Sudan: three years of the EU looking the other way
Summary: the EU chose to put economic considerations ahead of firm action to prevent a genocide in the Sudanese city of El-Fasher. Now another Sudanese city faces the same fate. Action not words is required from the EU.
We thank Nour Halabi for today’s newsletter. Nour is a Lebanese political scientist and journalist whose work focuses on Middle East politics with a particular interest in identity politics and sectarianism.
The genocide in El-Fasher was not a surprise. It was an inevitability. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) besieged El-Fasher the capital of North Darfur State for 18 months, cutting off food, water and aid, then took the city in October 2025 with mass killings, rape, torture and enforced disappearances. At least 6,000 people killed in the first 72 hours alone. And now, history is threatening to repeat itself in the city of El-Obeid the capital of the adjacent state of North Kordofan.
For months, UN officials and humanitarian organisations warned that the city of El-Fasher was heading towards catastrophe. Yet, international actors limited themselves to expressions of “deep concern.” Only once the siege had turned into mass displacement, starvation and atrocities did the condemnations become unequivocal.
Drone strikes are escalating in El-Obeid. Civilian infrastructure has already been hit. The city, which is a strategic gateway to western Sudan and home to hundreds of thousands of civilians, is showing the same warning signs that preceded the El-Fasher genocide. On July 3rd, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for urgent action at “the highest level”, warning that what had happened in El-Fasher was foreseeable and preventable in El-Obeid.
The question now is whether Europe, a major global actor, has finally begun to listen. On July 9th, 2026, the European Parliament adopted an urgent resolution on Sudan that, for the first time, named the United Arab Emirates directly as among the external actors supplying weapons, financing and mercenary support to the RSF. It also called for urgent humanitarian action to protect civilians, stronger accountability for war crimes, sanctions on those fuelling the conflict and tougher EU measures against the RSF and its backers.
It is a radical shift from November 2025, when the same Parliament, under sustained Emirati lobbying in Strasbourg, stripped every reference to the UAE from its Sudan resolution and settled for the euphemism “external enablers.” But a resolution is words on paper until it is enforced.
Thus, this piece asks two timely questions: why did it take the EU years and evidence that was sitting in plain sight for most of them to act? What will change now that the UAE has finally been named?
![]()
The UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces’ systematic campaign of violence against civilians, including rape, gang-rape and sexual slavery amount to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity say human rights organisations.
The UAE Question
It would be misleading to say the EU ignored Sudan. It has funded humanitarian operations, issued statements condemning atrocities and adopted rounds of sanctions against Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF-linked individuals and entities.
However, there is a structural mismatch in how Brussels has approached this war: it treats Sudan mainly as a humanitarian crisis, rather than as a conflict being actively armed and financed from outside the country.
The EU presents itself as a defender of human rights and a firm echoer of democracy and diplomacy. Its first response when it comes to wars and major crises around the world is almost always to condemn them and provide humanitarian aid. That doesn’t mean aid isn’t necessary; it undoubtedly is. However, when humanitarian aid is not accompanied by meaningful political action or accountability for those sustaining the conflict, it risks becoming little more than a way to prove that the EU has done its part with the aid portfolio. The humanitarian response remains essential, but on its own, it risks reflecting a kind of saviour complex rather than a genuine commitment to ending the violence.
The EU fails to go deeper than the humanitarian response despite the evidence.
The UAE’s blatant involvement in the war is clear and obvious. Credible reports from multiple organisations have clearly shown that the UAE has provided substantial support to the RSF, despite repeatedly denying these allegations.
The Brussels-based International Federation for Rights and Development’s (IFRD) documentation reveals a wide system of support: weapons and military materiel traced through the UAE, cargo routes to Chad and Libya operating partly under humanitarian cover, mercenary recruitment through UAE-linked structures and financial/procurement networks connected to conflict gold.
Humanitarian aid cannot stop the flow of weapons, money, logistics and fighters sustaining the RSF’s military capacity. Brussels is only cleaning up after the violence.
Diplomacy has become a cover-up that several Member States use in order not to put a strain on bilateral relations with the UAE. But this isn’t the only reason. The EU’s past reluctance to name the UAE can also be understood in the context of its broader economic relationship with Abu Dhabi, including the ongoing pursuit of a Free Trade Agreement. We have seen a similar dynamic with Israel and the EU’s trade relationship. The EU is not the human rights defender it claims to be in the Middle East and North Africa region.
Ironically, the UAE arguably has more to gain from an FTA than does the EU. The UAE has consistently sought closer economic ties with the EU as part of its strategy to strengthen its position as a global trade and investment hub. Meanwhile, the EU already benefits from a highly diversified network of trade agreements, which gives it greater economic alternatives and therefore significant leverage.
In addition, Abu Dhabi places great importance on its global reputation and strives to prevent anything harming its image internationally. Publicly naming the UAE as a fueller of the war raises the reputational cost of continued support for the RSF. In other words, this increases pressure on the UAE to reconsider its support for the RSF in order to protect one of its most valuable assets: its international reputation.
Despite the fact that the EU had both the leverage and the reasons to act earlier, it did not. Sustained civil society pressure finally pushed the issue onto the political agenda. Thus, while the urgent resolution is deeply welcomed, the EU waited far too long to act.
What Happens Next?
The European Parliament’s resolution is an important political signal but its real significance will depend on what follows. Words will not protect Sudanese civilians. The EU must now turn this political commitment into concrete action. Sudan now represents a test of whether the values and principles the EU prides itself on are applied even when they challenge strategic partnerships and interests.
For El-Obeid this moment is especially imperative. The city is displaying warning signs of becoming the next El-Fasher. The failure then of the international community was its failure to act while the warning signs were already flashing red. Right now, a window of opportunity still presents itself: a chance to intervene before another atrocity unfolds.
Therefore, the resolution creates an opportunity for the EU to move from reaction to prevention and to prove that it is still an impactful global actor on the ground when it comes to foreign policy. But this will require more than its usual statements of concern; it will require accountability measures and, more importantly, the political will to confront those fuelling the conflict - chief among them the UAE - regardless of economic or diplomatic interests.
Will the EU bite the bullet and save the Sudanese trapped in El-Obeid from a horrible, foreseen fate?
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.