Iran Is Exacting a Price on Trump's Energy War as Netanyahu Eyes Escalation
The war between the United States and Iran is sending shock waves across the Middle East, with repercussions for other conflicts, most notably Saudi Arabia's confrontation with the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
For now, the illusions being peddled by U.S. President Donald Trump about the regime in Tehran capitulating quickly have failed to materialize. The war is becoming more complicated on several fronts and it could still have repercussions for Israel's situation.
A month and a half ago, on August 1, Trump abandoned the possibility of returning to a full military confrontation with the Iranians.
Until then, the president had deliberated between two possible courses of action: renewing the war with Israel's assistance or retreating in the face of Iranian positions and seeking a quick end. In early August, Trump chose a third path: economic pressure, by blocking movement south of the Strait of Hormuz and imposing sanctions on the banking system and energy companies. In recent weeks, the U.S. recorded successes, bypassing the Iranian blockade and clearing a sea lane for tankers and ships from the Gulf, near the coast of Oman.
But the story is far from over. Iran has already announced the adoption of a new doctrine in the region: an offensive, proactive approach and a disproportionate response to attacks against it. This doctrine is integrated with the increasing use of proxies, its emissaries and partners in the region.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is not new, but it aligns with Iranian plans. The Houthis have feared a Saudi ground invasion of their territory for some time, with assistance to the official government in Yemen. In the past week, they seized islands and coastal areas that would allow them a more effective closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The stated aim is to disrupt Saudi shipping and the kingdom's oil supplies, but in doing so, they are once again keeping their hand on the valve controlling a significant share of global maritime traffic.
Concurrently, drone attacks were recorded on a central oil pipeline crossing Saudi territoryfrom east to west that was meant to serve as a basis for expanding Saudi oil exports to the West, bypassing the need to pass through Hormuz. Some reports attribute the attacks to Iran-backed Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
Ultimately, the economic war Trump declared on Iran has indeed achieved successes – and is also causing severe hardship even in the supply of daily necessities for the country's population – but it has not yet ended in the crushing victory the American president promised. Instead of an all-out war, we have an energy war, whose effects on the global oil market are still limited, but could expand as the conflict continues. And despite Trump's predictions, the regime shows no signs of distress leading to surrender.
U.S. partners in the region are also paying heavy prices, exacted by Iran and its partners. This could develop into a long, costly and tedious affair. In the eyes of the Tehran regime, it has a clear advantage over the Americans when it comes to resilience and patience. It should also be noted that the new alliance created by the Mecca agreement, between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, has yet to translate into tangible support from the two Muslim powers for their partner in trouble.
Israel's war by proxy
Meanwhile, in the current campaign in the Gulf, Israel is mostly watching from the sidelines. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pressed Trump to return to a full war and involve the Israel Defense Forces, but has so far been refused. This does not mean Netanyahu has entirely given up his hopes. The frequent rhetorical provocations by Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz against Iran, this time mainly against the backdrop of the fighting in Lebanon, appear designed to draw the Iranians into the war.
Last week, the IDF achieved a significant accomplishment in the fighting in southern Lebanon. After a planned effort lasting months, regular and commando forces seized bunkers, command posts and tunnels that Hezbollah had built over many years on the Ali Taher ridge. These made up the command post of Hezbollah's Badr unit, responsible for a significant portion of the group's military activity against Israel. In recent months, several dozen members of the organization who were entrenched there were killed; it appears several dozen more fled.
The capture of the ridge and destruction of the bunkers are a morale blow to Hezbollah, which had tried to portray Ali Taher as an unconquerable target.
There is growing confusion and concern among the Shi'ite community in southern Lebanon, as the ridge had helped shield the nearby Nabatieh area, which had until now been considered relatively safe. This could lead to another mass exodus of residents toward Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, for fear of an Israeli ground invasion in the area. But according to senior IDF officials, at least, the approach is now different. After completing its mission on the ridge, the IDF plans to pull its forces back somewhat and take up positions that are easier to defend.
The army's desire to tout an achievement is understandable enough. What seems unnecessary is Netanyahu and Katz's effort to portray the battle for the captured positions as though it were a war for a Shi'ite stronghold akin to the legendary Jewish Masada fortress. Their boasting about the defeat inflicted on Hezbollah, as well as repeated threats of military action against Iran, are also unwarranted. The achievement here is less strategic than they are trying to portray it to the Israeli public.
Clearly, in a direct military confrontation, the IDF has the upper hand, especially after the blows it dealt Hezbollah in the previous round in the fall of 2024. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the organization's ability to inflict damage. Its new leaders have not surrendered and the growing use of fiber-optic-controlled explosive drones presents the IDF with a challenge for which it has yet to develop an adequate response.