[Salon] Allies who can't afford to give up on America

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

https://harici.com.tr/politico-asyali-muttefikler-abd-semsiyesinden-uzaklasma-arayisinda/

Allies who can't afford to give up on America

Harici.com.tr 20.08.2026 14:16Author

Asian allies, who cannot afford to give up on America, are extremely cautious, hesitating to anger Trump.

Huong Le-Thu, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific program of the International Crisis Group
Time, July 22, 2026

These are not easy days for America's allies. From Europe to the Middle East, from there to the Asia-Pacific, the US security partners are extremely cautious, afraid to anger President Donald Trump, who accuses Washington's closest allies of parasity, imposes heavy tariffs on them, and even questions the sovereignty of some allies with extraordinary allegations.

Risks anywhere are not as high as in Asia-Pacific. The region may seem more stable compared to Europe or the Middle East, but in reality it is not calm at all: Rising China is demanding more influence in a region where American supremacy and the position of its allies were once largely unquestioned.

As if to emphasize this point in particular, China conducted a long-range ballistic missile test from a nuclear submarine on July 6, the day before the start of the NATO summit in Ankara, and the missile crashed into the South Pacific Nuclear-Armainsed Zone. The launch of this missile, which has the capacity to reach the US mainland, has drawn attention to the increasing capacity of China to threaten American cities if it is a huge military build-up of China and Washington to the aid of its regional allies in a conflict with Beijing. The missile test may be a show of a new capability from China, but it is also a reminder of a long-standing threat.

Washington and some US allies in Asia-Pacific criticized this "irresponsible" attempt. Despite this, the incident further reinforced the long-standing concerns of the allies about how effective and reliable US security guarantees are to deter the increasingly powerful China. So what should America's allies and partners do? Responses vary from region to region, but all point to a stronger American role.

Unrest in Asia-Pacific

There is no counterpart of NATO in Asia. Security regulations in the region are mainly based on the "center and arms" system that Washington established by signing alliance agreements with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Thailand after World War II. The US also signed a mutual defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954, but terminated this agreement in 1980 after relations with China normalized in 1979. However, these American allies, that is, the "arms", did not necessarily have defense obligations against each other. All of these countries, albeit to different extents, rely on the security commitments of the United States to discourage China from using its military power to impose its own will on them and the wider region.

Almost all Asian capitals today are less sure than in the past about whether Washington will fulfill these commitments if tested. Although Trump does not often make angry statements against Asian allies as he does against NATO partners, this does not make the Asian capitals very comfortable. Some interpret this as an indication that Washington doesn't even care enough to be angry about them.

These concerns are also growing with other subtle changes. Many people are concerned that the Trump administration may move away from the region as it prioritizes US homeland security and Western Hemisphere. The Pentagon's decision to remove the "Indian" _expression_ in the name of the Indo-Pacific Command is also seen as a sign of a change in direction to move away from the region.

The Iranian war deepened this fear even more. The US shifting missile defense preventers from South Korea to the Middle East caused discomfort in Seoul. Allies and partners worry that promisesd shipments to them may not arrive on time as the war quickly depletes U.S. stocks and Washington prioritizes its own military needs.

Some increased their efforts to produce their own weapons and began to contribute to America's war stocks. Australia fired the first guided rockets produced in its own country in a test site in April. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are building their own missile production lines.

Taiwan proposes record defense budget for 2027

This strategy, which increases armament, is not new to keep the US as close as possible. A number of reports by the International Crisis Group on military modernization in the region reveal that some of Washington's Asian allies and partners have been following a similar path for several years. However, today they have much stronger incentives to continue this strategy.

The most dramatic structural change in the defense sector is seen in Japan. Tokyo has been keeping its defense spending below 1 percent of GDP since 1967. This ceiling has now disappeared and Japan is on its way to reach 2 percent before the 2027 target set by the previous government in 2022.

Japan also purchased American missiles that could reach mainland China. These are the first weapons of this kind that the country has had since 1945. Tokyo plans to spend up to $100 billion in five years to increase ammunition stocks, maintenance activities and strengthen military bases across the archipelago.

This rearment effort began before Trump's second term, but Washington's pressure gave the process additional momentum. American targeting data will still be needed to use Tokyo's new long-range domestic ammunition developed by the country effectively with Tomahawk missiles purchased from the USA.

Japan is also intensifying its diplomacy with other regional actors as it deems necessary at a time when the American withdrawal is taking place and the tensions with China are increasing due to Taiwan. Tokyo has hosted the leaders of Canada, France, India, Italy, the United Kingdom and South Korea in recent months.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited various countries, especially Vietnam and Australia, to support and “develop” Shinzo Abe's “free and open Indo-Pacific” idea, which aims to balance China and highlights pragmatic economic security, strategic supply chains, energy resilience and proactive policies.

Japan defends military buildup for stand economic prosperity in new White Paper to oppose Chinese 'threat'

South Korea has promised to raise defense spending from 2.3 percent of GDP to 3.6 percent, and has been described as an “exemplary ally” by winning the praise of Washington.

Seoul's contribution is largely shaped by its factories. South Korea has become one of the world's largest arms exporters by filling the European arms stocks consumed by the Ukraine war with its tanks and howitcers. These sales finance Seoul's own defense modernization while also creating a global source of influence. Despite this, the South Korean government shows a relatively limited desire to assume a broader regional diplomatic role.

Seoul is also considering options on how to deal with North Korea's progress in nuclear capacity. Nuclear armament debates, which were almost taboo for a while, have now entered mainstream political discourse. However, in the medium term, the possibility of this option is still theoretical and leaves South Korea dependent on the US's nuclear umbrella.

South Korea: Joint exercises continue despite Trump's objections

Australia, on the other hand, continues to invest in getting closer to Washington instead of becoming more independent from the USA after making the largest defense investment in its history in nuclear-propelled submarines within the scope of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-USA) partnership established in 2021.

Canberra is aware that Washington has rearranged its commitments to its allies, but it does not see an alternative that can replace American military support. To be a more competent partner, Australia has committed to increase defense spending, which are still at the level of 2 percent of GDP, to 3 percent by the mid-2030s; expand its own guided weapons production lines; allow the US to build a war-ready weapons depot on the country's eastern coast, which is out of range of Chinese missiles, and invest in marine facilities that can serve allied forces's nuclear submarines.

Despite the decrease in trust in President Trump, Canberra remains attached to the alliance. He is aware of the limits of the capacity he develops compared to the capabilities of his competitors. Australia's 2026 National Defense Strategy clearly states that the American security umbrella is still "fundamental".

Malaysia is worried about US-backed Philippine military base

The ratio of the Philippines' defense budget to its economy is lower than almost all other American allies in Asia. There is also no industrial infrastructure that will allow the country to create a significant production capacity.

For this reason, Manila is based on its strategic location and geographical proximity to Taiwan and mainland China. Even Trump accepted this in his own style and described the Philippines as "the most valuable piece of real estate from a military point of view".

Manila increased the number of bases accessible to U.S. troops from five to nine, allowing the U.S. military to deploy Typhon missile launchers at a range of reaching the Chinese coast on Luzon Island at the northern tip of the country. The Philippines is also improving relations with Japan and Australia.

Why did Japan and the Philippines's sea border talks anger China?

There are no plans outside of America

Although every ally in Asia deals with American unpredictability in different ways in line with their own security conditions and internal political dynamics, their strategies have some in common.

They are all trying to establish stronger ties with other “branches” and beyond them with external partners such as Europe. The clearest indication of this is that Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand now regularly attend NATO summits, although they are not NATO members.

However, this active balancing policy will not replace the alliance with America. The goal is to complete it. Asian allies focus on showing that they are valuable partners to Washington in the hope of ensuring the continued presence of the US in the region.

This permanent dependence on a variable they cannot control is defined as the "no plan B" dilemma.

For America's Asian allies, the US continued presence in the region remains the most effective deterrent against the threat it sees as Chinese hegemony.

They see their investment in higher defense budgets, weapons factories, and Trump's efforts to carefully manage the mood as the price of keeping this deterrence tool accessible.

Strategic autonomy can be a popular idea. But for now, while most of America's Asian allies consider this a remote possibility, they see the threats they should deter clearly and closely.

Therefore, the question of whether to continue these investments may not be a big dilemma after all.