[Salon] A second island chain strategy for Asia




EXPLAINER RELEASE:
September 10, 2026
Contact: press@defensepriorities.org
 

A SECOND ISLAND CHAIN
STRATEGY FOR ASIA

Core U.S. interests in Asia—protecting the homeland and economic access—require far less forward military presence than currently maintained.

Shifting the U.S. posture from the vulnerable first island chain to the more defensible second island chain would reduce American military requirements and the risk of a war with China while still protecting U.S. interests.

Read the newest Defense Priorities explainer by Senior Fellow & Director of Military Analysis Jennifer Kavanagh: “A second island chain strategy for Asia.”
 
READ THE EXPLAINER
The three island chains
Most U.S. personnel in East Asia are stationed along the first island chain. Moving them to the second island chain would make their positions more defensible while reducing the risk of a catastrophic war with China.
KEY POINTS
  1. The United States has two core interests in Asia worth protecting with military power: defending the U.S. homeland and safeguarding access to key economic markets and trade routes. The first priority requires little in the way of a forward military presence while the second benefits from a modest air and naval presence to hedge against outcomes that would threaten U.S. interests.
     
  2. A strategy that shifts U.S. military commitments and presence from the vulnerable “first island chain” toward a more defensible “second island chain” would reduce U.S. military requirements and the risk of a war with China while still protecting U.S. interests.
     
  3. The United States should narrow its defense commitments in the region, shifting to a clear non-intervention position on Taiwan, ending mutual defense alliances with South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan, and negotiating narrower and flexible security partnerships in their place. U.S. military posture should change accordingly.
     
  4. The United States should remove most Army and Marine Corps deployments from Asia and cut air and naval power significantly. The remaining U.S. forces should be consolidated at more survivable bases farther from China’s coast and tasked with securing U.S. economic interests and signaling continued U.S. involvement in the Pacific region.
     
  5. The United States should provide a clear plan of its intentions and communicate carefully with its allies and China. Changes should be phased over a period of three to eight years, with most changes complete by 2030 and all finalized by 2035.
New explainer—“A second island chain strategy for Asia”:

https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/a-second-island-chain-strategy-for-asia
###


DEFP fellows and experts are available for appearances and interviews from accredited media. To book, contact press@defensepriorities.org.


This email was sent to cwfresidence@gmail.com. Manage your email preferences, or
unsubscribe to stop receiving emails from Defense Priorities.

DEFP seeks to inform citizens, thought leaders, and policymakers of the importance of a strong, dynamic military—used more judiciously to protect America's narrowly defined national interests—and promote a realistic grand strategy prioritizing restraint, diplomacy, and free trade to ensure U.S. security.

Defense Priorities Foundation is a non-profit organization formed under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are unlimited and deductible for Federal Income Tax purposes.

Copyright © 2026 Defense Priorities 2311 Wilson Blvd Fl 3 Arlington, VA 22201 USA
defensepriorities.org


This archive was generated by a fusion of Pipermail (Mailman edition) and MHonArc.