|
The new article, “Visions of Gulf Security in an Era of Uncertainty: Between External Alignment and Regional Autonomy” by Rory Miller and Şaban Kardaş, is available in our special issue, October 7 Legacies: Regional War, Global Crisis. The collection features investigations of Netanyahu’s fostering pre-October 7 security lapses and ginning up enthusiasm for war with Iran, as well as global crises triggered by the Iran War, the clerical hold on power in Tehran, and the Palestinian struggle for autonomy. Fifteen of the 17 articles are outside our paywall and free to read. Also available are our Fall 2026 double issue and our special issue commemorating a quarter century since the 9/11 attacks. If you find this newsletter useful, please forward it to others you believe will benefit. You can register to receive our weekly updates here. And please follow us on the social media platforms X, Instagram, and LinkedIn.
Miller and Kardaş show that the recently forged partnership among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, dubbed the Mecca Pact, is just the most recent attempt by a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to hedge against reliance on a US-dominated security system that has failed to protect regional allies. The authors interrogate the “long-standing debates over alternative security arrangements, including GCC-centered defense integration, broader mechanisms of cooperative security, and more novel options like a regional nonaggression framework,” finding that the current Gulf efforts are likely to be constrained by the same forces that have kept them bound to the American-led order.
Two of the previous attempts at regional self-reliance focused on military integration, Miller and Kardaş explain. In the 1980s, the monarchies formed the multinational Peninsula Shield Force to protect GCC members against threats, especially from Iran but also from Iraq. However, this did not become a full-fledged defense alliance due to disagreements over command, divergent threat perceptions, and resistance to Saudi dominance. In addition, success in the Gulf War elevated the American option. “During the 1990s, as the security relationship with Washington flourished, the force failed to develop as a viable tool for collective defense against external aggression, remaining confined to regime security,” the authors write. “Despite these limitations, improved defense cooperation combined with high military spending had a political as well as a security objective: demonstrating intra-regional cooperation.”
A similar initiative led by Riyadh in the 2010s sought to transform the GCC into a more unified political and defense union with joint military command. However, Miller and Kardaş show, Bahrain was its only enthusiastic supporter, and other members resisted surrendering sovereignty and accepting Saudi leadership.
While these episodes focused on military integration, states have also tried to formalize regional dialogue. This approach was advanced by Qatar in 2018, as it faced a Saudi-led blockade, as well as by Riyadh and Tehran when they forged a normalization deal in 2023. Miller and Kardaş note similarities between these efforts and a recently proposed
regional nonaggression pact between the Gulf states and Iran. This amounts to a call for a framework in which local actors promote collective moves toward conflict resolution. This ambitious undertaking requires, in the first place, the substitution of exclusionary instincts with confidence-building measures and assurance mechanisms that facilitate and sustain dialogue that can effect regional reconciliation. The hope is that this opens the way toward a form of omni-enmeshment allowing for the gradual integration of the Islamic Republic into a mutually beneficial framework for regional security and peace.
Despite the obstacles to creating an autonomous collective-defense system, Miller and Kardaş identify three important gains from this historical process, though these are most evident at times of crisis: security cooperation, military coordination, and regional collaboration. Such achievements should not be dismissed simply because they fell short of replacing the American security umbrella.
However, the authors argue that while the Gulf states are ramping up their efforts at regional self-help, it is unlikely they will develop real alternatives.
The Iran War has essentially crystallized, rather than healed, the divisions among the GCC members. The centrifugal forces persist such that integration of security-defense capabilities on a regional platform appears highly unlikely in the foreseeable future....It is likely that, at least in the medium term, the US-centric model will continue to offer the least bad, if not the preferred, option.
|