Iraq’s militia deadline is losing its leverage
Summary: Baghdad has backed down from its efforts to disarm Popular Mobilisation Forces pushing the deadline back to 2027 thus sending a clear signal that for now at least it has neither the political clout or the hard power to bring the militias under its control.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
Iraq’s deadline for bringing armed factions under state control has moved from September 30 to June 2027. The extension gives Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi more time to negotiate with groups that rejected his original timetable. But it also creates a difficult contradiction. The US-coalition whose presence some militias cited as a reason to remain armed left Iraq at the end of September while the government has yet to establish full control over the groups themselves.
The US withdrawal removes one of the main arguments that hardline factions have used to justify their weapons. Zaidi had argued that there would be no justification for a separate armed “resistance” role once foreign forces left. That condition has now been met. On September 30, Kataib Hezbollah, one of the Iran-backed armed militias, announced a suspension of its military activities in Iraq following the US withdrawal. But it retained the right to target aircraft it considers hostile while other groups said they were not bound by any government disarmament timetable.
![]()
Iran-backed militias, funded by the Iraqi state, celebrate National Day in the streets of Baghdad, Saturday 3rd October.
The responses raise questions over the new deadline. Some factions have indicated that they are willing to place weapons under state authority and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein says the government has been negotiating with seven armed groups. He says several have already begun handing over weapons. But several powerful factions continue to resist the process. Baghdad therefore needs to negotiate a settlement with groups that are simultaneously armed actors, political organisations and, in many cases, formally part of Iraq’s security architecture.
The distinction between formal state custody and operational control will be important. Iraq has spent years incorporating former militia fighters into the Popular Mobilisation Forces and other state structures. Bringing weapons under government authority does not necessarily mean that the factions controlling those weapons have lost their political or military autonomy. Zaidi’s challenge is to establish that armed groups cannot independently decide when and where force is used.
That problem has already acquired a regional and economic dimension. In September, Saudi Arabia said drones launched from Iraqi territory had struck its East-West oil pipeline. Baghdad subsequently confirmed that the attack originated in Iraq and launched an investigation. The Iraqi foreign minister said on October 1 that the attack had taken place only 13km from the Iranian border and that Iraq was in contact with both Saudi Arabia and Iran over the incident. He also said Baghdad wanted to reassure Gulf states that armed groups operating from Iraq would no longer be able to attack neighbouring countries. But Zaidi promised the same back in July, when Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the US, hit Iraqi militias that were said to be responsible for drone strikes against Saudi oil facilities and energy infrastructure.
Baghdad is trying to deepen economic and political ties with the Gulf while reassuring its Gulf neighbours that Iraqi territory will not be used for attacks against them. The government's ability to control armed groups is therefore becoming part of its broader effort to protect those relationships and attract investment.
The problem is also domestic. The Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq has been repeatedly targeted by both Iran and Iran-backed Iraqi militias during the current conflict between the United States and Iran, with Kurdish officials reporting more than 1,000 drone and missile attacks since February. Kurdish leaders have expressed concern over the withdrawal of the US forces, leaving them without sufficient air defence.
The US withdrawal also changes the security environment in which Zaidi must pursue the process. While Washington has ended its Iraq-based military mission, it will continue targeted training and intelligence support. Iraqi forces will now carry primary responsibility for internal security including the remaining Islamic State threat. Hussein said Iraqi forces can handle ISIS themselves but warned that fighters operating in Syria could still cross into Iraq.
The June 2027 disarmament deadline is a test of whether Baghdad can consolidate authority during a difficult transition. The government has more time to negotiate but the US military presence that provided intelligence, surveillance and other capabilities has ended. The remaining US role is also less direct.
Time will tell whether the factions honour the initial suspension of attacks and whether negotiations produce changes in command as well as the formal custody of weapons. Given ongoing hostilities between the United States and Iran, Baghdad will need to be more effective in preventing armed groups from using Iraqi territory to attack neighbouring states or foreign interests. The Saudi pipeline incident suggests the issue will remain difficult even if the government can identify and punish individual perpetrators. Identifying assailants may be relatively straightforward. Bringing them to justice is altogether more challenging.
The extension of the disarmament plan to June may give Baghdad the time needed to reach a workable settlement with the factions. Alternatively, it may lead to yet another extension which will further diminish the credibility of the federal government. Progress requires a concentration over control in the use of force. While the US withdrawal has removed the principal justification some groups gave for maintaining an independent armed role, others have moved the goal line, calling for the expulsion of Turkish troops and Kurdish militias in Iraq.
For now Zaidi’s revised timeline appears designed to preserve US support while avoiding a wider domestic confrontation. But the space for delay is not unlimited. Washington can apply financial and political pressure and Gulf states could respond kinetically if attacks from Iraq continue. Iran may encourage the militias to escalate if they conclude that Baghdad intends to disarm them by force. Zaidi therefore faces pressure from all sides to turn the new announcement into a credible process before any one of them decides to act first.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.