Trita Parsi on why US air strikes strengthened Iran’s hand and failed to trigger a revolt
Iranian-born and Washington-based expert analyses Tehran’s leverage, China’s non-intervention strategy and shifting Persian Gulf alliances
Trita Parsi is co-founder and executive vice-president of the Quincy Institute, a Washington-based think tank. He is an expert on US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign policy and the geopolitics of the Middle East. He has written four books on US foreign policy in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Iran and Israel. Born in Iran, Parsi moved to Sweden with his family as a child and then to the United States as an adult.
Trump’s D-Day sanctions will either fail to squeeze Tehran very hard and not much happens, or they will be hard-hitting and then the question is whether Iran counter-escalates or surrenders. And the pattern so far is really clear: Iran fears capitulation much more than escalation.
And given that [US Treasury Secretary Scott] Bessent has not listed any clear demands, Tehran will interpret the purpose of D-Day as a measure to force its surrender.
So instead of this leading to an end to the conflict, it will just start another round of the escalatory cycle.
Unfortunately, I don’t see any end in sight right now. Despite the fact that [Iran and the US are] not necessarily far away from each other on some of the core issues on the strait, there still seem to be a couple of things in the talks that have dramatically reduced confidence and trust between the two sides, and that’s already in a scenario in which trust clearly has been in very limited supply.
So, I do fear that in the near future we will not see any positive developments and, unfortunately, there is a risk of a further return to more conflict despite the fact that the conflict so far has been so tremendously non-constructive. It has not given the United States any additional benefit. We may still end up in another round of fighting.
They are still possible. It’s just that it will become riskier because what happens is that the US is running out of ammunition which it can fire from a long distance. In the next round of fighting, we may end up seeing that the US uses more aeroplanes that will have to fly into Iranian airspace and fly at lower altitudes, which will increase the risk for the US. And as a result we may see more aeroplanes getting shot down, and things of that nature.
What is the prospect of the Strait of Hormuz reopening, and under what circumstances could it happen?
Unfortunately, the prospect at this point seems very limited, but for it to open up it’s important to recognise that, even short of a deal, we may end up in a scenario in which some traffic will increase because both the Iranians and the Americans have a need for there to be traffic.
Iran is also suffering from the fact that the strait is closed. So, this is not pain only on one side.
So, the strait may still be blocked in name but some kind of traffic may still go through – even though the parties will not admit it?
Yes, but it would be very limited. It would not be near normal levels.
Five months into the war, what has changed in Iran politically and socially, and what has changed in its influence in the region?
Iran’s influence in the region, arguably, has increased. At least its leverage has increased and, I think, a lot of countries are now of the view that this war has clearly not only failed but has also led to a scenario in which the Iranians have really survived an attack that almost no other country in the region would be able to survive.
They have been attacked by two nuclear-weapon states and they have essentially come out on top. This is not something that any other country in the region could easily have done. And as a result, their deterrence [against] the other states has increased, and their leverage has increased internally.
However, [while] the population is accepting that this is a war situation, they can only accept that for a period of time. They cannot accept a war situation for months, dragging into years.
Now, of course, this was an aggression against Iran. They see this as a war of defence, which gives the government an amount of time in which the internal situation will be somewhat stable, despite shortages and economic problems.
But if this goes on for more than a year and if there’s a perception – and I’m not saying that perception exists right now – that the Iranian government itself is an obstacle to a resolution, then you will start seeing a lot of anger and sentiments internally in the country welling up.
It’s also important to recognise that the government has a lot of problems with the larger population. Those problems are now secondary because there’s a war. But once the war is over, these problems are going to come back. They haven’t gone away. They have not been resolved.
And if this war goes on for too long and the population is suffering, that’s going to add to some of these challenges. But for now, it’s safe to say that the government’s internal position is stronger than it was six months ago.
And in some ways, the war may have saved the Islamic Republic just as much as Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980 did. He thought he was going to overthrow the Iranian government, but he ended up saving the Iranian government. The revolution was still new. They had not consolidated their power, but because of the external threat, they did consolidate that power. They did manage to get control of the internal situation.
Iran was facing some of the worst protests in decades. And then [this year] this attack comes and the country unites against an external threat. And in that way, the attack may have saved the Islamic Republic.
It has been strengthened because there’s a war and people are concerned about their security. When the US is bombing critical infrastructure, refineries and simultaneously saying that they’re trying to destroy the country and an entire civilisation, at this point it becomes clear this is not a war against a government. This is a war against the country as a whole, and that works in the favour of the government.
Absolutely. And it shows you the foolishness of this war and the massive miscalculation.
First of all, that is absolutely correct. This is a manifestation of the fact that a lot of countries in the region have lost faith in the American security umbrella, in its efficiency and reliability. They have seen that the security umbrella is ineffective against Iran and at the same time the American side is unwilling to really defend these countries from Israel.
So, they have to look for alternatives and this is just going to be one of many things that I suspect will happen, and these are initial reactions. They may not end up becoming the end state.
This pact also is explicitly said to be open. Additional countries can be added to it. It can go in that direction if the Iranians play their cards wrongly in this long-standing American effort to contain and isolate Iran, which has been the organising principle of American foreign policy in the region and was driven by American hegemonic desires.
The US’ desire for hegemony in the region, which necessitated isolating Iran, may now be replaced by a regional desire for the same goal, meaning that the impetus will come from regional states that will seek to isolate and contain through a pact that isolates and encircles Iran because of a perception of threat. This would be a very bad development for the Iranians. It ultimately would be a very bad result for the region because the real conclusion that should be drawn is that you can’t contain or isolate Iran.
That policy inevitably led to this war. And if you try that policy again, but without the US, the result will nevertheless likely be the same. It will just lead to another conflict.
And we see that pattern in other bloc formations as well. Bloc formations are supposed to create stability, but oftentimes they make a long-term conflict more likely. What this can end up becoming, however, is the beginning step. It’s an embryonic agreement. Its end destination and objective is undecided and it may move towards becoming a larger regional security arrangement, not just a bloc between three countries, which ideally would be an inclusive security order [taking] inspiration from Asean. That would be much better for the region as a whole, and it would be based on creating economic integration and interdependence between the states in the region.
That possibility is still there because this pact does not preclude it. But it can lead to a scenario in which this pact eventually becomes an obstacle to that vision.
What is the likelihood of Iran becoming a regional power? If Iran somehow gets the US to lift some of the sanctions, will it become a regional power?
Iran already is a regional power. The question is, is the region accepting Iran’s role as a regional power or is its role as a regional power contested?
Iran needs to have a role that is commensurate with its geopolitical weight. And that is where diplomacy really comes in, and where the Iranians have to play their cards very cleverly and effectively and not rely entirely on hard power.
Because if you rely too much on hard power, all you do is convince your neighbours that you are a threat and their reaction will be to try to balance you.
Let’s first review what China has done in this war so far. China has really stayed out of this conflict, it has not taken sides.
There is a revelation on the Iranian side that China was not hostile to Iran, of course, but China did not come to Iran’s aid in a very significant way.
Yes, there may have been some intelligence sharing et cetera, and that may not have been unimportant, but that’s very different.
There have been two main orientations in Iran: one that favoured orienting Iran towards the West; and the other one favoured leaning towards China and Russia. But both schools have been proven wrong. The first because a deal with the US was not possible, and the second because neither Russia nor China supported Iran meaningfully in the war.
The conclusion is that Iran is alone. Iran has always been alone. It doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have friends, but it doesn’t have security pacts. Those strategic relations do not translate into security pacts.
And as a result, it has to stand on its own [two feet]. And in some ways, that makes Iran’s outlook very similar to that of China. China is looking at itself similarly – it does not extend security pacts.
The Iranians, as a result, are going to invest more, not to say that they’re going to walk away from China at all. On the contrary, they’re going to continue to invest in China relations, but with a clearer idea of what that relationship is. It is not a security relationship or a pact in which they can rely on Chinese support for their defence.
Instead, it will be that Iran will have to invest in the region. It will invest in its forward defence, meaning its reliance on the Houthis, on Hezbollah and other groups, and then try to see how it simultaneously can improve relations with its regional neighbours.
But the forward defence is a protection not against its neighbours. It’s a protection against the US and Israel.
Hezbollah is Iran’s first line of defence against an Israeli attack. Israel only attacked when Hezbollah was weak. When Hezbollah has been strong, the Israelis have been more careful about attacking Iran.
However, China has played its cards very well. It has stayed out of this conflict. It has not done anything to deliberately damage the US. It has not taken advantage of this to undermine the US. The US is doing enough to undermine itself – China doesn’t need to.
At the same time, China has also realised that, yes, it always had a balance between its relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia. But now China has realised that Iran is much stronger – not that Saudi Arabia isn’t but Saudi Arabia is dependent. Iran is independent. Iran alone defeated Israel and the US.
Saudi Arabia, even with the help of the US, could not defeat the Houthis. And China’s perspective in the long term is to have very good relations with the countries that have the ability to provide stability in specific regions. And there, the outcome of this war has put Iran in a different light from Beijing’s perspective.
How will Beijing’s relationship with the Gulf countries change, and how will these countries view Beijing? Because some may expect China to act to relieve or mediate the situation, but it has not.
Beijing’s strategy so far has been very smart. It has not entered into any alliance with other states. It’s doing the opposite of the US. The US cannot help itself but get involved in everyone else’s conflict, whereas China very wisely stays out.
But China is going to see an effort by the other GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states to become as close to China as possible economically to make sure that any future potential conflict between Iran and any GCC states would have a deep impact on China economically and, as a result, China would have a greater need for not necessarily getting involved militarily, but to get involved diplomatically.
China has an ability that the US doesn’t have here. Everyone trades extensively with China. No one can afford to have a bad relationship with China because of economic reasons. And as a result, China can come in as a diplomatic force because everyone wants to make sure that they don’t move themselves too far away from China.
The GCC will be hoping that China will get involved diplomatically and that it will feel a self-interest to get involved diplomatically because of economic reasons.
Why did Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reject Trump’s Gaza proposal, and how will the US relationship with Israel change? Trump is under a lot of pressure internally, with Israel blamed for dragging the US into this war.
There is a tremendous amount of frustration in the White House with Israel. Israel dragged the US into this war. We’re also seeing that Netanyahu is willing to say no to Trump. The Trump administration has not pushed back hard against Netanyahu on this issue, and there have even been statements saying that Netanyahu was faced with an election and, as a result, this is a sensitive period.
If this was happening under the Biden administration, it would have gone out of its way to blame Hamas when Israel rejected a peace deal. We saw that repeatedly. Israel kept on rejecting peace deals, undermining peace deals, and the Biden administration protected Israel by blaming Hamas. The Trump administration did not do that this time. Everyone knows it’s Netanyahu who rejected this proposal.
I find that interesting.
Has Hamas been weakened so much that it’s hard to say it is Hamas any more?
No, I don’t think so because it was the same situation before, and Hamas, even though it is weakened, still has some agency. So one could easily have done it back then as well.
What we have seen is that Trump, even though he doesn’t put consistent pressure on the Israelis, is willing to go out and blame Israel and push back hard against Israel at times. It tends to be very temporary, but he has shown that willingness. Whereas the Biden administration had a policy in which they wanted to see no daylight between Israel and the US. And by that, allow the Israelis to completely set the agenda.
Are you suggesting there is reduced US backing of Israel?
We may end up seeing a significant distance between the two countries. The Israelis were very unhappy about the signing of the MOU [memorandum of understanding, by the US and Iran in June] and if the MOU had succeeded, and it still may, it would have led to a scenario in which there would have been a crisis in US-Israeli relations.
How will Trump’s dealings with the Middle East, especially the war with Iran, affect the midterm elections?
There’s going to be a general unhappiness because of inflation, gas prices, food prices, directly resulting from this. You’re already seeing that in some primaries, the US relationship with Israel has become a very hotly contested issue and the race is almost reduced to whether a candidate is in favour of the war, in favour of Israel, in favour of what Israel did in Gaza, or against it.
This is very unusual. And it’s showing how things are changing in a very dramatic way in the US. But for these specific midterms, the Republicans are going to suffer defeats. Some members of Congress may come out and blame Trump and the war explicitly, either to save themselves or, if they lose, out of anger and frustration, because many of them are not just angry about the war. They are angry because they see that Trump does not care what happens to Republican members of Congress.
He does not seem to be particularly concerned about this and as a result they’re facing an end to their careers politically because of what Trump has done and Trump does not do anything to support them. So, there’s a feeling of betrayal and abandonment. It’s very hidden right now but beneath the surface it festers.
Will that increase the risk? Will that prompt Trump to take even more radical actions if there are failures in the midterms?
There is a risk that after the midterms that Trump – because he has more difficulties in Congress – will become even more radical in his conduct. This is one of the potential miscalculations the Iranians are making in which they think the punishment of Trump in the midterms would be satisfactory to them, which perhaps on an emotional level it would be, but it can also lead to a scenario in which he increasingly does not care about certain constraints, and certain norms and guardrails.
Look at how his behaviour changed after he lost the election in November 2020. Between November 2020 and January 2021, Trump considered some very radical options. One of them, which was actualised, was the protests on January 6, [an] attempt at a takeover, but he was also contemplating war with Iran during those two months as a way of staying in power. You may end up seeing a scenario in which the midterm elections and a loss will make him more radical.