren Technology – which announced they had fully adapted to the model.
The developments reflect a broader transformation in China’s AI strategy. Instead of trying to rival the United States solely in cutting-edge chips, domestic firms are increasingly focusing on inference – that is, running and deploying AI models at scale.
“We are already seeing AI chipsets from Huawei, Cambricon, Moore Threads and MetaX gaining momentum in China. Alibaba Cloud’s PPU and Baidu’s Kunlunxin are also being deployed for AI training and inference workloads at hyperscale,” said Su of Omdia.

Morgan Stanley analysts underscored this trend in a recent report, which argued China’s AI graphics processing unit (GPU) market had shifted “from whether domestic chips can participate” to “which vendors will win meaningful share as inference demand scales”.

“China is narrowing the US lead in AI compute not simply at the chip level but also through system-level innovation, supply-chain localisation and increasingly attractive inference economics,” wrote the analysts led by Charlie Chan, a technology researcher leading the investment bank’s Greater China semiconductor coverage.

Zhang Yunquan, a professor specialising in high-performance computing at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said rising demand for computing power had made inference-friendly chips an area where China could compete internationally. But he cautioned that China remained behind in high-end training chips – with Huawei leading domestic efforts to close the gap.

“Over three to five years, with continued iteration on chipset yields and CANN maturity at cluster scale, domestic chips could handle most of the domestic training workloads,” said Su of Omdia.

But chips are only half the story, as Nvidia’s greatest strength has never been just computing power. The dominance of CUDA – its proprietary software ecosystem and programming model underpinning AI development – has made it extremely difficult for users to migrate to other systems.
This [the Match Act] is an area of bipartisan consensus... And that’s going to limit Trump’s ability to influence that piece of legislation going forward
Nick Marro, Economist Intelligence Unit
DeepSeek V4’s shift towards Huawei’s CANN, however, suggests China may be starting to loosen Nvidia’s stranglehold.

“As the AI chipset ecosystem in China continues to mature, we will see … more Chinese model providers build AI models optimised for Chinese AI chipsets from day zero,” Su said.

A new equilibrium?

The emergence of a viable domestic AI stack in China is also shifting attention to market share and commercial scale. Morgan Stanley analysts estimated that China’s AI accelerator market could reach US$67 billion by 2030, with the domestic self-sufficiency rate surging from 33 per cent in 2024 to 86 per cent.
Beyond Huawei, the investment bank also highlighted Cambricon, Iluvatar Corex and MetaX as the companies most likely to benefit from the chip localisation strategy.

According to the report, Huawei’s Ascend 950 and Cambricon’s Siyuan 690 can outperform Nvidia’s H20 by 50 to 150 per cent in different scenarios when measured by tokens per second – a crucial metric in China’s inference-driven market that reflects both hardware performance and software optimisation.

Most of the leading domestic chips also carry lower costs, with market prices for Huawei’s Ascend 950PR, MetaX’s C600 and Moore Threads’ MTT S5000 cheaper than both the H20 and H200, according to the report.

The authors also identified a fundamental shift in China’s AI chip procurement – from “policy-driven” to “profit-driven” – as major AI companies rush to monetise amid rising token consumption. That means firms able to deliver ready-to-use accelerators quickly could be best positioned to see surging revenue growth.

But as China’s domestic AI ecosystem advances, uncertainty is growing over the future trajectory of US export controls – and the wider technological rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

05:04
China creates analogue AI chip said to be 1,000 times faster than Nvidia GPU
Lutnick, the US commerce secretary, said in April that Trump had struck a “delicate balance” on technology sales, given his cordial personal relationship with Xi.

That balancing act is expected to feature at the coming summit, though the outcome of the talks could be complicated by a stark divide within Washington over the scope and scale of tech restrictions.

According to Marro at the EIU, the executive branch had shown some willingness to keep China dependent on US technology, as seen in the H200 policy, while a hardline Congress was pushing aggressive legislation such as the Match Act.

“This is an area of bipartisan consensus,” he said. “And that’s going to limit Trump’s ability to influence that piece of legislation going forward.”

And yet with both leaders wanting to declare victory at the summit, “marginal progress” was possible, he added. This was echoed by Olson of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, who said the talks could see limited gains, such as relaxing restrictions on tech and critical minerals and “some commitments by China on purchases of US products”.

On chips, Eurasia’s Wang argued that Trump was still unlikely to ease controls on the most advanced chips below the 7-nanometre threshold, though export volumes of less advanced chips were likely to rise – suggesting Washington would continue to manage, rather than sever, China’s access to US technology.

Additional reporting by Kandy Wong

Ann Cao
Ann Cao is a Shanghai-based technology reporter for the Post, covering technology start-ups and policies in the city and eastern China. She graduated from the University of Hong Kong with a master's degree in journalism.
Ji Siqi
Ji Siqi joined the Post in 2020 and covers China economy. She graduated from Columbia Journalism School and the University of Hong Kong.



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