In a US-China world, Asean must do more than avoid choosing sides
Following the uneasy truce at the Xi-Trump summit, Asean must go beyond passive hedging and forge middle-power partnerships to secure its autonomy
But that does not mean an end to competition. Washington and Beijing continue to differ over technology, industrial policy, security and the shape of the international order, while Iran and Taiwan remain fraught topics. They have moved away from the broad tariff war waged last year, but targeted restrictions and industrial measures continue.
For many years, the answer has been no. Seeking good relations with both and not being drawn too closely into either camp has been the common response. Yet by itself, hedging is no longer sufficient. The challenge for Asean and the wider region is to preserve the ability to make our own choices.
There are obvious pressures to align. Security concerns push some countries towards the United States. Economic geography, trade and investment bring others closer to China. Technology restrictions, tariffs, supply-chain policies and defence arrangements can increasingly turn seemingly separate decisions into strategic choices.
Yet not choosing is not enough. Nor does this concern only security.
Simply hedging and refusing to choose does not preserve autonomy. Countries need to create more choices with other powers to exercise autonomy in what I call a “Minus 2” world.
From time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together. The possibilities are considerable
A Minus 2 world does not mean excluding the US and China. Nor should middle and smaller powers organise a third bloc. The proposition is more modest: from time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together.
The possibilities are considerable. Japan has deep technological and industrial capabilities. South Korea is important in semiconductors, batteries and advanced manufacturing. India has scale and a growing technological base. Europe offers investment, markets and green technologies. Australia has resources, education and security capabilities.
Their interests are not identical. Some are US allies. Asean members are diversely oriented. But almost all share one important interest: they do not want every consequential decision to be defined by US-China rivalry.
Diversification is often valued in economic terms. Countries and companies diversify markets and suppliers to become more resilient. But there is today a strategic dimension to diversification. A Minus 2 mindset can give smaller countries more choices and agency, and foster more centres of influence. The more either great power pressures others to choose sides, the stronger the incentive for these others to work with one another in a genuinely multipolar world.
The coming Asean summit brings that into focus. Of course, this is a platform to engage the US and China. But it should also strengthen relationships that give Asean members greater room for manoeuvre. Many other partners will already be around the table, offering a practical application of how Asean thinks about “centrality”.
These are some projects already making progress. They can also provide platforms for deeper partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Europe and others, including in AI and digital technologies, green finance and advanced manufacturing.
The Xi-Trump truce may give breathing room. But the initiative must be taken by others in Asia, using that space to deepen connections among themselves.
Strategic autonomy is not secured simply by refusing to choose. It grows from having more choices and a Minus 2 perspective. The Asean summit is an opportunity to show the region has agency.