The missile attack that Iran launched against Qatar in mid-March sent plumes of smoke rising from the largest natural-gas production facility in the world.
Qatar pursued secret talks with Iran to shield gas complex from strikes, security officials say
Qatar’s back-channel effort offers a glimpse into the hidden ways Gulf states have sought to spare themselves damage from the region’s worst war in a generation.
By Greg Miller
There was an additional, hidden consequence. The strike also dashed secret efforts by Qatar to keep its gas complex, known as Ras Laffan, off Iran’s target list, according to Middle Eastern security officials and Western officials briefed on the intelligence.
Seeking to protect its economic crown jewel, these officials said, Qatar approached Tehran at the start of the war to present a mutually beneficial arrangement: Iran would refrain from hitting Ras Laffan, and Qatar would halt gas production unilaterally — a move that would send energy prices soaring and put economic pressure on the United States and Israel to shorten the war.
Qatar presented what amounted to a “secret deal,” said a senior regional security official, vowing to use leverage over gas supplies to help bring the war to a swift end while seeking Iran’s commitment on “one condition: you are not going to attack us.”
A second official with access to the same intelligence said that Qatar’s message to Iran was that “you will achieve your objectives without striking us.” The officials were among several who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss information gleaned from intercepted communications and other intelligence.
Qatar did not secure a commitment from Iran, officials said. The sequence that followed, however, indicated that the possibility of a tacit understanding remained on track, at least temporarily.
Qatar closed Ras Laffan on the third day of the war as Iran launched hundreds of missiles and armed drones at targets across the Gulf. At the time, Qatar attributed the move to “military attacks on ... operating facilities.” Satellite imagery later examined by The Washington Post showed no evident damage at Ras Laffan.
Statements by Qatari officials amplified anxieties in global energy markets, including a warning from the country’s energy minister that the war would “bring down the economies of the world.”
In response to questions from The Post, Qatar denied pursuing any secret arrangement with Iran and said its decision to halt production at Ras Laffan was driven solely by the threat of attacks and concern for workers and infrastructure at a facility that is the lifeblood of the country’s economy.
“Any suggestion that operational decisions relating to energy production were — or have ever been — made in coordination with Iran, for Iran’s benefit, or to influence the course of the war is categorically false,” Qatar’s international media office said in a written statement.
Qatar described the allegation as an effort “to sabotage ongoing efforts to mediate an end to the conflict, damage Qatar’s reputation and undermine the strategic partnership between Qatar and the United States.”
Qatar’s alleged back-channel effort, which has not been reported previously, provides a glimpse into what security officials described as the ways that Gulf states have sought to spare themselves amid the region’s worst war in a generation. Qatar, a tiny emirate that juts out into the Gulf, is more vulnerable than most but also has levers to pull on both sides of the conflict.
Qatar maintains close contacts with leaders in Iran as part of its role as a regional mediator. It allows leaders of the Iranian-backed militant group Hamas to maintain a presence in Doha, and shares access to the world’s largest field of natural gas deposits with Iran.
At the same time, Qatar has fostered deep ties to the United States. Its al-Udeid Air Base is the largest U.S. military compound in the region. Much of Qatar’s energy infrastructure is jointly owned and operated with ExxonMobil and other U.S. companies. After President Donald Trump was reelected, Doha presented a $400 million Boeing 747 as a “gift” that is now being refurbished as an upgrade to Air Force One.
Qatar’s alleged outreach to Iran also underscores the extent to which Gulf countries viewed their sway over energy supplies as leverage from the war’s outset — though it has been Iran, through its stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz, that has proven most adept at taking maximum advantage.
U.S. officials said the CIA and senior Trump administration officials were aware of the foreign intelligence on Qatar’s outreach to Iran, a move that might be perceived as undermining U.S.-Israeli objectives in their military campaign.
But there has been no indication of a rupture in Doha’s relationship with Washington. In a social media post last month, Trump said he had opted against resuming strikes on Iran after appeals from Gulf monarchs he listed by name, starting with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
Qatar has remained involved in peace talks with Iran — sending a delegation to Tehran as recently as this week — even after relinquishing its role as lead mediator to Pakistan.
The facility that security officials said Qatar sought to safeguard is a sprawling industrial complex nearly twice the size of Washington, D.C. The natural gas that it produces is used for everything from kitchen stoves to electricity-generating power plants in Asia and Europe.
QatarEnergy, the state-run company that operates Ras Laffan, has for years been regarded as the world’s most reliable source of liquefied natural gas, or LNG, having never previously missed a significant shipment, according to Qatari officials and energy analysts.
That uninterrupted run ended March 2, however, delivering one of the war’s early shocks to energy markets. The halt at Ras Laffan came before Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or other Gulf states had taken comparable steps, and before it was clear that the Strait of Hormuz would be closed for months to tanker traffic.
Qatar’s outreach to Tehran was captured through monitoring of the communications of Iranian leaders, security officials said. The officials declined to identify those involved in the talks, citing the need to protect intelligence capabilities.
Several officials said the intelligence made clear that Doha was prepared to protect Ras Laffan regardless of any consequences for U.S.-Israeli interests, even if doing so bolstered Iran’s survival strategy of sowing economic chaos.
Qatar’s main motivation seemed to be “to avoid damage that would probably take 10 years to recover,” a regional security official said, adding that it was part of a broader pattern of quiet maneuvering by Iran’s neighbors. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries also sought ways to curb Iran’s retaliatory campaign, officials said, but Qatar’s attempt was perceived as more explicit.
Doha’s alleged outreach, the official said, was an example “of how hedging works behind the scenes with Gulf states and their communications with Iran.”
A Qatari official disputed these characterizations, acknowledging that Doha had “urged Iran not to attack in general” but denying any effort to seek special protection for Ras Laffan or signal a willingness to manipulate energy markets.
Doing so would set “a very dangerous precedent,” the official said, creating an expectation that “whenever Iran is angry we should shut down operations. We would legitimize taking an economic hit whenever Iran has a geopolitical issue.”
Qatar is seen by some Western and regional officials as having an incentive to preserve the status quo in Iran because Doha has benefited disproportionately from the two countries’ shared access to the South Pars-North Dome gas field — in part because Iran’s ability to exploit its side of the site for years has been hobbled by Western sanctions.
The Qatari official denied that Doha sees advantage in the survival of Iran’s theocratic government. “For us, Iran has always been a threat, even before the Islamic revolution,” the official said. The war, he said, is a “nightmare scenario.”
After facing blockades by Gulf neighbors in recent years and Israeli strikes against Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar has developed an instinct for self-preservation that could account for any outreach to Iran, according to current and former U.S. and Western officials.
“Last year they were attacked by Israel; this year they are being attacked by Iran,” said Timmy Davis, who served as U.S. ambassador to Qatar from 2022 until last year. “There is a survival mode that Qatar has had to adopt for many years but especially since Gaza — and is in now.”
Davis said he doubted Qatar would approach Tehran with an explicit quid pro quo, but wouldn’t hesitate to highlight how Doha’s contingency plans “might be positive for Iran and would shorten the conflict.”
If Qatar succeeded in securing protection for Ras Laffan, it proved fleeting.
After a barrage of U.S.-Israeli strikes on the war’s first day — killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of his inner circle — Iran responded March 2 by launching a blizzard of missiles and drones at its Gulf neighbors.
As they shuttered Ras Laffan, Qatari officials sent conflicting signals about what happened at the facility.
“We don’t yet know the extent of the damage,” Saad al-Kaabi, the energy minister, said in an interview published March 6 in the Financial Times. “It is not clear yet how long it will take to repair,” al-Kaabi said, adding that the war would “bring down” global economies.
The country’s prime minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, said in a separate interview that Ras Laffan had come under a “major attack” but “through a miracle” sustained minimal damage. The fallout would go beyond LNG supplies, Thani said, disrupting production of synthetic fertilizer and other products, threatening “the food security of many countries.”
A Washington Post review of satellite imagery showed no obvious damage during this period at Ras Laffan or other sites that Qatar said had been targeted. The Post compared imagery captured on Feb. 27 and March 6 of Ras Laffan Industrial City.
Feb. 27
March 6
Ras Laffan
No visible damage
Ras Laffan Industrial City had no obvious damage on March 6. (Planet)
The Qatari official said that a concrete slab at Ras Laffan had been hit, but by a drone with such a small munition that neither the impact nor ensuing damage would be visible in satellite images.
In its statement to The Post, Qatar’s media office described as “baseless” any suggestion that Doha had “exaggerated or fabricated damage to the Ras Laffan LNG facility as a pretext for its closure.” The decision followed “threat assessments by Qatar’s military, which identified a credible risk to human life at energy facilities,” the statement said.
A little more than two weeks later, on March 18, Qatar’s fears were realized when Iran delivered a series of damaging blows after Iran’s own natural gas infrastructure was crippled by Israeli airstrikes — an attack that prompted Trump to rebuke Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
March 26
Damaged facility
500 FT
Ras Laffan sustained visible damage on March 18 at one of its liquid natural gas facilities. (Airbus)
Ensuing statements from Qatari officials were more detailed than those that accompanied the Ras Laffan shutdown. The attack destroyed critical infrastructure that accounted for nearly 20 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports, Al-Kaabi, the energy minister, said.
The damage would “take between three to five years to repair,” he said, and cause years-long disruptions in deliveries to China, South Korea and Belgium. The strikes “weren’t just an attack on the State of Qatar,” he said, but “on global energy security and stability.”
Jarrett Ley in Washington contributed to this report.