Saudi Arabia’s military defeat in Yemen has global consequences
Summary: a failed Saudi-backed ground offensive enabled Huthi forces to capture critical Red Sea territory, seize Western weaponry and severely disrupt global energy markets.
The conflict in Yemen has entered a new and potentially decisive stage. The Huthi movement, known as Ansarallah, has routed a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, laying bare the severe limitations of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s regional strategy. As the Huthis consolidate control over vital maritime chokepoints and cripple Saudi oil export capacity, Riyadh finds itself facing unprecedented military vulnerability, mounting financial distress and a dwindling array of strategic options.
The current crisis escalated after a poorly coordinated ground offensive orchestrated by the crown prince failed. Intended to neutralise Huthi presence and defeat Iranian-backed forces in Yemen, the campaign relied on a fragmented coalition - including tribal levies, Al-Islah factions, Tareq Saleh’s forces and the Giants Brigade - that lacked central command, tactical coordination and logistical support. Consequently the disjointed effort collapsed, triggering a swift and disastrous defeat.
Exploiting coalition chaos through superior intelligence, Huthi forces launched a rapid counter-offensive, capturing around 5,000 square kilometres across the governorates of Taiz and Hudaydah, including the historic port city of Mocha. Rather than attempting to occupy flat, exposed coastal beaches where they would remain vulnerable to Saudi airpower, Huthi commanders focused on seizing high-ground elevations, such as the mountainous terrain in Maqbanah. By fortifying these positions, they have established firing positions capable of harassing or blocking Red Sea shipping using short-range artillery, Katyusha rockets and light watercraft, substantially reducing their reliance on expensive ballistic missiles. The swift advance brought them within 30 kilometres of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, while Tareq Saleh’s collapsing forces suffered more than 500 killed and 1,500 wounded.
The retreat left vast quantities of Western military hardware in Huthi hands, including Canadian-built Streit Group armoured vehicles, American Oshkosh MRAPs, German anti-aircraft guns and anti-drone jammers. Concurrently, Huthi amphibious forces seized Perim (Mayun) Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, placing vital international shipping lanes under direct threat. The limits of coalition airpower were also exposed when a Huthi surface-to-air missile brought down a Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 SA from the 55th Squadron, highlighting the increasing lethality of Huthi air defences.
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Wreckage showing the tail fin of a Royal Saudi Air Force 55th Squadron F-15 fighter jet. Along with reports of losses over Iran and more than 25 downed US MQ-9 Reaper drones, the shootdown underscores the mounting risk advanced multi-role aircraft face against regional integrated air defence systems.The domestic and economic fallout for Saudi Arabia has already been severe, marked by civil defence alerts across ten provinces and widespread infrastructure damage. The capital Riyadh came under fire with an oil storage depot at King Khalid International Airport set ablaze while Huthi strikes hit other Aramco facilities in Yanbu and Jizan. And prior to the Huthi counter-offensive the most crippling blow had targeted the East-West Pipeline. Drone attacks reportedly initiated by Iran-backed militias in Iraq disabled three key pumping stations, halting the seven-million-barrel-per-day line, affecting 4% of global oil supply. Despite official disinformation about a “precautionary” shutdown, satellite imagery confirmed extensive damage, causing total Saudi crude exports to crash from nine million to two million barrels per day. The supply bottleneck drove Brent crude above US$100 per barrel and pushed regional shipping insurance surcharges up to US$1 million per vessel daily.
Internally, Saudi Arabia faces severe economic strain as oil revenues plunge, GDP contracts and national debt approaches 2 trillion SAR. MbS has largely depleted the 3 trillion SAR cash reserve built under King Abdullah with megaprojects like NEOM and the Mukaab, leaving only the minimum required to back the riyal. To plug growing liquidity deficits, the kingdom has turned to high-cost monetary workarounds such as reverse repurchase agreements, short-term high-yield bonds and foreign borrowing by state enterprises like Bahri. Meanwhile, foreign investors have hesitated to back PIF projects or Aramco equity due to unpredictable governance and lack of legal guarantees, forcing asset sales at steep discounts or internal share offloads to regional neighbours.
Seeking direct intervention, MbS twice asked US President Donald Trump to launch strikes against the Huthis but was refused beyond intelligence and targeting aid due to Washington’s reluctance following its previous costly “52-day war” with Yemeni forces. US losses then included shot-down drones, jet near-misses and Navy aircraft carriers forced to dump planes into the sea while dodging Yemeni fire.
Riyadh subsequently requested military assistance or security guarantees from numerous other countries including France, Britain, Pakistan, Egypt and even China but none agreed to deploy ground troops. Egypt declined to avoid another costly entanglement in Yemen (where it had suffered significant losses in the 1960s) opting instead for back-channel talks with the Huthis to protect Suez Canal revenues the Sisi regime desperately needs, while Pakistan and Türkiye limited their defence commitments strictly to protecting Saudi territory against foreign state invasions. Significantly the latter two countries had only recently signed the Mecca Pact intended to provide mutual defence.
Logic would dictate that the best option for the Saudis would be to quickly sign a peace agreement with the Huthis. However, Gulf leadership decisions are still primarily driven by defence and economic ties to Washington rather than sovereign strategic planning. Still tied to US foreign policy for political survival, Riyadh finds itself unable to negotiate independently as was demonstrated when Washington barred the kingdom from separate security talks with Iran in Oman.
The Middle East is once again hovering on the brink of a high-stakes military confrontation that could engulf the entire region. There are signs that another massive US-Israeli attack on Iran is pending, perhaps joined by others. The situation is reminiscent of February, the difference is that this time Iran may choose to strike first. In the absence of a diplomatic initiative, neither Washington nor Tehran can exit the current crisis without either total military confrontation or complete strategic submission.
Tehran holds the upper hand in the immediate Gulf theatre through its control over the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to project power via regional proxy networks. Iran can disrupt international shipping and target US bases or Gulf infrastructure at will. Structural damage has already been inflicted on US military installations, radar networks, and naval assets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia with the Pentagon scrambling to conceal the full extent of the losses. Due to security vulnerabilities, major components of the US Fifth Fleet were forced to pull back from Bahrain to distant installations like Diego Garcia.
Though the Huthis have their own agenda, their drive toward Bab al-Mandab dovetails well with the wider regional plan by Iran to gain leverage over global maritime chokepoints ahead of any full-scale confrontation. The recent attacks on pipeline and refinery infrastructure are only a limited foretaste: if a full-scale war erupts, strikes will directly target the actual oil-producing fields and wells across the entire Gulf. While pipelines, pumping stations and storage tanks can be repaired within weeks or months, damage to oil fields takes years to restore. In a full-scale conflict Iran will directly strike oil extraction and production fields across Gulf states with the potential to cripple global oil supplies for years.
Despite strong domestic opposition - with approximately 80% of the American public against entering a new conflict - Donald Trump may nonetheless be tempted into a full-scale military confrontation with Iran ahead of the upcoming mid-terms. Such a clash would vastly exceed the scope of recent regional wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, taking on the dimensions of World War II-era total warfare.
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