Trump Blows Wind in Erdogan's Sails as Turkey Advances Regional Ambitions - Middle East News
U.S. President Donald Trump is making things up. The interesting question is whether he knows he's making things up, lying and constructing an alternative reality, or if he believes in the reality that he is creating.
The latest example was his comment claiming that Turkey was about to join the war, "maybe on the Iran side, because he's not a big fan of Israel." Luckily, according to his version, he asked Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan "to stay out." And Erdoğan allegedly agreed.
Ankara, as expected, denied the story. "Turkey never intended at any stage to intervene in the war with Iran," a Turkish government official told Haaretz. He said the Turkish position was clear from the start. It opposed the war, even after Iran fired missiles at Turkish air space. NATO forces and Patriot batteries shot down all four Iranian volleys at Turkey. Ankara didn't even think of invoking NATO's joint defense clause. Still, there's reality and then there's Trump. In his reality, he asked the "very strong person" to stay out, and the Turkish leader gallantly agreed.
It's also worth noticing what Trump didn't say. Contrary to his venomous language when he declared that Netanyahu "will do whatever I want him to do," he spoke with demonstrative care about Erdogan, and not by chance. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who is also the Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq, called the Trump-Erdoğan relationship a "bromance." It rests on Trump's deep admiration of Erdoğan going back to his frist administration. Trump stressed he would only attend the NATO summit opening on July 7 "out of respect" for Erdogan. He also said, "I'm going to probably do something that's going to make him very happy" regarding Turkey's request to buy F-35 fighter jets and advanced jet engines. Trump perhaps invented the intervention story, but not the new status Turkey is seeking – to dictate policy rather than merely obey it.
For Erdogan, the upcoming NATO summit isn't just another conference. It's a historic opportunity. Turkey last hosted a NATO summit in 2004, a year after he rose to power. It was a completely different Turkey then. The country was just emerging from a dire economic crisis that helped propel him to power. The generals still threateningly hovered over the civilian politicians, especially over him. The local defense industry barely supplied a fifth of the army's needs, with turnover of little more than $1 billion. Turkey bought its first drones, ironically, from Israel.
That first drone deal became a decisive lesson for Turkey. Ankra ordered 10 drones. The deliveries were delayed. When they arrived, the Turks complained that Israel had deliberately sabotaged the drones' ability to photograph and collect intelligence. Only years later, after mutual recriminations, crises, and diplomatic pressure were the problems resolved. However, for Erdogan, the affair accomplished its goal. It bolstered the decision he had already made to make Turkey self-reliant.
Since then, Turkey has undergone a true revolution. Erdoğan canceled deals worth billions, funded local production infrastructure and built a military industry that has made Turkey a regional empire of drones and a global player in the defense industry. Turkey has NATO's second largest army. Its annual defense industry production is around $20 billion, and it plans to invest more than $27 billion this year in expanding production. At the same time, it seeks to present itself not only as a weapons client or effective user of arms but also as a supplier of arms and military experience.
Thus, the coming summit in Ankara is planned as a Caesar-like display. The Turkish Presidency's Directorate of Communications announced that 32 heads of state, nearly 100 ministers and thousands of "foreign guests" will be attending. It noted that around 3,000 international media professionals had applied for accreditation. (Turkey has denied accreditation to dozens of journalists, according to Reuters.) There will be around 1,600 workstations for members of the press, while Turkish broadcaster TRT will provide live coverage from 26 locations. There will be dozens of events, symposia and guided tours in Istanbul.
Turkey is investing around $250 million to host the summit, including airport preparation, fixing roads and sidewalks, and unprecedented security measures. Tens of thousands of police officers and security personnel are already deployed in key locations. Turkey has also banned all protests, press conferences and other public gatherings, as it has done for previous such events. It has already arrested more than 200 people in "anti-terror" raids, a catch-all clause that allows not only detaining individuals who might disturb the peace but also dissidents and political rivals.
Erdoğan wants his guests not only to participate in the summit but also to buy into his narrative. They are all due to receive three fancy books prepared especially for the summit – about Turkey's military power, its production capabilities, its fight against terror and its regional and international standing.
The message is clear. Turkey isn't just another "East-West bridge," that diplomatic cliché attached to it for years. It seeks to be considered a vital partner. Not a weigh station but a destination. Not one that supplies mediatory services for others' interests but the one formulating its own regional interests.
The war with Iran offers Turkey an almost perfect opportunity to show off this upgrade. The invitation of Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to the summit wasn't meant only to embellish the group photo. These countries are members of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative established at the 2004 summit. It is part of a clear Turkish attempt to fix Ankara in the role of being the central axis between NATO and the Gulf states, and between the United States the regional architecture that will perhaps arise the day after the war.
It's also the new doctrine that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has begun to articulate. The lesson for him is clear. Countries in the region cannot continue to base their security solely on external alliances or American sponsorship. Fidan told Al Jazeera in January that Turkey seeks to establish regional security arrangements that will create "fundamental and ultimate trust" among the states. "We want to create a regional solidarity platform," he added. It's a much more ambitious vision than the usual image of Turkey as a mediator. Fidan proposes a new security order, in which Turkey is the main writer of the script.
However, this doctrine remains far from becoming a desired product. First, the "regional solidarity" Fidan speaks of has a clear political limit from the get go. Israel is not a partner as long as it doesn't adopt the two-state formula. Secondly, the Gulf states are very cautious. None of them has severed relations with Iran, and some of them are already talking with Iran about security arrangements and economic cooperation following the war. Moreover, the close ties that Turkey built in recent years with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – including arms deals and huge investments in the Turkish economy – have not totally erased the historic suspicion that these regimes harbor regarding Turkey in general and Erdoğan specifically.
Then there are the internal disputes among the Gulf states. The rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi regarding Yemen and Sudan, their ongoing competition with Qatar, Kuwait's meticulous neutrality, and mainly the uncertainty around the future of negotiations between the United States and Iran all keep the Gulf states in a holding pattern. They're prepared to listen to Turkey, maybe even buy arms from it, but they're not ready to hand it the keys to regional security.
And Turkey itself has structural problems. As a NATO member, it enjoys mutual defense through Article 5. A regional defense pact, in which Turkey would serve as an anchor of defense for the Gulf States and not only an arms supplier, is liable to create a system of obligations that would put it in direct conflict with its NATO allies. Here lies the Turkish paradox. Ankara doesn't want to abandon the alliance. On the contrary, it seeks to leverage it economically and politically, but at the same time it aspires to be the center of security dependence for other countries in the region. It's hard to simultaneously possess a preferred member card in NATO and status as the one organizing the Middle East's new security arrangement.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan must also take great care regarding a list of national objectives. For example, he must see to it that Trump doesn't adopt regional arrangements that will hurt Turkey's interests in Syria; that Israel doesn't expand its war in Gaza; that Kurdish forces in Syria be integrated into the national army under conditions acceptable to Ankara; that the peace process with the Turkish Kurds and Kurdish underground move ahead without blowing up; and, mainly, to find a way to legally run for another term after this one expires in two years. And so, even as he hosts the world, Erdoğan remains a captive of domestic politics.
If Trump gave Erdoğan a gift, it wasn't the claim that Turkey was about to intervene in the war for Iran against Israel, nor his participation in the NATO Summit. Rather, it was the opportunity to remind the world that of the alliance between him and Erdogan; it was stressing that Turkey, not Israel, is again at the heart of the story; and perhaps it was also backing the Turkish vision. The question is whether summit attendees will buy this vision or suffice with the performance.