Torunika Roy
The current war begun in February by the US and Israel against Iran is not confined to the Middle East. Its repercussions are being felt across the globe, and South Korea is no exception.
As the crisis in the Middle East intensifies, US allies in Asia find themselves in a dilemma over whether to fulfill their supposed alliance obligations to Washington or distance themselves from a conflict they are not responsible for.
South Korea has been a US ally for over 70 years, and it feels the brunt of the crisis in several ways. First, the Washington Post reported that the US is moving parts of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system from South Korea to the Middle East as a precautionary measure against Iran’s retaliatory attacks. Second, the downsizing of military exercises and the absence of the top US military official in Korea at a command bunker during the Freedom Shield joint military exercises raised eyebrows. Third, during the exercises, North Korea tested nuclear-capable multiple rocket launchers. The test came one day after North Korea fired around 10 ballistic missiles toward the East Sea. Fourth, US President Donald Trump urged allies, including South Korea, to send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open but later reversed his position.
Given shifting US priorities and North Korea’s increasing missile adventurism, South Korea is confronting a difficult security situation. As a result, the trust deficit with US security commitments is gradually growing, which is stirring heated domestic debates on strengthening indigenous capabilities, including the possibility of an independent nuclear capability.
Questioning US security commitments
Since the Trump 2.0 administration began, South Korea has faced doubts over US security commitments. Trump questioning the cost of overseas deployments and demanding allies pay more for the US military presence, along with him calling North Korea a “nuclear power” already raised concerns in Seoul.
Even during his first term, Trump threatened to withdraw or reduce US troops in South Korea. In 2024, he called South Korea a “money machine,” suggesting that Seoul should pay $10 billion a year for US troops.
The recent reports of the US redeploying parts of air defense systems including Patriot and THAAD from South Korea to the Middle East fueled fresh worries for Seoul. THAAD at high altitudes and Patriots at low to mid altitudes play different roles in Korea’s multi-layered missile defense system. Experts argue that the possible withdrawal of THAAD would leave a gap in missile defenses against North Korea, as it is the only defense system that provides high-altitude coverage at 40-150 km.
Although South Korean President Lee Jae Myung downplayed the security risk by saying that redeployment would not hinder the country’s deterrence strategy, the repositioning of defense systems without consulting South Korea certainly signals that the US is no longer prioritizing Northeast Asia – a region strained by both the Taiwan contingency and North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the 2026 US-ROK Freedom Shield joint exercises that aim to strengthen combined defense readiness against North Korea, have reportedly been reduced, with the number of field training manoeuvres cut from 51 in 2025 to 22. Adding to this, the absence of United States Armed Forces Korea Chief Gen. Xavier T. Brunson from the command bunker during the exercises raised further questions about the US commitment. Brunson was engaged with secure communications initially and joined the exercises after returning from Thailand.
If US military bandwidth is stretched, possibly due to the Middle East conflict, it would impact the security environment of US allies. This intersects with America’s strategic flexibility, as mentioned in the 2026 US National Defense Strategy, which allows the US to move its forces and regional assets from permanent bases to manage multiple crises whenever required.
Problems for Korea
To make matters worse, North Korea unusually fired 10 ballistic missiles, an action taken seemingly to maintain its relevance at a time of intensifying global instability and to reinforce Pyongyang’s operational capabilities in response to the US-ROK joint exercises.
Trump repeatedly urged South Korea to deploy warships to the Strait of Hormuz; then he reversed himself, saying “the US no longer needs naval assistance” from its allies. This only reinforced Seoul’s fear of American indecisiveness and transactional policies. Earlier, Trump had threatened that he would remember the countries that did not send warships. For Seoul, the issue is not merely deployment but also how US allies are treated in a time of shifting American priorities.
Trump’s “request” also posed a strategic dilemma for South Korea. Had Seoul agreed to send warships, it would have risked entanglement in a distant regional conflict. If it refused, then Seoul may have to bear repercussions over its recently finalized trade and nuclear-powered conventionally armed submarine deal with the US.
Domestic discussions
Experts and critics are questioning the foundations of the US-ROK alliance and underscoring its limits. Even though Seoul invests heavily to maintain US forces and assets in Korea, US security is not guaranteed, especially due to the US now pursuing strategic flexibility. There are more deliberations on whether the US would return the defense systems sent to the Middle East back to the ROK without preconditions, or will this be another occasion for transactional wrangling? Questions also arise on the scope of the redeployment – is it limited to air defense assets or could it draw more parts of the US military, including Marine Corps battalions?
Some critics argue that THAAD is largely symbolic and was primarily installed to monitor and contain China rather than North Korea. This is the reason why China sharply protested against the THAAD installation in in 2017. Against this backdrop, concerns appear to be relatively limited, given South Korea’s growing conventional capabilities and its primary reliance on the US for nuclear deterrence.
This has spurred more discussions on increasing Seoul’s own capabilities. The successful combat debut of South Korea’s medium-range surface-to-air missile (the Cheongung-II) against Iranian strikes in the UAE has drawn attention in the Middle East and Europe. The Cheongung-II recorded a “96% hit rate in actual combat,” according to People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon. This has prompted countries to consider purchasing Korea’s upper-tier missile defense systems. South Korea has also emerged as a major supplier of weapons into Europe since the Russia-Ukraine war began.
However, the conversations in South Korea have shifted from the availability of hardware to the question of trust. Given the volatile nature of the current government in the US, discussions center more on the scale and timeliness of the support Seoul can expect from the US – and if such assistance is conditional.
Moreover, public support for an indigenous South Korean nuclear deterrence has increased since 2025. According to the 2025 Asan Poll, “76.2 percent of Koreans supported acquiring an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.” This is likely to increase further, driven by eroding confidence in the US and North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities.
With China’s growing nuclear arsenal, Russia and North Korea having renewed ties, the expiration of the START treaty and its impact on arms control, and signs of the US “stretch” in the Middle East and Ukraine, South Korea’s need for independent nuclear capabilities seems to intensify.
The war in the Middle East has not only tested South Korea’s security calculus but also its energy needs, as it relies on the Strait of Hormuz. These added pressures, along with existing concerns about security commitments, accelerate Seoul’s reconsideration of its long-term dependence on the US versus its drive toward greater autonomy.