Trump Wants a New Contractor in the War on Hezbollah. Syria Doesn't Want the Job -
The president of the United States, in a moment of honesty and based on his experience as a real estate entrepreneur, presented his new plan for solving the war in Lebanon. "If Israel can't do the job without killing everyone else, he'll do the job, Syria will do the job," Donald Trump said on Tuesday, referring to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, during a meeting with the Qatari prime minister at the G7 meeting in France.
"He's [al-Sharaa] very capable. And he's been very good for me. He's protected everything that I've asked for… And if Israel can't do the job without killing everyone else, he'll do the job."
That's how it is in a business where time is money. When a construction project takes too long to complete and results in too many houses being needlessly demolished, there's no choice but to replace the contractor. Israel should have been alert to the fact that Trump doesn't see eye to eye with it about the Lebanon theatre, which has rapidly turned from an Israeli battleground into a bargaining chip for Iran in a game Trump has already forfeited.
Because, beyond Iran's aspirations for preserving Hezbollah's standing and strength, Lebanon is an inseparable part of the tangible guarantees Tehran is demanding as proof that the U.S. can meet its commitments. The cease-fire in Lebanon, like its demand for the early release of billions of dollars frozen in overseas banks and the lifting of the Hormuz blockade, is all one package of opening conditions Iran demanded before negotiations begin on Friday.
The idea of handing over the war with Hezbollah from Israel to the Syrian contractor is a little reminiscent of the far-fetched idea of using Kurdish militias to help overthrow the Iranian regime. Al-Sharaa, a Sunni leader who overthrew the Assad regime, despises Iran and has a long-standing feud with Hezbollah (which murdered many of his men during the Syrian civil war), should be passionately motivated to crush the organization. He has a growing army and a handful of militias that may just be chomping at the bit for new wars after al-Sharaa clamped down on them after taking power. What could be better than a bloody gang war inside Lebanon that will annihilate Hezbollah within "two or three weeks"?
But if we take seriously the latest twist in Trump's strategic thinking, note that the same Iran that dictated the terms of the cease-fire in Lebanon to him and Israel could just as easily demand that Syrian forces stay out of Lebanon.
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But it is unlikely that Iran will have to intervene at all, since Al-Sharaa has already made it clear that he is not interested in the project. With all the respect and friendship he has for Trump, and Syria's dependence on the U.S. administration, a military entanglement in Lebanon, while Syria itself is seething with violence and is not yet stabilized militarily and administratively, is not a realistic option.
Al-Sharaa recently made clear that "the time when Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon is over." The two countries held complex talks over many long weeks about how to improve bilateral relations, among other ways by an exchange of prisoners, coordinating border controls to prevent smuggling and especially delineating their joint border, a subject that is closely connected to negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.
At the same time, Syria demanded that Lebanon coordinate any diplomatic move with Israel regarding security arrangements and the Israeli presence on Lebanese territory. Damascus is concerned that if Lebanon agrees to a continued Israeli presence on its territory, even temporarily, it could serve as a precedent for Israel receiving American permission to remain on Syrian territory.
Above and beyond these issues, Lebanon still bears the trauma of Syria's years-long presence in Lebanon. Any hint of a Syrian return, even in a war against Hezbollah, makes the Lebanese anxious.
But even if in his heart of hearts al-Sharaa did want to make war on Hezbollah, his political and military policies are subject to Saudi consent, or at least close coordination with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is funding a large part of Syria's current expenses and, with Turkey, which was a critical ally in Al-Sharaa's bringing down the Assad regime, is today helping to rebuild the Syrian army. Both countries are investing heavily not only in stabilizing Syria and reviving its economy, but also see eye to eye on the urgent need to enable the government of Lebanon to reassert sovereignty over all its territory.
A week ago, a Hezbollah member of the Lebanese parliament, Al Fayyad, revealed that a Hezbollah delegation had met with Turkish officials, who assured them that Syria had no intention of sending an army into Lebanon.
Turkey's ability to make commitments on behalf of Syria should come as no surprise. What is interesting is that Hezbollah turned to Turkey out of recognition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's ability to influence Trump, thereby giving Ankara a foothold in a place in which it has rarely been active (except for humanitarian aid). That places Ankara in competition with Israel.
In the meantime, fearing massive pressure from Washington on the Lebanon issue and after consulting with Turkey, al-Sharaa decided to postpone his trip to Washington that had been planned for mid-June. No new date for the meeting with Trump has been set.
Syria will not intervene in Lebanon, but no one can ignore the sharpened arrow that Trump shot at Netanyahu when he cast serious doubt on Israel's ability to achieve the goals for which it occupied a swathe of Lebanese territory, killed thousands of people, and destroyed villages and towns. The immediate implication is that Israel's room for maneuver in Lebanon will be shrinking even further. Coordination between Washington and Tehran is closer than that between Trump and Netanyahu, who is still trying to convince him that the drops falling on him are summer rain.
In this murky atmosphere, another meeting between the Israeli and Lebanese delegations is planned for next Monday. With negotiations between Iran and the U.S. beginning in the background, it is still unclear what will be on the agenda.
Will Israel be required to present a timetable for the establishment of the "pilot zones" from which it is supposed to withdraw and allow the deployment of Lebanese forces? Is there a clear Iranian condition for a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon? If so, what is the U.S. position? Will the Lebanese government be able to continue implementing the Hezbollah disarmament plan, or will Iran veto that? In short, how will it be possible to advance negotiations with Lebanon on security coordination and later on formal relations when these are subject to the success or failure of negotiations between Iran and the U.S.?