Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington.
Even as the bilateral U.S.-China relationship has stabilized over the past 12 months, Taiwan remains a dangerous flashpoint and the issue most likely to drag the two major powers into catastrophic conflict.
The island's continued centrality was evident again on Thursday when Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington, with China's leader calling on the U.S. to uphold what he called the "correct position" of opposing Taiwan independence and to handle the issue prudently.
For its part, Washington's approach to preventing war in the Taiwan Strait has long been to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity, under which it refuses to either commit to defend Taiwan or to state that it would not do so. With this position, the U.S. aims at double deterrence, discouraging both China and Taiwan from unilaterally changing the status quo.
This arrangement has preserved cross-strait peace for decades but maintaining this stance indefinitely is neither sustainable nor wise for America. Unification between China and Taiwan would have important military and economic implications for Washington, but these implications can be mitigated and do not threaten U.S. existential interests. However, with its military power weakened and increasingly constrained, the U.S. cannot manage the costs and consequences of a major war with China. It needs a Taiwan policy that explicitly rules out a military intervention should the island come under attack.
A U.S. decision to move away from strategic ambiguity would have significant ramifications for regional security and for U.S. allies, who may interpret the change as Washington beginning to relinquish its commitments in Asia. But any revision to the U.S. position will happen only over time, giving East Asian powers time to guarantee that their own interests are secure, no matter what Washington chooses to do.
When U.S. officials first adopted strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, China's military was no match for that of the U.S. This is no longer the case. Today, China's military power is increasing rapidly and rivals the U.S. in many areas. At the same time, the American military suddenly seems fragile, lacking in the advanced munitions and naval forces it would need for a major power conflict and facing serious vulnerabilities in its basing infrastructure. Simply put, the U.S. military remains the strongest in the world, but its ability to outlast China in a war over Taiwan is now in question.
Any U.S. president should be ready to use military force to defend core U.S. interests, but wary of entering conflicts where the stakes do not meet this benchmark. This is the case with Taiwan.
Taiwan has long been held up as the linchpin of American military power in Asia and the key to blocking China's path to regional hegemony, but there is little evidence to support this narrative. Seizing Taiwan would not be enough to shift the regional military balance in Beijing's favor, nor would holding Taiwan give China launchpad for further expansion. Economic consequences would be more notable, especially if China were able to take Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing facilities undamaged. Even this can be overcome, however, with more intensive efforts to reshore high tech manufacturing to the U.S.
But if Washington can weather the consequences of unification between China and Taiwan, the challenges for U.S. allies in the region may be more significant. Tokyo, for instance, has indicated that a conflict over Taiwan could be existentially threatening to its security. Not only could Japan experience spillover from hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, but a war would also disrupt vital trade routes on which its economy depends. Leaders in Japan and South Korea may also worry that Chinese control of Taiwan would bring risks even if unification occurred peacefully by making it easier for China to interdict trade in nearby waters or emboldening Beijing elsewhere in the region.
Because U.S. allies in Asia have depended on Washington to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait, as things stand today, they will be left with no plan B if Washington adopts a nonintervention policy toward Taiwan and conflict over the island occurs.
Rhetoric aside, without the U.S. leading the charge, no state in the region is prepared to intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf. Each would instead prioritize its own self-defense. Japan, for example, would work to reinforce air and missile defense for its southwestern islands and use its navy and submarine fleet to protect its littoral waters. There would likely be few assets left over to offer Taiwan direct military support. Even if Tokyo or Seoul wanted to intervene militarily, a Washington intent on staying out of a conflict over the island might limit what allies are able to do, to reduce risk to U.S. military personnel at bases across the region.
But a U.S. policy of nonintervention toward Taiwan does not need to leave other U.S. allies less safe. Countries across East Asia can act now to ensure that their vital interests are protected no matter what decisions Washington makes regarding Taiwan.
First, for countries closest to Taiwan, additional investment in asymmetric defensive capabilities, such as air and missile defense, drones, sea mines, and anti-ship missiles can reinforce the security of outlying territories in case of spillover from a future conflict over Taiwan. There is little indication Beijing sees Taiwan as a first step to wider regional expansion, but such capabilities would also bolster deterrence as a hedge against such a scenario.
Second, East Asian powers should reduce dependence on chokepoints in and near Taiwan by developing alternatives to their most heavily trafficked commercial trade routes and diversifying supply chains to avoid single points of failure. This resilience-boosting strategy would be smart regardless of how the situation in East Asia develops given lessons from the closure at the Strait of Hormuz.
Finally, U.S. allies should look to each other to safeguard their security interests. Countries throughout Asia are already building self-reliant partnerships that allow them to cooperate more closely and deeply without America. They should do more of this. These types of organizations can help offset the effects of U.S. posture changes by balancing against China's growing power and offering additional options for military and economic support even if the U.S. pulls back.
U.S. allies in East Asia have long seen Washington as the foundation of their security. As the U.S. reevaluates its global commitments, this will have to change. But adjustments to U.S. policy in Asia, whether on Taiwan or elsewhere, should not be feared. Regional allies can adapt to and manage these changes.