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The new double issue of Middle East Policy features incisive analyses of the Iran War: Gawdat Bahgat contends that there will likely be no return to the status quo antebellum in the Strait of Hormuz; Buğra Sari’s structural analysis of the Iran-Israel conflict shows that Washington must shift the incentives on both sides; and Robert Springborg and Guilain Denoeux contend that the US-Iran standoff is not amenable to Trump’s transactional style. In addition, Ariel Limanya Limbu and Ronen A. Cohen examine the extension of Iran's forward defense into sub-Saharan Africa, and Umud Shokri shows how Gulf-Asia energy ties are being reshaped by maritime insecurity, corridor disruption, and the shift toward multipolar energy governance. The table of contents of this special double issue is below.
You can still read our special issue on the Iran War, published in March. If you find this newsletter useful, please forward it to others you believe will benefit; register to receive our weekly updates here. And please follow us on the social media platforms X, LinkedIn, and Instagram.
In his open-access article on the co-constitution of revolutionary identity and pragmatic security doctrine in Iran, Alabbas F. Alsudani contends that scholars have erred in arguing for one or the other as the central driving force of regime behavior. During the formative period of the early Islamic Republic, as factions across the ideological spectrum competed for power, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arose as a protector of clerical principles. However, its mission soon expanded to homeland defense in the face of the Iraqi invasion of 1980. “Through this process, ideology and strategic learning became institutionalized within the state’s military structures,” Alsudani writes, “producing a hybrid strategic culture composed of mutually reinforcing revolutionary identity and pragmatic adaptation.”
Over the decades that followed, Iran faced periodic domestic unrest that threatened its legitimacy while increasingly relying on a doctrine of forward defense to deter external adversaries. These efforts continued to merge revolutionary identity and homeland security. For instance, Hezbollah became a key ally due to its shared ideological vision, Alsudani argues, “but its operational logic aligned with Iran’s forward defense.”
This week’s renewed fighting shows that the two aspects are inseparable. Hezbollah’s rejection of the new Lebanon ceasefire—which conditions Israeli withdrawal on the militant group’s disarmament—demonstrates that Iran’s forward-defense strategy remains intertwined with the revolutionary commitment to preserving the Axis of Resistance.
This fusion also enabled the mobilization of paramilitaries in Iraq and the Houthi movement in Yemen. Analyses must take all of this together to understand Iranian behavior, Alsudani contends:
The regional order that has emerged since 1979 is therefore neither purely sectarian nor purely strategic. It is marked by hybrid actors operating within partially fragmented states, by sovereignty that is negotiated rather than absolute, and by deterrence exercised through networks rather than conventional armies. This reconfiguration is the enduring impact of the Iranian revolution.
Alsudani allows that when “Iran’s regional network is systematically degraded”—as it has been since 2024, leading to the direct wars against the regime over the last two years—“ideology and strategy contract toward the homeland as networked deterrence shifts to direct confrontation.” However, he concludes: “While the co-constitution has been placed under extreme pressure by the US-Israeli war of 2026, it has persisted in modified form and is likely to continue as a fundamental logic.”
The renewed conflict in the Gulf thus illustrates both dimensions of Alsudani’s argument. Iran’s threats against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz reflect the pragmatic requirements of homeland defense and regime survival under direct attack. At the same time, Tehran continues to view Hezbollah as integral to its revolutionary identity. Rather than replacing ideology with pragmatism, Iran’s actions show how the two remain co-constituted.
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