The Gulf and the US: shifting sands
Summary: as a consensus emerges that US hegemony in the Gulf is over and Washington continues to cast around for an acceptable exit strategy from the war with Iran, it is none too soon to consider how best the US could safeguard its national interests there into the longer term.
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast “Energy and a hard winter ahead” here.
Even in the fortnight or so since the publication of the 1 October Newsletter considering the probable end of the US hegemony in the Gulf, a great deal of water (and a surprisingly large amount of oil) has flowed through the Strait of Hormuz. But this still falls some way short of the flow of words forthcoming from a commentariat which has rapidly reached a consensus to the effect that we are, indeed, at a watershed moment in the region.
Consider first the following quote from a 7 October article for the New York Times by David E Sanger and Eric Schmitt commenting on the withdrawal of American B1 bombers from their base in the United Kingdom:
To anyone watching the deployment of American power around the globe in the seven months since Mr Trump decided to attack Iran, it was another glaring example of how, time after time, Mr Trump and his defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, have been forced into retreat, pulling back military forces that had been deployed to the Middle East and Britain as a deterrent.
President Barack Obama’s Middle East coordinator Philip Gordon, while arguing in Foreign Affairs on 12 October that US “disengagement is not the answer”, conceded that "the US military presence in the region which was long considered essential for deterring war and keeping energy flowing, has in many ways become a liability."
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A missile launched by Yemen's Ansar Allah (Huthi) movement hit a building owned by Saudi Arabia's state oil company Aramco in the eastern city of Dhahran on Tuesday.Furthermore, it isn’t only the commentariat which appears to be having what one might call a Damascene moment.
Most notably, after months of, at best, frosty diplomatic relations, it was surely no coincidence that the UAE’s Vice President, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan, flew to Riyadh to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on 29 September — i.e. in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s refusal to engage alongside Saudi forces battling the Huthis and as the final US withdrawal from Iraq was taking place. This is potentially very important, not only in the context of Yemen. Regional security as a whole is at stake and as I noted in the 1 October Newsletter currently Saudi/UAE rivalry is the biggest single barrier to intra-GCC cooperation
The meeting was only one small step and, for now at least, the UAE remains firmly in bed with the US and Israel. But, 'personalities' notwithstanding, this could change very suddenly — even, as I speculated in the 10 September Newsletter, over possible ‘events’ relating to Israel's upcoming general election. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu’s offer to Saudi Arabia to strike the Huthis — which MbS has reportedly turned down — could, in theory, bring Riyadh and Abu Dhabi closer together but only at the expense of, at minimum, Riyadh/Ankara relations and, as James Spencer outlined in the 13 October Newsletter, almost certainly for little or no ‘gain’ militarily.
Additionally, there are expert — and, in my view, credible — suggestions that the GCC members have quietly agreed to pay Iran a ‘fee’ of up to 20 percent of the cargo value for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which would certainly account for the sudden increase in the flow of oil. Inevitably, Mr Trump is continuing to claim that the uptick is a reflection of the US Navy’s “total control” of the Strait. But it is far more likely, in my view, that the US Administration has (rightly) concluded that it cannot guarantee safe passage and, with one eye firmly on gasoline/diesel prices and the midterm elections, has, for now, turned a blind one to fee payments.
Meanwhile, Riyadh has moved rapidly to beef up its Joint Defence Agreement with Pakistan and Türkiye. As I posted on the Arab Digest Facebook page on 6 October: “…there may be more symbolism behind [the 5 October] 'rapid deployment' announcement…than there is substance.”
However, and as I continued, although we are very unlikely to see Pakistani and Turkish military personnel (already based in Saudi Arabia) in the front line against the Huthis, the meeting which led to the announcement nevertheless added:
...some flesh to the pact's Strategic Political & Defence Committee and, as such, does amount to a concrete step towards setting up a joint operational structure, which is not a negligible development.
Underpinning all this is the possibility (probability, in my view) that, individually and collectively, the GCC members understand — and are not dismissive of — Tehran’s war aims consistent with an essay by Narges Bajoghli and Vali Nasr published in Foreign Affairs on 9 October arguing:
…the Islamic Republic…believes its military can drive US troops from the Persian Gulf by continuing to strike American bases directly and by getting Arab countries to push the United States to leave. It thinks that by wreaking havoc on energy markets, it can force Washington to lift economic restrictions, as well. Tehran’s theory of victory, in other words, is that it can hold out and inflict enough pain that the United States will end its containment of Iran.
It is by no means certain that Tehran’s confidence in their theory will prove to be justified. But Messrs Bajoghli and Nasr are correct to argue that, despite differences within the ruling elite over tactics, there appears to be a high degree of unity over this goal and no sign whatsoever of capitulation or even a willingness to offer much by way of compromise.
This may be lost on Washington for now and, in any case, no-one can be sure of Mr Trump’s next move once the midterms are out of the way. However, pressure will surely continue to mount both internationally and domestically for the US to pull back significantly from a forward military deployment which is patently unsustainable.
In his Foreign Policy essay Philip Gordon notes both the negatives and the positives for Washington to retain its presence in the region. The latter, he argues, outweigh the former. Engagement coupled with policies which would protect “(US) interests there in a smarter and more realistic way” could benefit all concerned. Getting there however remains the biggest ‘known unknown’ of all.
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