Hello from the Cottage
In this newsletter, we dive deep into how US diplomats have dealt with North Korea over the years. Our oral history archive starts just after World War II. The US was not ready to occupy Korea—it was a “last-minute” decision and the Americans were “totally unprepared,” according to Richard Ericson, who served in the Army in Korea from 1945-1947. It was an inauspicious start to a devilishly complex endeavor that has occupied countless hours of US diplomacy. We have selected a few insightful stories below.
But first, know that we at ADST are keeping busy, even in this slow month. Just yesterday, we hosted the Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to be ADST’s Distinguished Administration Speaker, something we have tried to do under every administration. Members had the opportunity to hear Landau’s stories of growing up in the Foreign Service and ask him questions directly. You can read the oral history of his father, Ambassador George Landau, here. His story is amazing - born in Vienna before the Anschluss, he fled to Colombia and started working for the Otis elevator company, who eventually transferred him to New York.
Before diving into our feature on North Korea, check out one of our latest archive additions:
- James Huskey: Huskey was a U.S. Foreign Service officer who encountered key historical inflection points throughout his career. Two highlights of his career experiences took place in Beijing and Nairobi. In Beijing, he reported on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, witnessed the military crackdown, and helped endangered dissidents escape China. In Nairobi, he and his family survived the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing. He was personally saved by the Assistant Defense Attaché, who pulled him away from the brunt of the blast. Check out this amazing life history.
You can read more new oral histories and our whole archive at ADST.org.
Preserving and sharing these histories requires sustained investment. For decades, ADST benefited from State Department officers detailed to our nonprofit. That support has now ended—but our mission has not.
👉 Your support is even more essential now. Please consider making a gift to sustain this work: adst.org/donate/.
Korea: Talking to the Hermit Kingdom
Across decades of shifting geopolitical dynamics, the United States has employed a combination of direct dialogue, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral bargaining to induce change in North Korea. These seven oral history accounts from diplomatic and operational leaders illuminate the strategic tools—ranging from crisis de-escalation and energy consortia to food monitoring and regional coalition building—used to break Pyongyang's isolation and alter its nuclear trajectory. You can find even more stories just like these here.
1. Richard A. Ericson (1968 USS Pueblo Hostage Crisis)
As political counselor in Seoul during the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, Richard A. Ericson helped lead negotiations at Panmunjom to free 82 surviving American crew members. He recalled how North Korean negotiators used rigid propaganda and psychological pressure throughout eleven months of deadlock. To secure the crew's release, Washington agreed to sign a temporary document acknowledging our intrusion into North Korean waters. Ericson noted that immediately after the crew crossed the "Bridge of No Return," the U.S. publicly repudiated the signed statement. This tense episode demonstrated the extreme measures the U.S. used to negotiate with Pyongyang while preventing full-scale war. (pp.137-144)
2. Linda Schmitt Gallini (1993–1994 Nuclear Standoff)
During the 1993–1994 nuclear crisis, Linda Schmitt Gallini remembered colleagues stopping her in State Department hallways pleading for a peaceful resolution. She described how chief negotiator Robert Gallucci realized that standard American talking points would fail with North Korean officials. Gallucci engaged Pyongyang through extraordinary patience, formal ceremony, and continuous consultation with regional nuclear experts. Gallini emphasized that building trust was the only way to persuade Pyongyang to freeze its plutonium production. Their persistence ultimately produced the 1994 Agreed Framework, halting North Korea's weapons program for nearly a decade. (pp.58-61)
3. Stephen Bosworth (1995–1997 KEDO Initiative)
Diplomat Stephen Bosworth felt like he was being asked to "jump off a cliff" when tasked with building the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995. Starting with no office or staff, Bosworth brought together American, South Korean, and Japanese teams to supply energy in exchange for North Korean nuclear concessions. He spent four months in intense, daily negotiations with North Korean envoys to establish protocols for constructing light-water power reactors. Through these arduous discussions, Bosworth gained crucial insights into how North Korean officials maneuvered during commercial and diplomatic bargaining. His work created a rare framework that placed Western personnel directly inside North Korea to influence its energy infrastructure. (pp.92-102)
4. Leonard Rogers (1997 Famine Relief Operations)
Heading USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response during North Korea's 1997 famine, Leonard Rogers joined a World Food Programme delegation to assess the crisis firsthand. He traveled across the isolated countryside, witnessing emaciated children, grim cities, and pervasive military checkpoints enforcing regime control. Amid fierce debate in Washington over whether the famine was genuine or staged by Pyongyang for political leverage, Rogers confirmed the catastrophe was real. He coordinated a massive international food aid package that saved hundreds of thousands of North Korean lives. Rogers reflected that sending food assistance demonstrated American goodwill while temporarily opening a closed, hostile society to international monitors. (pp.33-35)
5. Donald Gregg (High-Level Diplomatic Engagement)
Former Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg actively promoted high-level diplomatic dialogue as the primary tool to change North Korea's hostile trajectory. He debriefed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright following her historic 2000 visit to Pyongyang, highlighting brief opportunities for structural breakthroughs. Gregg recalled how diplomatic momentum stalled when President George W. Bush took office and expressed deep personal skepticism toward Kim Jong Il. Despite shifting political winds in Washington, Gregg continuously urged American leaders to maintain open channels with Pyongyang. He maintained that face-to-face engagement remained the only practical strategy to influence the regime's long-term behavior. (pp.29-37)
6. J. Richard Bock (On-Site Nuclear Monitoring)
Diplomat J. Richard Bock highlighted how the U.S. maintained a continuous physical presence inside North Korea to monitor its nuclear materials. Despite severely limited intelligence about the regime, American technical specialists worked on-site to clean up and secure spent fuel rods. Bock observed that operating under the KEDO consortium required daily coordination among U.S., South Korean, Japanese, and North Korean personnel. This rare operational arrangement placed Western engineers directly inside North Korea's closed nuclear facilities. Bock viewed this episode as a practical example of successfully modifying North Korean actions through direct, on-the-ground oversight. (pp.109-111)
7. Stephen C. Engelken (Deterrence vs. Direct Force)
Reflecting on early North Korean aggression, Foreign Service Officer Stephen C. Engelken recalled asking senior officials why the U.S. did not apply direct military force. A senior diplomat responded bluntly by asking whether Engelken wanted to bring American hostages home in coffins. That interaction highlighted the terrifying risks of launching military strikes against a tightly armed adversary. Engelken realized that deterrence and careful negotiation were the only realistic tools available to American policy makers. This sobering perspective shaped decades of U.S. efforts to change North Korean behavior through containment rather than military escalation. (pp.5-6)
You can read much more about the U.S. diplomacy with the Koreas at ADST.org and in our Korea country reader.
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