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James discusses the geopolitical environment that enables Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, as well as US-Israeli relations in the University of Haifa’s Eyes on Gaza mini-lecture series. The video’s first 15 seconds are in Hebrew after which the conversation switches to English. Transcript [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] Shalom lechulam, bruchot habot leinayim al-Aza, sidrat haarzaot shelanu shy chibur shel mecha’a ve-lemidah, kol sheni ve hameshii kan b’zoom. Now I’ll switch to English. As we note 1,000 days to October 7th, 2023, we return to one of the principles that guide us here in Eyes on Gaza. That understanding the genocide in Gaza, that keeping our eyes on it, requires considering Gaza and its current political and other situation, requires considering it in its wider context, far and near. On Monday, we focused on the history of Gaza, and today we want to think about the larger geopolitical context today, especially as Israel embodies itself and the region in mounting sites of aggression, wars within wars and front after front. To do so, we could think of no better than James M. Dorsey. Dorsey is a journalist, a senior fellow at Singapore’s Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the author of the widely syndicated, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey, available on Substack, and I encourage you all to follow him. He writes about geopolitics, about the Middle East and the broader Muslim world, about religious soft power rivalry, and also about the politics of sport. The title of his talk today is Israel overplays its hand. James will speak for eight minutes as is our want, and after which we will have time for questions in writing on chat. You can feel free to write your questions in Hebrew and in English, and I will convey them to James. Thank you, Dr. Dorsey. The floor is yours, and we’re very grateful that you joined us today. [James M. Dorsey] Ayelet, thank you for inviting me, and thank you for that generous introduction. You’ve given me an almost impossible task, which is to sum up the big picture in eight minutes. What I’m going to do is articulate a number of bullet points that go from the macro to the micro and that puts Syria in a larger context. In doing so, hopefully, I will raise questions or more questions that we’re going to have time to answer, and we can also then delve in the Q&A deeper into Syria if there is an interest. First of all, Prime Minister Netanyahu benefits from more than just a close US-Israeli relationship and a US president who has been exceptionally supportive. He benefits from the fact that he and Trump are part of a critical mass of civilisational leaders that think in civilisational rather than national terms and operate on the principle of might is right. Just as an off topic aside to this, if one looks at the post-Netanyahu era, or what it might look like, one place to look at is Hungary and Viktor Orban’s successor, Peter Magyar, at least when it comes to the aspects of the hollowing out of Israeli democracy. My notion of civilisational leaders frames what I believe is a post-October 7th change in Israeli defence strategy that no longer sees military superiority, collective punishment, and the sledgehammer as the only pillars of deterrence. October 7th has added the notion of the eradication and or the military emasculation of Israel’s enemies as we have seen in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza. Part of Israel’s strategy has always been to support for ethnic and religious minorities who feel that their rights have been ignored, if not abused. It is a strategy that by and large has backfired. It is Israel’s strategy in Syria with support for the Druze and the Kurds. It was the case going back to the Iraqi Kurds in the 1960s and 1970s, the Maronites in Lebanon in the early 1980s, and if Israel would have had its way with the Iranian Kurds and potentially the Baloch, we would have seen that again today in the Iran war. Finally, to sum up Israeli strategy that has backfired primarily because it overplayed its hand at great cost to its moral standing globally and in important segments of the Jewish community, its relationship with the United States and Europe, and its potential in the Gulf. Having said all of that, all is not lost. The opportunity for improved relations with the government of Ahmad al-Shara and an equitable resolution of the Palestinian quest remains. However, it will probably take more than a Peter Magyar for Israel to avail itself of those opportunities. Let me leave it at this and I hope I’ve provided enough food for thought and multiple questions. Thank you. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] Thank you very much. Yes, I’m sure there are many questions as we... [James M. Dorsey] I’m not sure if that was eight minutes or not, but... [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] No, that was less than eight minutes and in that you are an outstanding participant. Let me begin the questions and ask about Syria. One of the things that we have found in our programme is that it’s very difficult to find people to talk about Syria because no one seems to know what is going on. Can you explain what, to your understanding, is Israel doing in Syria? Where? What? [James M. Dorsey] Why? Well, I think there are things that Israel is doing on the ground and there are things that Israel says, but nothing really is happening on the ground. So what Israel is doing on the ground is it’s created what it has done in Lebanon, a buffer zone, which goes beyond the occupied Golan Heights, which were occupied in 1967 and formally annexed by Israel. And it’s done those areas that are predominantly Druze populated. The Druze community is, like many communities, a divided community. There are those who are seeking secession. There are those who believe that Israel is an ally and a supporter that is crucial to a Druze struggle. And there are those that see themselves as part of Syria and may have grievances with regard to the status of the Druze in Syria, but don’t necessarily want to break away from the state. So, and that together with perceptions of Ahmed al-Shara, the Syrian president, a former jihadist who has been embraced by much of the world and has clearly made clear that he wants to deal with Israel on equitable terms, that he’s not opposed to an ultimate peace settlement with Israel. Obviously, there are major stumbling blocks, including the Golan Heights. And that is something that Israel has by definition rejected. If you go back to the days immediately after the toppling of Bashar al-Assad, what Israel did is essentially emasculate the Syrian military on the notion that one Israel or this Israeli government does not believe that human beings can change. So, in other words, once a jihadist, always a jihadist, and therefore has sought to significantly weaken Ahmed al-Shara rather than to try and strengthen him. At the same time, and I’ll be short on this so we can have more questions. At the same time, Israel has expressed verbal support for the Syrian Kurds, who, again, are not necessarily looking for secession, but they are looking for autonomy and have been much tougher in their negotiations with the central government in Syria, because they have wanted to keep that Syrian Kurdish identity and also see it manifested in the way Kurdish guerrillas are integrated into the Syrian military. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] So, continuing on this, Amalia asks, can you tell us what al-Shara’s regime’s position is regarding Lebanon and Israel? Is it possible to decipher at this point, do they, do you think the regime has a position? [James M. Dorsey] First of all, I think one has to keep in mind that Hezbollah was vital to Bashar al-Assad during the decade-long civil war. On the other hand, you know, you’ve had these expressions by Donald Trump saying, let’s hand the Lebanon file over to the Syrians, let them deal with it. That’s not what Syria wants, and I don’t think you’re going to see Syria militarily intervening in Lebanon. Bashar al-Assad has basically kept his doors open in the sense that he has been willing to talk to everybody. He’s talked to the Russians, and he’s cut deals with the Russians, even though it was the Russians together with Iran that backed the Assad regime and ultimately gave Bashar al-Assad the plane to escape from Syria. And that’s, and it’s Russia where Bashar al-Assad lives today. In the last 24 hours, interestingly, Bashar al-Assad, sorry, Ahmad al-Shara has said that he’s willing to talk to Hezbollah. So, I think that Syria, there’s a historic relationship between Lebanon and Syria, which is complex. And I think that Syria is willing to play a role, but that does not mean that it’s willing to play a military role or to be wanted to be seen to be aligned with Israel in whatever Israel does in Lebanon. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] There’s a sort of a wider question here that says, what does Israel’s endgame seem to be, in your opinion, regarding territorial conquests in the Middle East and who are its allies? [James M. Dorsey] Well, I think it’s been very clear that with regard to the West Bank, you know, I think, you know, we’re seeing a progression towards annexation, or in any case, further integration into Israel, efforts at a degree of depopulation. I think it’s been very clear in Gaza. The government is, you know, just look at what has been said in recent days, in terms of reviving the whole concept of depopulation of Gaza, Israel’s progressive occupation of territory in Gaza, statements that there’s not going to be any departure from Gaza, let alone the West Bank, but also Lebanon and Syria. So, I think in that sense, it’s very clear. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] Do you think that, just following up on that question, do you think that the territorial conquests in Lebanon, in Syria, right, are moving on to a full-fledged occupation, colonial occupation, like in the West Bank, like in Gaza, or do you see a different form or endgame in terms of that territorial? [James M. Dorsey] Well, again, I think it depends on who you ask within the Israeli government, but if you ask Bezalel Smotrich, he’s clearly said, let’s put settlements down. Other ministers like Israel Katz have been more ambiguous about that and said, we’re going to be there as long as we need to stay. I think that the Israeli presence, despite what the Lebanese-Israeli government says, is perhaps the most tenuous, and that is in many ways going to depend on how the Iran-U.S. negotiations fall out. I think it’s important in this concept, or in this regard, to note one thing which doesn’t enter the discussion very much, which is Israel is viewed as a potential spoiler in Lebanon, and it is a potential spoiler without question, but I can see a situation that may have already occurred at least once in which Hezbollah is a spoiler. So if you go back to June 14, the day that Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel and Israel responded by bombing Beirut, Hezbollah knew what it was doing. At a moment that the Memorandum of Understanding with Iran was being signed, the question why Hezbollah provoked that incident and what followed after that has never been answered. Did it do that in coordination with Iran, or was it determined to put Iran on the spot to ensure that Iranian support remains firm? But assuming that the Iranians are serious about Lebanon, and I think one should assume that, then that makes the Israeli presence in Lebanon the most tenuous. More tenuous than Gaza, which at this point is unobstructed, or in Syria for that matter. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] We’re going back to Syria with the next question. If you can inform us a little bit about the state of rehabilitation in Syria. Are Syrian refugees returning in large numbers? What is the economy like there? Is it recovering? [James M. Dorsey] Look, there are Syrians that are returning. Some of them are returning temporarily to see where things stand, potentially to see what happened with their homes, with their towns. I think a large number, a large segment of the Syrian community, diaspora community, or exiled community, would like to return. The problem is, of course, that you need the economic development. You need the reconstruction, the rehabilitation. That’s really only at the beginning. Now, in a sense, Syria potentially benefits from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in the sense that Gulf states, others, are looking for alternative routes. There are all kinds of problems with alternative routes, but having said that, one of the things that we saw very recently is the plan to revive the Ottoman-era Hejaz Railway, which potentially would go beyond Medina down to Oman, and all the way up to Turkey through Jordan and Syria, would in some ways defeat the Israeli-U.S. plan of the corridor with India, which included Israel. The railway does not include Israel. But that positions Syria as a hub. You’re also seeing that in terms of fibre optic cables. In that sense, Syria may be a net beneficiary from the Iran war and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] That’s very interesting and actually leads us right back to our next question, which is about the U.S. administration. The question is, do you see the U.S. supporting continued Israeli presence in Syria and Lebanon? You can also open it wider to think about what you started your talk with, which is the U.S. involvement in the region and its ostensibly unconditional support over Israel. Is that shaking? Is that still as strong as it used to be? [James M. Dorsey] Well, I think what you’re going to see as a result of the Iran war is not a fundamental shift in relationships as much as a restructuring of relationships. The U.S. is a bit in a bind because it, on the one hand, has signed an agreement or fostered an agreement and co-signed an agreement between the Lebanese and Israeli governments, which for all practical purposes does not put a timeline on the Israeli presence in Lebanon. In fact, could make it indefinite. And yet, at the same time, it has signed an agreement with Iran that in its first paragraph stipulates the ensuring of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Lebanese state. So, I think ultimately the United States will have little choice but to pressure Israel with regard to Lebanon. I think all parties with regard to the U.S.-Israeli relationship, meaning Israel and the U.S., both recognise and anticipate a fundamental change in the relationship. Now, that does not mean by definition the U.S. is going to become less supportive of Israel. Sure, Israel has lost in public opinion, but you have significant gaps between what an overwhelming opinion is within the U.S. Congress and what that is in the U.S. public, and we’ll see how that falls out after the midterm elections. You’re also going to see a shift in relationships between the Gulf and the United States. That is not to say that you’re going to see a withdrawal by definition of U.S. forces in the Middle East. You may get some geographical shifts, which are being debated within the U.S. military at the moment, but fundamentally the U.S. will remain the anchor of Gulf security. What you are going to see is that the status of U.S. bases in the region, in the Arab region, is going to be more conditional, is going to have to be more consultative, and at the same time what you’re going to see is Gulf states, without endangering the relationship with the United States, diversifying their relationships, whether that’s with China, whether that’s with Russia, whether that’s with Turkey, Pakistan, India, or European nations. [Host Ayelet Ben-Yishai] We’ve run out of time. We’re even a little bit over time. I told you this 20 minutes is short, but this has been fascinating, and as we like to say here in Eyes on Gaza, we learn so that we can resist. We think that knowledge leads to political action, and you have contributed much to that knowledge, and I thank you very, very much for joining us today. Next week we will be here again on Eyes on Gaza, Monday and Thursday. We’ll publish our flyer for next week on Saturday. Stay with us. We’ll see you again, and thank you very much again, Dr. Dorsey. [James M. Dorsey] Thank you for having me. It was a pleasure. Thank you for joining The Turbulent World. I’m honoured that you spend time with my work, given that we live in a world of information overload in which time and attention come at a premium. The Turbulent World offers in-depth, independent, evidence-based, and original geopolitical analysis of the Middle East, the Muslim world, and the rise of civilisational leaders that goes beyond what mainstream media offer. Paid subscribers make The Turbulent World possible. They have full access to all postings, podcasts, and videos as well as the newsletter’s multi-year archive. They can post comments and get one-on-one briefings on demand. Please consider becoming a paid subscriber. This is as good a time as any other to subscribe. Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Associate Editor of WhoWhatWhy, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey. You're currently a free subscriber to The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey. For the full experience, upgrade your subscription. © 2026 James M. Dorsey |