Someone whose
life is saved by a new medicine is unlikely to care whether it was
invented at home or on the other side of the world. Yet America’s
policymakers have begun treating China’s biotechnology industry as the
next front in the tech war. A bill before Congress would amend the COINS
Act, which restricts American investment in sensitive technologies
abroad, to include licensing Chinese biotech. Some want the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), America’s drug regulator, to disregard clinical-trial data from China.
America’s
worries have been brought about by a remarkable shift in where
innovation happens. Chinese firms ran nearly a third of the world’s
clinical trials last year, up from just 6% a decade earlier. China is
now the world’s second-largest source of new drugs, behind only America
itself. In 2025 nearly half of licensing deals worth $50m or more were
struck with Chinese firms, up from none in 2020. In some categories,
such as antibody-drug conjugates, a promising class of cancer
treatments, Chinese firms accounted for almost all the licensing.
To view Chinese medical innovation as anything other than good news would be a mistake. In AI
and semiconductors, America worries about its intellectual property
leaking to China. In biotechnology the flow of information runs in the
opposite direction. And though anxiety about China’s dominance in the
physical supply chain for drugs is understandable—the country accounts
for over 70% of the active pharmaceutical ingredients for essential
drugs—manufacturing resilience and scientific collaboration are
different issues. America cannot lose from gaining new knowledge.
Setting
aside Chinese advances would be especially foolish, given that drug
development suffers from poor productivity. Bringing a new medicine to
market now costs roughly $2.8bn and can take well over a decade.
Policymakers often complain about the rising cost of medicines. Yet
proposals such as disregarding Chinese clinical-trial data would
lengthen development timelines, raise costs and make drug discovery less
productive. Does Congress really want pioneering treatments to be
available in Europe or Asia before they reach Americans?
Some
politicians fear that if drug firms spend their research budgets
licensing Chinese molecules, less capital will be available for American
biotechnology. But investment is not a lump to be divvied up. As the AI
boom shows, when opportunities grow, so capital flows in. What matters
is to make sure that American biotech is not hindered by bad policies.
Fortunately, American firms remain the world’s leaders in drug
discovery. They possess deep expertise in taking promising molecules
through late-stage clinical trials, regulatory review and commercial
launch. Chinese biotechnology executives privately acknowledge the FDA as the global regulatory leader.
America’s recent choices are blunting its edge. The FDA
has suffered high turnover among senior officials, including the
resignation of Marty Makary, its head. Decision-making has been
politicised: firms can receive “priority vouchers” that speed up reviews
in return for lowering their prices and investing in domestic
manufacturing. Funding for the National Institutes of Health, the
largest funder of biomedical research in the world, has been slashed.
Research programmes have been cancelled for ideological reasons. At the
same time, immigration policies are making America a less attractive
destination for the scientists on whom the industry depends, including
many talented researchers from China.
Take the red pill
America
should fix those problems rather than locking out Chinese innovation.
The best world for patients is one in which both China and America
develop cheap and effective drugs. Diseases cross borders. So should
their cures. ■