On 17 June 2026, the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding. That memorandum has since been violated and the ceasefire broken. The two sides are now clashing about the MoU’s clauses pertaining to the Strait of Hormuz, specifically how much authority Iran was meant to exert on the strait. U.S. policymakers and naval strategists remain queasy about the idea of Iran exercising control over a maritime chokepoint of such major importance to the global economy.
Yet the possibility of a new approach to Middle East security—however fleeting—that follows decades of failure suggests setting aside traditional concerns about freedom of navigation may be appropriate now, under such complex circumstances. Doing so could help end the Iran conflict and support the more vital U.S. interests of stability, peace, and prosperity.
Wisdom From Clausewitz
First and foremost, the U.S. military is not to blame for the current military and diplomatic imbroglio. American service members have fought bravely and successfully at the tactical level; they have accomplished all that has been asked of them under arduous conditions.
The difficulty of the situation can be expressed in the words of 19th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz: “The value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also [the war’s] duration.” The U.S. military has the forces to seize complete (if temporary) control of the Strait of Hormuz, but the costs might amount to dozens of ships damaged or sunk and thousands of American service members killed. Maintaining a large permanent force in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman to maintain freedom of navigation in the strait could cost hundreds of billions of dollars, or more.
Common sense dictates such costs would be unacceptable, especially because little of the trade through the strait goes to U.S. ports.
The initial rationales for the war—halting Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, destroying its ballistic missiles, and cutting off its support for regional proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthis—were quickly overshadowed by a desire to reopen the strait once the conflict began.
Yet most Americans are not overly perturbed by Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The U.S. intelligence community declared those aspirations dormant, and limited regional nuclear proliferation has proven to be relatively self-contained and manageable. Nor are Americans inclined to reopen long-closed wounds, such as the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, as a reason for continuing the war.
Thus, it is no surprise that the war has proven to be the most unpopular in American history. The American public agrees with Clausewitz’s emphasis on the “value of the object” and they are not buying in. The Persian Gulf—and the larger Middle East—are and will remain quite ancillary to U.S. vital interests.
The Myth of Freedom of Navigation
The primary concern for military strategists is not the Levant but navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and I suspect this issue will make or break the present U.S.-Iran negotiations. Iran is emphatic that it will regulate the strait going forward, while the U.S. government firmly disagrees. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in late June, “We need to get back to what the straits looked like before this conflict.”
Yet pragmatism is more likely to prevail, not least for the obvious reason that Americans’ standard of living could be substantially injured by the economic harm that would result from prolonged closure of the strait. Even President Trump acknowledges the long-term economic risk, saying last month he didn’t want to be compared to former President Herbert Hoover, whose term was weighed down by the Great Depression.
It is time for Washington to accept some deeper realities. First, there are the stark circumstances of geography. The Strait of Hormuz is incredibly narrow—a mere 21 miles at its narrowest point. Iran possesses more than 1,000 miles of coastline, stretching in both directions from the strait, meaning Tehran’s forces can launch attacks from beyond the confines of the strait. The forbidding Zagros Mountains, with dozens of peaks reaching more than 10,000 feet high, make Iran a natural fortress.
Second, new technologies favor littoral domain defenders. The drone revolution is apparent in the Iran conflict, though Iran has generally not resorted to major deployment of cruise missiles or mines. These capabilities have been attritted to some extent, but they also form a defense in depth that would be exceedingly difficult for the United States to overcome for a prolonged period due to their asymmetric nature.
A third reality is the skittishness of shipping and maritime insurance companies that have shown great reluctance to place their ships, cargoes, and crews in harm’s way. If U.S. vital interests were at stake to move this cargo, perhaps we would see a replay of the drama from the convoy war in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, in which merchant vessels braved similar dangers. Plainly, such stakes are not present, especially because the United States is not directly reliant on trade through the strait and low-cost alternatives, such as diplomacy and paying minor fees, are readily available.
Accepting these realities, along with Clausewitz’s dictum concerning the “value of the object,” means an accommodation with Tehran is required. Perhaps, as Robert Malley and Stephen Wertheim write, it is conceivable that the “loudest champion of a brutal war” could transform (once again) into “a bringer of peace.” They cite the example of Richard Nixon going to China. Washington has opted for bitter rivalry and sporadic military conflict with Iran for nearly half a century. It is past time to try a peaceful alternative.
Moreover, there is reason to believe Tehran will exercise rationality and moderation in its regulation of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has been in continuous negotiations with Oman regarding how the strait would be managed, implying it is serious about multinational regulation. Moreover, it is worth reflecting on the divergent models of regulation that exist for transit through straits, from Malacca to Suez to Panama to the Dardanelles. In all these cases, a balance between pragmatism and local state interests has tended to prevail without any frequent resort to force.
There will be myriad objections to negotiating with Tehran and allowing it to regulate or control traffic through the strait. What will be the impact on oceanic commerce and the world’s naval order? How will contending great powers, especially China and Russia, take advantage of this opportunity? Will a deal with Iran now portend Chinese control over the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait in the future? Or expanded Russian control in the Arctic?
These are timely questions, but objective analysis must overcome hand wringing and threat inflation. No other maritime chokepoints will be impacted by a deal with Iran. As a trade juggernaut, Beijing has not shown interest in erecting tolls for the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Thus far, China has exercised a moderating influence on Tehran. The South China Sea will remain open to maritime commerce despite an ever-increasing Chinese naval presence. Russia does not seek expansion in the Arctic but greater trade and international shipping along its Northern Sea Route.
The Iran war has confirmed what many long feared—that Iran could threaten or control the strait. This war let Schrodinger’s cat out of the box, and now that it is out, U.S. maritime strategy must stop grasping at straws and come to grips with the emergent multipolar order. As Vitaly Kozyrev and I wrote in The New Cold War at Sea, this could look like a “maritime strategic conception built on the twin concepts of ‘offshore balancing’ and ‘spheres of influence’ [that] can [allow the U.S. to] safely and confidently step back from overreach in both the Asian and Eurasian littoral regions.”
A more pragmatic approach will recognize Iran’s “control” of the key waterway has myriad gradations, many of which the U.S. and its allies could live with. On 19 July, a London-based think tank suggested widening the proposed multilateral controlling mechanism for managing the Strait of Hormuz beyond Oman and Iran to encompass the other GCC states, including Saudi Arabia. Notably, that idea was evidently well-received in Tehran, demonstrating the promise of such an alternative, regionally centered approach.
With respect to future U.S. naval strategy, Dr. Jennifer Kavanagh points to naval theorist Julian Corbett as showing a better path forward. He maintains that navies can have a major impact by seizing temporary control of key sea lanes to protect vital commerce or move necessary military assets (emphasis mine). Dr. Kavanagh explains: “With this more modest purview, the United States could still manage the maritime domain and intervene directly with force when required to defend core interests.”
“Freedom of navigation” has a ring to it, and this principle has accrued a near-religious reverence in Washington and allied capitals in recent decades. But realists know well that high-sounding rhetoric in support of good intentions can frequently lead the nation astray.
Now is the time to experiment with new diplomatic and military alternatives—this time favoring military restraint, stability, and peace, along with a much narrower definition of the national interest. Paradoxically, a humbler and more insular United States may actually hold its head higher among nations.