A group of monarchists in Tehran abducted a pro-government vocalist, Hamidreza Rajabzadeh, and subjected him to an act of medieval brutality: they skinned his scalp while he was still alive, cut him open from throat to torso, and tore out his lungs and heart while they were still beating. They filmed it, sent the footage to his family, and then released it publicly.
If the United States and its European allies had even a shred of decency, this would trigger an immediate demand for accountability, as the people who lead the perpetrators operate openly from Western territory. Instead, some of these same governments have designated, or are moving to designate, Iran's formal armed forces as a terrorist organization, while showing almost no interest in whether a monarchist network tied to Reza Pahlavi — a guest of honor in Western capitals — is running a campaign of political violence against civilians.
That gap exposes something worse than a double standard.
The perpetrators operated within a network of Pahlavi activists that recruited and financed operatives to identify and kill people associated with the Iranian government. The legal question is straightforward: if the evidence shows this network is organized, foreign-based, and connected — through direction, financing, sponsorship, or operational control — to the organization associated with Reza Pahlavi, it meets the statutory criteria for designation under U.S. law.
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1189) requires three findings to designate a Foreign Terrorist Organization: it must be a foreign organization; it must engage in terrorism or retain the capability and intent to do so; and its activity must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the United States itself.
The facts fit that framework with unusual precision.
1- Organization: If the group behind this act has leadership, continuity, recruitment, financing, and a command structure, it's a foreign organization — not a handful of unaffiliated individuals. If it further operates under the direction or sponsorship of Pahlavi's organization, organizational responsibility becomes the central question.
2- Terrorism: Abducting, torturing, and killing a civilian — then distributing the footage — is political violence designed to terrorize a wider population. The victim is one person; the intended audience is everyone in the targeted political camp. That's the definition of intimidation by design. If the network has recruited operatives to identify further targets, the case strengthens further: this is organized capability and intent, not an isolated crime. It also isn't isolated in practice — monarchist networks showed a similar pattern of violence and coercion during the unrest of January 2026. §219 doesn't require a long list of victims before recognizing capability and intent.
3- National security: A foreign organization running political assassinations in Iran operates in a region of direct U.S. strategic interest, with implications for regional stability, American personnel, diplomatic interests, and the broader security environment. The statute doesn't require American victims. The MEK — another exiled Iranian opposition group — was designated on the same grounds for years, before Hillary Clinton delisted it for political convenience.
If these facts hold up against Reza Pahlavi's organization, the statutory test is met.
So why would Washington hesitate?
Not for any reason §219 recognizes. The statute doesn't care whether perpetrators call themselves monarchists, oppose the Iranian government, or enjoy sympathy in Western capitals. It asks only what an organization is or does.
If an organization tied to Reza Pahlavi organized, financed, directed, or materially supported this campaign of abduction, torture, and assassination, Washington should designate it under §219 and hold those responsible to account.