Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa is one of seven MAGA-friendly Latin American leaders elected during Donald Trump’s second term, testament to the president’s efforts to exercise greater US influence over the hemisphere.
So why has Noboa just concluded a weeklong trip to China, meeting with President Xi Jinping and securing Chinese support to help prepare for the El Niño climate event, including an AI-powered meteorological system?
The fact is that for Noboa and many of his regional counterparts, political closeness with the Trump administration doesn’t translate into choosing the US over China on the economic front.
China has overtaken the US as Latin America’s top trading partner, while goods trade with the region has grown from just over $14 billion in 2000 to more than $500 billion in 2024.
The rightward political turn under Trump’s so-called Donroe Doctrine has done little so far to unwind those strong economic ties with Beijing.
China continues to deepen its position in sectors it’s cultivated for decades — including critical minerals, power and infrastructure — while expanding into areas like financial services, consumer businesses and manufacturing.
It’s also moved up the value chain into electric vehicles, batteries and other clean technologies that the Trump administration largely shuns.
That’s not to say that Beijing is ignoring Trump’s push for hemispheric hegemony. It’s adapting to US scrutiny, shifting some of its push away from exposed government-to-government projects toward quieter private-sector channels.
China’s reach increasingly extends below the national level, with Chinese firms cultivating governors, mayors and local business groups even when governments tilt closer to Washington on issues like security.
The result is an economic relationship that even some of Trump’s staunchest regional allies are unwilling to unwind.
To much of Latin America, political alignment with Washington is one thing; walking away from what China has to offer is another. — Mie Dahl