[Salon] New book on the Ukraine war by Stephen Kinzer




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EXCERPT

Boiling Point

Author: Stephen Kinze


Ready to Revolt

Huddled beside an airstrip in southern Germany, a handful of anti-Communist warriors prepared to fire the first shots of the Cold War. A CIA officer from the Munich Operations Base was in charge. The Hungarian crewmen he had recruited stood nearby in flight suits. With them were two Ukrainian exiles who had volunteered to parachute into their homeland. They were code-named Apostle 1 and Apostle 2. Each carried forged identity papers, a miniature radio transmitter, a pistol, a machine gun, hand grenades, a purse full of gold coins, and a poison pill to be taken in case of capture. An unmarked C-47 transport plane was waiting.

The CIA officer overseeing this operation, a twenty-six-year-old Yale graduate named Stephen Tanner, watched the plane take off and disappear into the night. It flew over East Germany and Poland, then crossed into Soviet airspace. As it approached the Ukrainian city of Lviv, a cargo bay swung open. The two Ukrainians jumped into the darkness. Their mission was to link up with partisan fighters, seize territory, and establish a clandestine base through which the CIA could send them weapons.

That flight, on September 5, 1949, was the first American act of covert war in Ukraine. The two would-be commandoes who jumped that night were an advance guard for what became Project Aerodynamic, the most ambitious and furthest-reaching project the CIA ever launched inside the Soviet Union. Its aim was to foment subversion in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Behind it lay a simple calculation: The Soviet Union is America’s mortal enemy; its greatest internal threat comes from Ukraine; the CIA should do everything possible to intensify that threat.

From their base in Munich, Tanner and other CIA officers anxiously awaited messages from the two Apostles. None came. An after-action report concluded tersely that “the Soviets quickly eliminated the agents.” It added, though, that this mission “sparked considerable interest at headquarters.” Losing two agents was hardly enough to derail such a promising project.

On May 19, 1950, another C-47 took off from the same base in Germany. This time it carried four Ukrainian volunteers. They parachuted into western Ukraine with a cargo their CIA overseers had packed. It was enough to arm a potent guerrilla band, including fifty submachine guns, thirty rifles, twenty-five pistols, and a hundred phosphorus grenades. The four volunteers hit the ground. They radioed news of their safe landing with cargo. Then they disappeared.

Later that summer, two more Ukrainian volunteers bid their comrades an emotional farewell. According to a CIA cable, “a round of drinks was served, toasts were made … hands were shaken, tears were shed.” Their plane departed at 6:55 p.m. on August 12. The pilot missed their drop zone in Ukraine, and they jumped twenty miles away. Neither was ever heard from again.

These flights were the centerpiece of a far-reaching operation in which the CIA sought to foment armed uprisings in Soviet-controlled territory. Between 1949 and 1952, the CIA dropped about eighty-five men, all equipped for guerrilla warfare, behind what was then called the Iron curtain. Three-quarters were quickly captured or shot.

“You’ve got to have a few martyrs,” reasoned Allen Dulles, chief of covert operations for the CIA. “Some people have to get killed.”

One of the CIA officers who helped direct Aerodynamic, Michael Burke, wrote a graphic account of how on November 3, 1950, he dispatched six would-be commandos to a most uncertain fate. Burke directed airdrops into several countries, and his sanitized memoir does not mention Ukraine. It says only that the plane flew through “unfriendly skies” and dropped the six volunteers into “their homeland.”

Our agents, waiting dispatch, were held in a safe house.… Into the back of a truck we loaded six parachutes and six containers of equipment—two for each two-man team—helped the agents pull on their striptease jumpsuits over their regular clothing, checked all the other pre-dispatch details—documents, side arms—and boosted the men atop their gear.… A rising moon silhouetted the plane poised silently at the end of a large arid field.… We transferred the containers and chutes from there, shook hands all around, and boosted the agents into the aircraft. The plane’s twin engines coughed and roared and it lifted off quickly, shaking free of the uneven ground. The crew made their three separate drops of bodies and containers.…

On the following two nights they flew out again trying to pick up ground-to-air signals from the agents, confirming that they had landed safely and were well. There was no response from the ground, not an encouraging sign.… We did not then know that we had dropped these men into an alerted security net.

Project Aerodynamic was a match made in covert-action heaven. Thousands of Ukrainian partisans had refused to lay down their arms after their Nazi allies surrendered on May 8, 1945. They wanted to keep fighting the Red Army—if they could find a new sponsor. At that same moment, the CIA was looking for a force that it could use to strike against the Soviet Union from within its own territory. Aerodynamic was the progeny of this union. It set off three-quarters of a century of American intervention in Ukraine.

* * *

Fear and uncertainty marked the first encounter between Americans and anti-Soviet Ukrainians. In the autumn of 1947, two years before the first CIA airdrop into Ukraine, officers from the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in occupied Germany learned that a band of armed Russians had appeared in the countryside near Munich. At first they thought this might be an advance guard preparing the ground for a Red Army invasion. A patrol was sent to investigate. Soldiers scoured the hills and meadows around the Bavarian village of Waldkirchen. Early on the morning of September 10, they heard voices. They closed in on a campfire around which men wearing military uniforms were singing in what sounded like Russian. After a moment of tension, the soldiers willingly surrendered their machine guns and hand grenades.

These thirty-five men, along with four other members of their band who were picked up nearby, were brought to an American base and debriefed for three weeks. It turned out that they were not Red Army soldiers, but Ukrainians who had consecrated their lives to fighting the Red Army. They belonged to a partisan force that was unknown to most outsiders: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Their commanders had ordered them to walk westward, find Americans, and seek help for the partisan rebellion.

One of the partisans told an interrogator that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was “engaged in armed combat with Soviet troops in the Ukraine at present” and that more Ukrainians were “ready to revolt” if given support. An officer who helped supervise the interrogations cabled to Washington that the Ukrainians were offering services “which may be of interest to you and may tie into an idea which, I believe, is being worked on at home at the present time.”

“If, as I understand, there is some planning going on with regard to how such groups as referred to above might be best used in our interests,” he suggested, “it might be useful to follow up this matter.”

Americans had just begun fighting the Cold War. Their great handicap was that they knew almost nothing about what was happening inside the Soviet Union. Now they learned that Ukrainians were waging war against the Red Army. This was an intelligence bonanza that opened new landscapes of possibility.

“To some US officials, the advent of the Ukrainian partisans signaled a chance for secret military action against Russia,” the intelligence historian John Prados wrote. “The Ukrainian movement offered the opening for an offensive move in the Cold War, a classic covert operation along lines made familiar during World War II. The United States was just then creating a capacity to engage in secret missions of all kinds, including covert operations.”

Some of the CIA’s most impassioned Ukrainian agents had fought alongside the Nazis just a few years earlier. Among them were veterans of SS Einsatzgruppen—mobile death squads assigned to massacre Jews and other civilians. This history troubled some of their American handlers, but not enough to disrupt their partnership.

“It was a visceral business of using any bastard as long as he was anti-Communist,” one CIA officer later recalled. Another officer described the Ukrainian volunteers even more sharply: “They were Nazis, pure and simple—worse than that, because a lot of them did the Nazis’ dirty work for them.”

Across Europe, American intelligence officers scoured teeming displaced persons camps looking for Ukrainians who were willing to join a covert anti-Soviet war. Recruitment was easy. Hundreds of thousands of young men—not just Ukrainians but refugees from all over the continent—were huddled in the bleak purgatory of these camps. The best they might hope for was work clearing rubble or picking crops. When men introducing themselves as part of the “American Intelligence Service” offered them paying jobs with good living conditions, plus the prospect of returning to war against Bolshevism, many jumped to accept. Vetting was minimal, so recruits included more than a few who had worked with the Nazis as militia members, police officers, and executioners. One recruiting officer said his job was easy: “You’d go to a refugee camp and say, ‘Here, Joe, you want to join a special project?’ Most of these people were, like, the homeless.”

This recruitment laid the foundation for Project Aerodynamic. Over the following years, it would overlap with other CIA projects using various cryptonyms, among them Acrobat, Androgen, Antler, Cartel, Carthage, Crust, Outbound, PDDynamic (PD was code for the Soviet Union), Plumb, and Red Sox. The goal—using Ukraine as a platform for covert war against Moscow—never changed.

* * *

Many Ukrainians welcomed the Nazi army that charged across their territory toward Moscow. Tens of thousands signed up to join its murderous march eastward. One reason was their wish to establish a Ukrainian ethno-state, which meant cleansing it of unwanted minorities. That fit well with the Nazi policy of massacring people from “lesser races.” The other reason was equally appealing: Hitler was fighting Russia. Ukrainian nationalists would have flocked to join any army waging that war. History helps explain why.

The word Ukraine means “borderland” or “bordering country.” In the deep past, it was overrun by Romans, Huns, Goths, Vikings, Bulgars, and Magyars. A Slavic quasi-state known as Rus, and later called Kievan Rus after its capital, emerged in the ninth century. Today’s Russia and Ukraine, along with today’s Belarus, trace their roots to that time and place.

In the following centuries, bands of peasants and nomads rose to resist slave traders and other invaders. They became known as Cossacks, and to this day they are celebrated as Ukrainian folk heroes. In 1649 they established a principality known as the Cossack Hetmanate. It became a Russian vassal five years later and, under Russian protection, survived for more than a century.

Few people who lived under the Hetmanate felt a strong Ukrainian or Russian identity. Their lives were shaped more by religion and class than by ethnicity. Revolutions in France and the United States, followed by the upheaval that shook Europe in 1848, inspired the first efforts to create a modern Ukrainian nationalism. By the early twentieth century, nationalists were rejecting their identity as “little Russians,” which they saw as an imposition of colonialists in Moscow.

“It is useless to tell Ukrainians that we all descended, by birth and spirituality, from Kiev,” the Russian Nobel laureate Aleksander Solzhenitsyn observed, “and it is just as useless to expect Russians to recognize the fact that people beyond the Dnieper River are different.”

As Ukrainians pondered the meaning of their collective identity, outsiders cast covetous eyes upon their land. To some European statesmen, Ukraine was the place where civilization had to draw the line beyond which it would not permit barbarism—Russia—to advance. Britain promoted this view most vigorously. In order to win public support for their imperial adventures in the Caucasus, around the Black Sea, and across central Asia, British leaders and the British press found it expedient to portray Britain’s rival Russia in the worst possible light. This propaganda campaign laid the foundation for a Russophobia that has shaped Western consciousness ever since.

In 1906 the British scholar, explorer, and politician Halford Mackinder published a highly influential essay entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History.” He called Ukraine and the Eastern European lands around it the “pivot region” of the world: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.”

Mackinder, one of the founders of the modern discipline of geography, recognized how geography made Russia vulnerable. Much of the land that comprises today’s Ukraine is an open plain toward Russia. That tempts invaders. Russians have understood this vulnerability for generations—even more vividly after the Nazi army used Ukraine as a main corridor in its push toward Moscow. For Russians, Ukraine is, among other things, a land from which they have been repeatedly invaded and could be again.

Nationalism was emerging in Ukraine when the Bolsheviks seized power in Saint Petersburg in 1917. That year, the Ukrainian Rada, a form of parliament, declared an independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. It survived for four years.

One leader of that short-lived republic, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, mused after its collapse, “Ukrainian history is one of the most unhappy, senseless, and helpless histories … a series of endless and uninterrupted uprisings, wars, fires, famines, raids, military coups, intrigues, quarrels, and sabotage. And isn’t the same thing happening now?”

After the Russian civil war ended in 1922 with victory for the Bolsheviks, pieces of what had become known as Ukraine went to Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. The largest piece, nearly as big as Texas, was incorporated into the Soviet Union and became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Lenin, the first Soviet leader, allowed Ukraine a measure of autonomy. That produced a flowering of cultural, political, and religious nationalism. It was short-lived. Stalin, who came to power after Lenin’s death in 1924, had been People’s Commissar for Nationalities and believed that ethnic nationalism constituted the most dangerous threat to Soviet unity. He reversed Lenin’s tolerant policies, declared “bourgeois nationalism” to be Ukraine’s central problem, and ordered the arrest and execution of artists, writers, and other intellectuals who he believed embodied it.

Stalin’s most brutal assault on Ukraine was the collectivization policy that created a mass famine in 1932–33. Historians debate whether this was the most acute piece of a tragic famine that afflicted much of the Soviet Union, an attempt to punish Ukrainians for resisting collectivization, or a deliberate effort to wipe out the Ukrainian peasantry and Ukrainian nationalism. The result, however, was not debatable. In less than two years, three to five million Ukrainians perished, as private farming was outlawed and grain was requisitioned for export to other parts of the Soviet Union. Ukrainians named this horror the Holodomor, “murder by starvation.” Mentioning it was banned in the Soviet Union for the next half century.

It was during this period that the revolutionary Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists emerged. During the early 1930s, its main activity was assassination. Many of its dozens of victims were advocates of conciliation between Ukrainians and Poles. Others were Ukrainians who spoke out against nationalism or terrorism.

The outbreak of World War II filled the OUN with hope. In 1942 it created a large and well-organized military force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, known as the UPA. At first the UPA resisted the Nazis, who were forcibly deporting Jews and Poles from Ukrainian lands. By 1944, however, they had established a tactical alliance. Nazi commanders supplied the UPA with weapons to fight the Red Army. Thousands of UPA fighters had been members of “auxiliary police” units that carried out massacres under Nazi command and brought their Jew-killing experience with them to the UPA. Others were veterans of the Nachtigall Battalion, a Ukrainian division of the Nazi SS.

The land that is today’s Ukraine, along with today’s Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania, has for centuries been the world center of anti-Semitism. Most of the horrors inflicted on Jews in modern times have been inflicted there.

Ukraine was the heart of the Pale of Settlement, an area of the Russian Empire where Jews were allowed to live. At its peak population, in the late nineteenth century, about five million Jews lived there—40 percent of world Jewry. Pogroms began in the seventeenth century and erupted periodically. During World War II, Ukrainian fighters eagerly massacred Jews along with Poles, whom they considered “enemies of Ukraine.” Ukrainian auxiliary police units helped Nazis carry out their slaughters. The most notorious was at Babyn Yar, near Kyiv, where over the course of two days—September 29–30, 1941—33,771 Jews were machine-gunned to death and buried in specially dug ravines.

Collaboration with the Nazis has left profound legacies in Ukraine. The most painful is the memory of 1.5 million Jews who were killed there, leaving a population of just 17,000 at the war’s end. The one that shapes modern Ukraine is the continuing power of neo-Nazis and other extreme nationalists in Ukraine’s political life.

After the Nazis surrendered in 1945, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army ordered its fighters not to disarm: “People! Know! Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians, the Jews are your enemies. Destroy them!” Many Ukrainians answered that call. “In the winter of 1945–46 there was hardly a day of no fighting,” according to a CIA account written several years later. Another CIA officer reported that “the struggle of the Ukrainian resistance movement for the liberation of the Ukraine from under the Soviet Communist domination is being conducted in practically all phases of life.… Because of the topography and character of the western areas of Ukraine, these activities were and are more intense and systematic in the Western Ukraine.… Since there is practically no rural family in the Western Ukraine which does not have a relative or close friend who is or has been in the underground, the UPA and all other branches of the underground depend on this section of civilian population more than any other.”

Soviet counterattacks against Ukrainian partisans were beyond fierce. Tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers stormed into battle alongside paramilitary and security police forces. They also lashed out against the civilian population of western Ukraine, where support for the insurgency was widespread. Between 1944 and 1953, according to one scholarly estimate, “153,000 underground members and supporters were killed, 134,000 were arrested, and some 204,000 people were deported. The active work of the OUN stopped in 1954, following the arrest of its last leader, Vasyl Kuk.”

That ended guerrilla warfare in Ukraine, but it did not discourage CIA officers who were directing Project Aerodynamic. As the partisan war wound down, they adapted their tactics.

* * *

Hunting Nazi war criminals was a central mission of American intelligence officers in postwar Germany. Some who they arrested, however, not only escaped prosecution but went to work for the United States. The first of these were rocket scientists who specialized in ballistic missile technology—and who had shown their skill by designing the rockets that rained down on London and other European cities during the war. Others were chemists and physicians who had conducted gruesome experiments on concentration camp inmates and became advisers to MK-ULTRA, the CIA’s program searching for mind-control drugs. The third group of ex-Nazis guided through the net were exiles connected to underground networks in Ukraine and other parts of Eastern Europe.

Loopholes began opening within days of the war’s end. On May 10, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of Allied forces in Europe, to arrest all Nazi war criminals—but added that “in your discretion, you may make such exceptions as you deem advisable for intelligence and other military reasons.”

That set a pattern. An American intelligence project, Operation Paperclip, was established to “bleach” the records of former Nazis so they could escape prosecution and either settle quietly into work for the Americans or, in some cases, immigrate to the United States. Then, in 1949, Congress authorized the admission of up to a hundred aliens into the United States each year “without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws or regulations” if their entry was deemed to be “in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission.” Some of the first to be admitted were Ukrainians whose Nazi backgrounds would otherwise have prevented them from entering.

During this intense early phase of the Cold War, the CIA accepted as axiomatic that using ex-Nazis to fight the Soviet Union made good sense. America’s war against Bolshevism, briefly interrupted by the Nazi distraction, was resuming. All volunteers were welcome.

* * *

If one man could liberate all oppressed peoples in the Soviet-dominated world, it was Frank Wisner. At least that’s what he believed. World War II had not even ended when Wisner decided to channel his fierce energy into clandestine warfare against the Soviet Union. He quickly realized that the most promising path to undermining Soviet power was through Ukraine.

Subversion in Ukraine was Wisner’s idea. From Washington and from secret bases in Germany, he planned and directed a host of projects that were designed to turn Ukraine into a battering ram against Moscow. He is the reason this campaign grew so large, lasted so long, and cost so many lives. If it failed utterly, as it seemed at the time, he is largely to blame. If it laid the groundwork for success generations later, some credit is his.

Wisner fit well with the silver-spoon adventurers who shaped the early CIA. Although not a product of New England boarding schools and the Ivy League, as were many of his comrades, he grew up with the sense of elite privilege that most of them shared. His family owned a lumber mill in Laurel, Mississippi. He grew up in a humid cocoon, isolated from children other than his cousins. After awakening he preferred to lie on his bed so a maid could dress him, rather than dress himself.

At the University of Virginia, Wisner was tapped to join an elite club, the Seven Society, which is said to be so secret that names of its members are revealed only after death. There he polished his charm. He was endlessly entertaining, a gifted raconteur who could adjust his Southern accent depending on circumstance—but also, according to one friend, a “cold, ruthless kind of guy.”

After winning a law degree from the University of Virginia in 1934, Wisner joined Carter Ledyard & Milburn, one of the elite New York law firms from which many intelligence officers emerged. In 1941 he enlisted in the navy, and after two years at desk jobs was seconded to the Office of Strategic Services, America’s wartime intelligence service. His life-changing moment came in August 1944, while he was stationed in Istanbul. His OSS superiors directed him to travel to Romania with twenty-one other intelligence officers and establish a station in Bucharest. Full of excitement, he headed toward what would become one of the happiest adventures of his life—and one of its most devastating traumas.

Romania was passing through a dramatic moment. King Michael’s government had been allied with the Nazis throughout the war, but on August 23, 1944, as Allied troops were approaching, he announced in a radio speech that Romania was switching sides. Wisner arrived in Bucharest like a monarch, the chief representative of American power in a lively capital that had escaped serious war damage. His first mission, arranging the repatriation of more than a thousand American airmen who had been imprisoned after being shot down over Romania, ended in success that solidified his commanding position. Impeccably manicured, dashing in his tailored navy uniform, he became the toast of society and an intimate adviser to the royal family. By some accounts he carried on an affair with the vivacious “Tanda”—Princess Alexandra Caradja, the twenty-four-year-old wife of the aging beer baron in whose mansion Wisner and his staff lived for several months.

“In a word,” Wisner wrote to his wife soon after arriving in Bucharest, “I have caught up with the war and I do not intend to get behind it again.”

Stalin, however, had plans for Romania that interrupted Wisner’s bacchanal. Red Army soldiers who arrived to occupy Bucharest were violently undisciplined. Soviet commissars imposed increasing restrictions on the monarchy. Wisner began writing cables back to Washington warning of an imminent Communist takeover and reporting that Romanians felt “abandoned by the US and Great Britain.” He was told in reply that he should stop complaining, avoid “any speech or action that would evidence antagonism to Russia,” and instead establish “cordial relations” with Soviet officers. That ran against his deepest impulses.

Wisner’s worst fears for Romania soon became horrific reality. At the end of 1947, the non-Communist prime minister was deposed and packed into exile. Leading figures of the traditional aristocracy were arrested. Stalin then ordered that all Romanians of German descent, regardless of nationality or status, be herded into boxcars and sent to labor in the Soviet Union. Eighty thousand people, many from ethnic German families that had lived in Romania for generations, were rounded up in a matter of days. Wisner drove wildly through Bucharest looking for people to save as Russian soldiers pulled victims from their homes. He had to watch helplessly as the Romanian elite he had come to love and admire—the group into which he had immersed himself so delightfully—was crushed around him. The sight of his elegant and educated friends weeping and crying for help as they were shipped to oblivion deeply stunned him. He never recovered.

“My husband was brutally, brutally shocked,” his wife recalled years later. “It was what probably affected his life more than any other thing.” Wisner himself conceded that this experience left “a profound and lasting influence.” Aerodynamic was part of his revenge. The passion he poured into destabilizing Russia began churning in Romania.

When World War II ended, Wisner, like many officers in the Office of Strategic Services, looked forward to a new post on the front lines of America’s emerging covert war against the Soviet Union. Like them, he was devastated when President Harry Truman announced on September 20, 1945, that he was abolishing the OSS. America had never had an intelligence service in peacetime, and Truman didn’t think it needed one. Veterans of the OSS, who had spent the war years directing all manner of derring-do, trudged unwillingly back to their jobs at New York law firms and investment banks. Wisner returned to Carter Ledyard, became a partner, and moved into an elegant apartment at 1050 Park Avenue. He and his former colleagues spent long hours reminiscing about their wartime adventures.

“They were aching to get back,” one CIA officer mused years later. “They were boy scouts who were bored in their law jobs. They were like fighter pilots in England after the Battle of Britain. They couldn’t adjust. They were both great romantics and saw themselves as saviors of the world.”

In 1946, after barely a year back at the law firm, Wisner secured a job in Washington. He became deputy director of the newly created Office of Occupied Territories, with the rank of deputy assistant secretary of state and duties that included intelligence work. Two years later, having established his credentials, he was named director of a new agency called the Office of Special Projects, later renamed the Office of Policy Coordination in an effort to disguise its true purpose. That gave him authority over American covert action worldwide.

As Wisner was assuming this command, President Truman made a decision that would shape America’s approach to Ukraine, and the rest of the world, for generations to come. Two years after abolishing the Office of Strategic Services, he changed his mind and decided that the United States needed a clandestine service after all. On July 26, 1947, he signed the National Security Act, which created the Central Intelligence Agency. Its duties were defined only vaguely: to “advise” and “make recommendations to” the newly created National Security Council (NSC). One brief clause, however, could be interpreted as giving it license to do much more. The act authorized the CIA “to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council shall from time to time direct.”

On June 18, 1948, the NSC specified what those duties would be. Its directive, known as NSC 10/2, is a crucial piece of Cold War history. It remained secret for decades. Frank Wisner kept his copy in a safe and required officers to sign a special secrecy pledge before they were allowed to read it. That was because it gave legal sanction to a detailed list of clandestine attacks against other countries. It authorized “any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”

As the CIA was organizing itself, Wisner pushed his Office of Policy Coordination into overdrive. He hired hundreds of officers and dispatched them to secret outposts around the world. His covert-action empire operated in a bureaucratic netherworld where the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA overlapped. With a growing crew of comrades, he plotted and directed America’s unseen war against Soviet power.

Among Wisner’s fixations was the idea of attacking the Soviet Union from within. That led him inexorably to Ukraine. He saw it—correctly—as the vulnerable underbelly of Bolshevik power, the only place inside the Soviet Union where rebellion could conceivably explode. American covert action in Ukraine was aimed at provoking that explosion.

Finances were no problem. Under a secret arrangement approved by Truman, 5 percent of the funds that Congress appropriated for the Marshall Plan, which was established in 1948 to support the reconstruction of Europe, were diverted to support intelligence operations. The historian and former CIA officer Richard Harris Smith called the Office of Policy Coordination a “virtual appendage of the Marshall Plan,” which lent its “men, foreign currency, and official cover to OPC in its covert campaign to compete with the Russians at every ‘unofficial’ level of European life.” Under this arrangement, more than $600 million flowed to Wisner and his Office of Policy Coordination over the three-year life of the Marshall Plan. Agents called it “candy.”

“We couldn’t spend it all,” one of them later marveled. “I remember once meeting with Wisner and the comptroller. My God, I said, how can we spend that? There were no limits and nobody had to account for it. It was amazing.”

* * *

Between 1948 and 1950, a rapid-fire series of events turned the Cold War suddenly hotter. The first shock came from Czechoslovakia, where in February 1948 Communists staged a “constitutional coup” and seized control of the government. Less than two months later, riots erupted in Bogotá, Colombia, while Secretary of State George Marshall was there. Soon afterward Stalin ordered a blockade of West Berlin, shutting off the land routes through which Western powers supplied its residents. In August 1949 the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Communists under Mao Zedong won the Chinese civil war. Then, on June 29, 1950, a Soviet-backed army from North Korea invaded South Korea. Washington saw these episodes as opening shots in a global war directed by puppet masters in Moscow.

“Present intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet armed forces the capability of over-running in about six months all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, while simultaneously occupying important continental points in the Far East,” the National Security Council reported to President Truman at the end of 1948. “By no later than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with atomic, biological and chemical weapons.” American policy, the National Security Council recommended, should be “to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence” and to “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”

Frank Wisner had already decided that Ukraine was the territory from which he could most effectively place “maximum strain” on the Soviet Union. As he was planning to launch guerrilla operations there, he concluded that Aerodynamic needed a civilian component. He directed his officers to identify Ukrainians and others of Eastern European descent who had helped administer Nazi-run territories during World War II. Wisner wanted to bring them to the United States and put them to work as anti-Soviet propagandists or activists. President Truman had signed an executive order rendering ex-Nazis ineligible to enter the United States, but there were ways around it.

Wisner arranged for General Lucius Clay, the US High Commissioner in West Germany, to remove the names of his chosen collaborators from lists of war criminals. Their biographies were sanitized. Some were given false identities. Then, working with friends in the State Department, Wisner obtained visas for them.

Soviet counterintelligence officers had anticipated these recruitment campaigns. They seeded the displaced persons camps with agents. Some of those agents infiltrated the CIA’s Ukrainian “secret army,” posing as guerrillas, underground resistance fighters, or organizers of exile support groups. Aerodynamic was riddled with informers from the start.

In 1948, as Wisner was recruiting these Ukrainians, the US Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, which authorized the entry into the United States of two hundred thousand European refugees but excluded all who had been associated with the Nazis. That clause was inserted after survivors of Nazi terror testified in Washington that many of their former tormentors were in the displaced persons camps from which the immigrants would be selected. Representative Arthur Klein of New York read a graphic account of a Nazi massacre in the Belorussian town Borisov and warned that the perpetrators were among those hoping to immigrate to the United States.

“No doubt every one of them now bears a new name, passes himself off as a martyr of Soviet oppression, and answers to all the specifications of a ‘political refugee,’” Klein told his colleagues. “The story of Borisov was enacted in every one of the hundreds of towns of Belorussia and Ukraine, and when the Jews were no more, the same present-day martyrs were used to hound partisans, recruit forced laborers, confiscate property, supervise labor gangs, operate the crematoria.”

This history did not distract Wisner. He believed that he was leading the grand crusade of his age and perhaps of all history: the war against Communism. If a law prevented him from bringing some of his Ukrainian warriors into the United States, he would bend the law in the name of human freedom.

* * *

Exile groups are notoriously quarrelsome. The Ukrainians were no exception, as their CIA handlers quickly learned. One who worked with them reported that they were “determined and able men, but with the psychology of the hunted. They are ready to sacrifice their lives or commit suicide at any time to further their cause or to prevent security violations, and they are equally ready to kill if they must.”

Some of the disputes that divided Ukrainian factions were encouraged by Soviet infiltrators. Many, however, stemmed from personal and political passion. Some Ukrainians set independence from Moscow as their nonnegotiable demand. Others wished to align Russia with a non-Bolshevik Russia. Émigrés in the United States managed to keep these and a host of other tensions under control, but in Europe they often spilled into violence. American officers used death squads made up of war veterans to kill suspected double agents in displaced persons camps. Several surviving reports of this project, called Operation Ohio, use the word “liquidation.” One of them describes an assassination spree at a camp near the Bavarian town Mittenwald that took at least twenty lives.

“Some of these guys were the best commercial hit men that you ever heard of,” one of the American officers who directed them said years later. “Mechanics, killers—they were Ukrainians, mainly.”

This background made Ukrainian veterans especially attractive to Wisner and other Americans who were looking for ways to fight the Soviet Union. The crucibles of World War II and the partisan rebellion that followed had produced a large pool of Ukrainian men who were eager to return to the battlefield and had the bloody skills that guerrilla warfare requires.

The first known CIA memo that suggested creating a “guerrilla warfare corps” to fight behind the Iron curtain is dated September 1947. A few months later, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff directed security agencies to find “political figures among the refugees” who could be forged into “the potential nucleus of possible Freedom Committees encouraging resistance movements in the Soviet World.” Then, in March 1948, the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee, known as SANACC, approved a directive entitled “Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in the US National Interest.” It ordered the launching of an effort to recruit “native anti-Communist elements … which have shown extreme fortitude in the face of Communist menace.” Officially these recruits would be deployed to “fill the gaps … in our politico-psychological operations.” One intelligence historian called that “a euphemism for covert destabilization and propaganda operations.”

Destabilizing the Soviet Union was not all that the Americans wanted their Ukrainian agents to do. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many in Washington genuinely feared that the Red Army was preparing to invade Western Europe. Any such invasion would likely be launched from or through Ukraine. That made American military commanders desperate for operatives on the ground who could provide advance warning by reporting troop movements or other signs of imminent attack. The CIA was tasked with finding and deploying those operatives. Its officers told Ukrainian volunteers that the United States wanted to help free them from Soviet rule. That was true, but not the whole truth. Richard Helms, a future director of central intelligence who was among the first officers to make contact with Ukrainian guerrillas, wrote in 1948 that the “best approach to these groups” would be “stating that our aim is rendering assistance to dissidents, rather than purely intelligence purposes.”

In 1948 Wisner added another operation to his Ukraine portfolio. SANACC directed him to conduct a secret sweep through Europe’s exile communities to find all those willing to take “special” anti-Soviet action. The directive—which, as a State Department representative to SANACC, Wisner had helped write—authorized him to spend $5 million to recruit and train exiles from Ukraine and other parts of the “Soviet World.” A second directive, issued a few weeks later, specified that recruits would be expected to operate inside Soviet-controlled territory and that their tasks would include “psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage, and miscellaneous operations such as assassination, target capture, and rescue of Allied airmen.” Money for this project would be discreetly transferred from the military to the State Department for “secret disbursement.” Wisner named it Operation Bloodstone.

“In some ways that effort encompassed a genuine bid to enlist Eastern Europeans and disaffected Soviets,” according to one study, “but in a distressing array of cases, Bloodstone served to cover collaboration with former Nazis. In this respect the project paralleled Operation Paperclip, in which the US Army imported scientists who had worked in Nazi secret weapons programs.”

CIA officers in Munich reported to Washington in 1950 that “the support, development, and exploitation of the Ukrainian Underground movement for resistance and intelligence purposes will be increased on a priority basis.” In another memo, they promised “greater exploitation of dissent” and reported that they were engaged in “preparations for covert programs.”

On December 22, Helms and Wisner submitted their recommendations to Dulles. They proposed “the exploitation and expansion of the Ukrainian resistance movement for the following purposes, either now or in time of war: (a) political and psychological warfare; (b) resistance and guerrilla warfare.” Dulles approved. He was doing more than launching the first American effort to destabilize the Soviet Union. He was also certifying that Ukraine was the best place in the world to make trouble for Moscow.

* * *

When Wisner first floated the idea of using Ukrainians to destabilize the Soviet Union, some had been skeptical. For a brief period after World War II, the State Department clung to the hope that the United States could continue a friendly relationship with its wartime ally. One diplomat who reviewed an early proposal for covert action in Ukraine, Llewellyn Thompson—later ambassador to the Soviet Union—replied cautiously. “The thinking here,” he wrote, “appears to be that we have to be very careful not to give much encouragement to Ukrainian nationalists because of the effect this might have on racial Russians.”

That view rapidly lost favor in Washington. In 1949, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal summoned one of his intrepid intelligence officers, the Harvard-trained linguist Harry Rositzke, and gave him the job of finding agents in Ukraine who could report troop movements or other hints of imminent invasion. Soon Rositzke was dropping cash, medical supplies, and—most importantly—radio transmitters to Ukrainian partisans who were still in the Carpathian Mountains. Yet the Pentagon was under no illusion that these partisans could hold out against the Red Army.

“The overall purpose of our operations was to provide an early warning system, to tip us off if there were indications of mobilization in the area,” Rositzke later conceded. “It was perfectly clear they would not survive.”

Rositzke had acquired a taste for cloak-and-dagger work during World War II, when he served in the OSS as chief of military intelligence in London and then in Paris. In the late 1940s, his work smuggling and air-dropping partisans into Ukraine—unsuccessful as it had been—attracted the attention of the newly established CIA. He moved from the Pentagon to become the first chief of the CIA’s Soviet Division. In that job, nothing was more important than promoting rebellion in Ukraine—even though Rositzke himself recognized the OUN, with which he would be working, as “primarily a terrorist organization.”

From the growing list of Ukrainians at displaced persons camps who volunteered to “join a special project,” Wisner’s officers chose the most promising to be trained as commandoes. At makeshift bases adjacent to the camps, they were trained in hand-to-hand combat and taught how to use small arms, how to carry out sabotage attacks, and how to transmit radio messages. Their instructors were a mixed bunch: US Army officers, German officers who until recently had been in the Nazi army, and veterans of the Waffen-SS.

During the late 1940s, Wisner shepherded more than three hundred Ukrainian Nazis into the United States. He placed the more educated in émigré groups that he covertly supported, with names like National Committee for a Free Europe and American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Others he sent to training camps in Virginia and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. All of this, as one Justice Department lawyer later wrote, Wisner did “over the express prohibitions of Congress, in violation of several criminal laws, and against the direct orders of the Commander in Chief.”

Beginning in 1949, these trained commandoes were brought to Germany and sent off to foment war in Ukraine. Some parachuted in. Others crossed unguarded borders at night. Wisner saw them as the vanguard of an insurgency that would set Ukraine afire and perhaps even pull the Soviet Union crashing down.

“These cross-border operations,” Harry Rositzke later recalled, “involved enormous resources of technical and documentation support, hundreds of training officers, thousands of safehouses, and above all hundreds of courageous men who preferred to fight the Russians or the Communists rather than linger in the DP camps or emigrate to Brazil.” Later the CIA commissioned an internal history of its approach to Ukraine during this period.

“From 1946 through 1948, American intelligence officials in Washington were ambivalent, if not wary, of establishing contact with Ukrainian groups in Germany,” it begins. “As the Cold War deepened, American rationalization for using these anticommunist groups underwent a subtle but crucial transformation. After 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency moved to cooperate with the Ukrainians against the Soviets as opposed to merely collecting information on émigré movements. This denoted a major shift from the approach that Headquarters took in 1946 and 1947.… Foreign Branch M’s Richard Helms and Harry Rositzke, chief of Foreign Branch S, submitted a proposal to Col. Robert A. Schow, the new Assistant Director for Special Operations, on 26 July 1949 seeking approval to exploit the Ukrainian resistance movement within the Soviet Union. Schow approved the proposal the same day.”

* * *

Officers who had faithfully served Hitler were part of the CIA’s Ukraine project from its inception. Wisner did not consider that infiltration, but simple common sense. True infiltration came from a source he refused to acknowledge: the Soviet secret services.

For years the CIA failed to recognize how fully its covert operations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had been compromised. It ignored concerns expressed by some officers who were assigned to recruit Ukrainian agents. As early as 1948, no less a figure than the director of central intelligence, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, had written, “The CIA has sufficient evidence at this time to indicate that many of these groups have already been successfully penetrated by Soviet and satellite intelligence agencies.” In 1952 the chief of operations for the CIA’s Russia Desk concluded that not just Aerodynamic but all CIA projects inside the Soviet Union were so fully penetrated that they should be stopped. He was overruled. The central goal of CIA operations in Ukraine—to wound the Soviet regime—was considered so transcendent that security precautions were almost willfully overlooked.

“A second problem was the war record of some of the anti-Communist Ukrainians,” according to an internal CIA report on Aerodynamic. “The struggle between the Wehrmacht and Red Army awakened and inflamed ancient rivalries and hatreds in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians despised Poles and Jews, as well as Soviet Communists. Ukrainians served in the German army and had been linked to Nazi atrocities on the Eastern Front.… Ukrainian nationalists allied themselves with their Nazi ‘liberators’ during the first days of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Even though the OUN’s enthusiasm diminished after the Nazis failed to support Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainians continued to fight alongside the Germans until the end of the war.… The sometimes brutal war record of many émigré groups became blurred as they became more critical to the CIA.”

During the entire Cold War, the Soviet secret service—known in the late 1940s as MGB, then MVD, and after 1954 KGB—maintained a large department devoted entirely to infiltrating dissident groups, both within the Soviet sphere of control and abroad. Volunteers emerged to join these groups, clandestine networks took shape, and operations were planned—often with the full knowledge of Soviet agents, who waited patiently for the right moment to crush them. Ukrainian groups that were in contact with the CIA were repeatedly rolled up and their members arrested because Soviet agents had infiltrated them.

The first chance that these agents had to penetrate CIA operations in Ukraine was handed to them by the CIA itself. It came through the life’s work of one of the twentieth century’s most remarkable spymasters, General Reinhard Gehlen.

Even before the CIA was founded in 1947, American intelligence officers had concluded that the United States should support anti-Communist Ukrainians—but how would they find those Ukrainians? The United States had been the Soviet Union’s ally during World War II and so was never in touch with anti-Soviet groups. Nazi intelligence officers, however, knew them all. To reach the Ukrainian underground, the CIA needed those Nazi officers.

On May 22, 1945, just fifteen days after the Nazi surrender, an elegant and refined officer turned himself in to the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps. He introduced himself to his American interrogator by saying, “I am a general and the chief of the Intelligence Department of the High Command of the German Army. I have information of the highest importance for your supreme commander and the American government, and I must be taken immediately to a senior commander.” The interrogator, unimpressed, replied, “You were a general. You were, sir. And please don’t tell me what I have to do.”

It did not take long for the Americans to realize who had walked in. Reinhard Gehlen was a unique prisoner. His captors dispatched him to Camp King, a US Army base in the town of Oberursel, near Frankfurt, that was a center of American intelligence operations in the postwar era. There he was interrogated and debriefed, but treated with the respect he believed he deserved and even given his own villa in a quiet corner of the base. That suited an officer who, during the war, had directed all of Hitler’s intelligence operations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Gehlen’s files were an encyclopedia of information about anti-Soviet networks in Ukraine and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. As the war was drawing to a close, he had microfilmed and hidden them. They were his life insurance policy.

First Gehlen stashed his trove in a wine cellar. Then he sent his most trusted staff officer, who had been a forester in civilian life, to find a safe hiding place amid the crags of Wendelstein, a mountain in the Bavarian Alps. The officer spread the treasure among caves and abandoned tunnels.

Gehlen and the Americans struck a deal that promised rich rewards for both parties. In exchange for immunity from prosecution and a handsome retainer, Gehlen delivered his network of Ukrainian informers, spies, and anti-Soviet fighters—along with his networks in the rest of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe—to the Americans. Thus the entire Nazi intelligence apparatus that had operated in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during World War II, known as Fremde Heere Ost, transferred its allegiance to the United States. Many of its agents were veterans of the SS and its intelligence arm, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers), which among other duties had been responsible for overseeing the mobile murder units called Einsatzgruppen. The American-dominated war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg declared the SD a criminal organization, sentenced several of its officers to prison terms, and sent its commander to the gallows. At the same time, other SD veterans were quietly entering the service of the United States. Gehlen was their paragon: one of Hitler’s senior intelligence officers who became a close collaborator of the Americans.

The value of this transaction was obvious and immense. At a single stroke, American intelligence officers acquired a unique road map of the anti-Soviet underground. Frank Wisner was so eager to turn this asset into action that he did not recognize—or did not want to recognize—how many Soviet agents had infiltrated Gehlen’s Fremde Heere Ost during the war years.

“The American secret-service novices had swallowed the bait and allowed themselves to be dazzled by the existence of a fictitious army of agents,” one of Gehlen’s biographers wrote.

Four months after Gehlen surrendered to the victorious Americans, he and three of his Third Reich comrades were flown to the United States for a round of meetings with military intelligence officers. By all accounts he was warmly welcomed. He remained for eight months.

“He’s on our side and that’s all that matters,” Allen Dulles reasoned. “Besides, one needn’t ask him to one’s club.”

Newspapers in East Germany gleefully published accounts of America’s burgeoning partnership with Nazi officers. “Reports in the Soviet-dominated press in Germany concerning the use of former German staff and intelligence officers are such that there is no question that the Russians know this operation is going on, even though they may have some of the details wrong,” Richard Helms wrote in one cable. “Certainly the fact that so much publicity has been given to this indicates serious flaws in the security of the operation.”

By the end of 1946, Gehlen had transformed Fremde Heere Ost into what he called the Gehlen Organization, known in intelligence circles as “the Org.” He brought more than three hundred former Nazi officers onto his staff, their salaries paid by the United States. At one point an American officer who worked with him calculated that 28 percent of intelligence officers in the Org had been Nazi Party members. Gehlen coolly replied that the Org had a lower percentage of SS and Nazi Party veterans than the German Bundestag.

Guided by Gehlen, the CIA made contact with Ukrainian nationalists, including guerrillas and would-be guerrillas. The Ukrainians were ecstatic to find such a powerful new patron. None had any qualms about transferring their loyalty from the Nazis to the Americans. Their shared goal—fighting Moscow—was all that mattered. One historian surveyed the results.

Many of the “refugee liberation groups” that American intelligence services embraced were in fact extreme right-wing exile organizations that had collaborated with the Nazis during the occupation of their homelands. Some of their leaders were major war criminals who directed massacres and deportations of Jews during the Holocaust. Despite this background, US clandestine operations experts convinced the National Security Council and other senior policymakers that US sponsorship of these organizations, and of their German agent handlers, would yield substantial benefits for the United States.…

The various factions of the Ukrainska Povstancha Armia (UPA) claimed to have large networks of sympathizers behind enemy lines.… The truth is that these Nazi utilization programs have frequently been disasters, even when all ethical considerations are laid aside. Their behind-the-lines spy teams are now known to have been largely nonexistent, and those that did exist were laced with Soviet double agents.

Gehlen worked first with G-2, the US Army intelligence service. The CIA took over soon after it was created in 1947, bringing him under its direct supervision. Over the next decade, the United States spent more than $200 million to subsidize Gehlen and his “Org.”

At the end of 1948, the National Security Council issued a secret directive that, while not mentioning Ukraine by name, helped set the stage for covert action there. It directed the CIA “to increase defections among the elite of the Soviet World and to utilize refugees from across the Soviet World in the national interests of the US.… Such defections, especially on the part of the elite and more particularly when the refugee is enabled to tell his story, serve to explode the Soviet myth.… All-pervasive distrust and suspicion would be aggravated, denunciations would be compounded and repressive measures multiplied. Such a chain of events would have a stifling effect on the creative capabilities of the Soviet World, damage its overall productive efficiency and generally tend to exert a demoralizing influence.”

Wisner played a role in shaping that directive. In effect, he gave marching orders to himself. Thus armed, he set off to launch clandestine war against the Soviet Union—beginning in Ukraine.

“Somewhere deep in him, you knew it was the evil empire versus the good guys,” one of his friends later recalled. “You knew it was part of him. And that it was a great game, to be played with great ferocity.”

* * *

Intense focus on Ukraine did not prevent Frank Wisner from seeking another place where he might also be able to spark anti-Soviet rebellion. He settled on Albania. It was part of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe but geographically isolated from Soviet territory. As an added attraction, it has a long coastline where clandestine fighters could land. Wisner’s dream scenario for Albania was the same as his dream scenario for Ukraine: Commandoes would land; they would organize disaffected locals and set off a popular revolt; the West would support them by air-dropping weapons and equipment; civil war would break out; and the flames of that fire would kindle rebellion across the “Soviet World.”

In Albania the CIA shared covert responsibilities with MI6, the British secret service. As in Ukraine, many of the recruits were fascists, veterans of a collaborationist group, Balli Kombëtar, that had helped the Nazis rule their country during World War II. They were taken to Libya for training in sabotage and guerrilla tactics and, beginning in 1947, air-dropped into the Albanian mountains. In 1949 this project, known as Operation Valuable and later Operation Fiend, expanded to support landings on Albanian beaches. Wisner sent officers to help train and direct the volunteer commandoes. His hopes were wildly unrealistic, based not on intelligence reports but rather on his own wishful thinking.

“Albania is ripe for revolt,” he fantasized in 1950. “All that is necessary is leadership, subsidy money, and eventually some arms.… If we have great success, we shall have eliminated a pocket of communist imperialism and dealt the Soviet Empire a blow that will resound behind the Iron Curtain.”

Instead of great success, Operation Valuable was an utter failure. As in Ukraine, nearly all the commandoes and their local collaborators, a total of about three hundred people, were arrested and shot. Also as in Ukraine, some survivors emerged with bitter accusations. “Our ‘allies’ wanted to make use of Albania as a guinea pig, without caring about the human losses, for an absurd enterprise that was condemned to failure,” one asserted. Another added, “We were used as an experiment. We were a small part of a big game, pawns that could be sacrificed.”

Operation Valuable was a small-scale test of regime-change possibilities inside the “Soviet World.” Wisner called it “a clinical experiment to see whether larger rollback operations could be feasible elsewhere.” One of his fellow warriors, Tom Braden, was sharper, calling the result “a tragedy, a searing defeat, a perfectly terrible thing.” Few beyond tight refugee circles—and the Albanian secret police—knew that Valuable had existed, much less that it had failed so completely. That failure made Ukraine even more alluring.

* * *

Frank Wisner’s stint as the freewheeling czar of American covert action ended in 1950 after Truman named a harshly demanding taskmaster, General Walter Bedell Smith, as director of central intelligence. Smith had been Eisenhower’s notoriously efficient chief of staff during World War II, and he came to the CIA determined to impose bureaucratic discipline. Wisner was an obvious target. For more than two years he had been his own boss. The White House, Pentagon, and CIA had given him wide latitude to launch whatever operations struck his fancy anywhere in the world. By 1950 his covert service, the Office of Policy Coordination, employed 1,500 case officers and used the resources of the CIA, the State Department, and various military intelligence units. Wisner gave his superiors only broad outlines of what his agents were doing. Until “Beetle” Smith arrived, that was all anyone wanted to hear. Smith, however, summoned Wisner soon after taking office and, with the gruffness for which he was renowned, told him, “Wisner, you work for me.”

For the next year, Wisner went about his clandestine business under the loose supervision of the CIA’s deputy director for plans, Allen Dulles. When Dulles was promoted to the Agency’s number-two job in August 1951, Wisner replaced him. That put him back in his old job—directing American covert action—with a new title. By 1952 he commanded nearly five thousand intelligence officers in Washington and at forty-seven foreign stations.

During his heyday in the 1950s, Wisner made history. He oversaw far-reaching CIA operations including the overthrows of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and President Jacobo Árbenz of Guatemala in 1954. Europe, however, remained his obsession. After his first tour of European CIA stations in his new role, he concluded that the CIA “should stop thinking of the Soviet Union as a monolithic nation” and instead begin “encouraging resistance movements into the Soviet World.”

That mindset was translated into official United States policy after April 1950, when Truman received a fifty-eight-page report he had commissioned from the State Department and Pentagon. It described the Soviets’ “hostile design” in near-apocalyptic terms. Soviet leaders were said to be plotting “world domination,” and could be stopped only by “the rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.”

This top-secret document, known as NSC-68, does not mention Ukraine or argue explicitly for covert attacks on the Soviet Union. Several of its clauses, however, reinforced the CIA’s determination to use Ukraine as a platform for anti-Soviet subversion—or, as NSC-68 put it, “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power” and “change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.”

We should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union.… The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people. That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear, and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

Truman responded to NSC-68 by tripling the American military budget over the next three years. In addition to recommending that buildup, however, NSC-68 also stressed the urgency of attacking the Soviet Union by “means short of war.” That led Truman to ask Congress for $100 million to support resistance movements behind the Iron curtain “or for other purposes.” Congress approved. In Moscow and Eastern European capitals, this was taken as a declaration of covert war.

“We accuse the United States of financing actions aimed at war and aggression,” a Polish diplomat declared at the United Nations after the $100 million was appropriated. “We accuse the United States of preparing acts of sabotage in our countries, intended to disrupt our economic life. We accuse the US government of financing treason and espionage.”

* * *

On June 8, 1946, two American intelligence officers in Berlin met near Alexanderplatz with two of their Soviet counterparts. They wanted the Soviets to turn over an American they had arrested, Fred Kaltenbach, who had been a Nazi propagandist during World War II and was wanted for treason in the United States. One of the Soviet officers replied that they would consider exchanging Kaltenbach for a Ukrainian living in Germany’s American Zone who they considered a traitor to the Soviet Union. He produced a list of names and pointed to the one at the top.

“This man is for us as Kaltenbach is to you,” one of them said.

The name to which that Soviet officer pointed was Stepan Bandera. This may have been the first time American officers heard it. Their meeting did not produce a prisoner exchange—Kaltenbach had died in a Soviet prison—but the Americans could not have failed to note the Soviets’ interest in Bandera.

The new director of US intelligence in Eastern Europe, Reinhard Gehlen, knew much more about him. Bandera was a violent Ukrainian nationalist of decidedly fascist bent. He joined his first militant group when he was fifteen and went on to become a leader of the largest of those groups, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. At the age of twenty-five, he joined with a handful of other OUN militants to assassinate Poland’s interior minister. They were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. In the chaos of the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, they escaped or were freed.

“Young terrorists such as Stepan Bandera were formed not by the prewar empires, but by fascist ideology and the experience of national discrimination in Poland,” the American historian Timothy Snyder wrote. “In the late 1920s and early 1930s, as a new Polish government sought reconciliation with its five million Ukrainian citizens, Ukrainian nationalists acted decisively to prevent any compromise settlement. Bandera was one of the main organizers of terror campaigns intended to prevent Ukrainians from accepting the Polish government by provoking Polish retaliation. The main targets of their assassination attempts were Ukrainians and Poles who wished to work together.”

In 1940, as World War II raged, Bandera concluded that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists had become too moderate. The group split into two factions. Bandera’s more militant force became known as OUN/Bandera. He first put it at the service of Nazi invaders, who embodied both his violent racism and his hatred of Bolshevism. Then, on June 30, 1941, the OUN/Bandera declared Ukraine an independent state. It pledged to “work closely with the National-Socialist Greater Germany, under the leadership of its führer Adolf Hitler, which is forming a new order in Europe.”

That didn’t satisfy the invading Nazis, who were rampaging toward Moscow. They wanted to rule Ukraine themselves. Rather than cooperate with Bandera, they placed him under “custodial arrest” along with others who had signed the declaration of independence. His “Ukrainian State” survived for just thirteen days.

Bandera spent much of the war interned at a barracks for high-level political prisoners adjoining the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In 1944 the Nazis released him so he could mobilize his fighters against the advancing Red Army. He threw himself into the task. By the beginning of 1945, working from a base in Austria, he had assembled a force estimated at up to a hundred thousand guerrillas and executioners. Eyewitnesses to one of the many massacres they carried out, a slaughter of Jews in Lviv, reported that as they mowed down their victims they shouted, “Long Live Adolf Hitler and Stepan Bandera! Death to the Jews and the Communists!”

While the Nazi surrender brought peace to most of Europe, combat in Ukraine not only continued but intensified. The OUN/Bandera fought on through its armed force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It pinned down two hundred thousand Red Army soldiers and killed more than seven thousand.

Ukrainian partisans also extended the terror campaigns that had endeared them to the Nazis. They massacred villagers who refused to give them supplies, killed “prosperous Jews,” and cut off the arms of peasants who had agreed—by raising their hands at public meetings—to join government-sponsored collective farms. Bandera was their leader and inspiration.

Bandera’s emergence as the singular hero of Ukrainian militants made him one of the Soviets’ principal targets. Propaganda leaflets and broadcasts emphasized his collaboration with the Nazis and his involvement in massacres. A vivid Soviet poster from this period depicts him as a bloodstained snake escaping from the coffin of Nazis. The text is just as explicit:

Do you recognize this serpent? The bloody, devouring beast is slithering. Guarded by a spidery symbol [swastika], its name is Stepan Bandera. Its name is Judas, Cain. These are the deeds of its snaky hands: Fires across our land. The spilled blood of innocent children. And the people stood up defiant. The country gave its verdict: Crush the serpent and its protectors, and pull out the reptile’s sting and teeth.

Bandera’s men waged what became the largest-scale partisan war ever fought on Soviet territory. Stalin sent his most accomplished military commander, Marshall Georgy Zhukov, who had commanded the Red Army during World War II, to crush it. Several times the Soviet press reported the “liquidation” of partisan bands. In 1948 the Communist leader of Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, declared that “the Ukrainian people have destroyed an insignificant bunch of Ukrainian nationalists and will annihilate the rest of them.” He recognized Bandera as “the generally acknowledged leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.”

“We clashed with Bandera, and he did us a lot of harm,” Khrushchev wrote in his memoir. “This was after the war, when the intense armed struggle of the Ukrainian nationalists against Soviet power had developed widely.… In those days the Carpathian Mountains were virtually inaccessible to us. Behind every bush you could find a terrorist.”

One study of this war concludes that it “was run by others, who had little if any contact with their faraway leader, but Bandera’s name remained closely linked with the underground.… All aspects of guerrilla warfare, good and bad, became associated with Bandera—the self-sacrifice of young men and women who gave their lives for the cause of Ukrainian independence as well as the ethnic cleansing of Poles in Western Ukraine, the participation of the individual members of the underground in the Holocaust, and the gruesome assassinations of Soviet ‘collaborators.’”

The first references to Bandera in US Army documents, written after the Soviets demanded his extradition in 1946, describe him as a war criminal and sadist who “earned a fierce reputation for conducting a ‘reign of terror’ during World War II.” He and his OUN/Bandera had compiled a record that richly justified that assessment. The ex-Nazi intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen had followed Bandera’s career for more than a decade and knew him as a charismatic, passionately anti-Soviet, and ruthlessly violent Ukrainian leader who admired Nazi ideology. A CIA profile called him “a political intransigent of great personal ambitions” and reported that he had “opposed all political organizations in the emigration which favor a representative form of government in the Ukraine as opposed to a mono-party OUN/Bandera regime.”

All of the thirty-nine partisans who suddenly arrived in Bavaria in 1947, and who gave Americans their first glimpse of what was happening inside Ukraine, were from the OUN/Bandera. “The Bandera boys are here in our Zone and available,” the Counter Intelligence Corps reported to US Army commanders. Gehlen advised his new American employers to make use of these “Bandera boys.” Some in Washington were hesitant.

“The Ukrainians were assumed to be penetrated, probably by the KGB,” according to one account. “Their enthusiasm as utility meatcutters for the SS was revoltingly well documented. Overt recognition risked geysers of outrage in the liberal press, followed up by Congressional inquiries.”

Frank Wisner never worried much about what was overt. Over the next few years, he extended a warm if unofficial welcome to Bandera’s men. In a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, he even obliquely congratulated himself for saving Bandera’s life. “The Russians demanded extradition of Bandera and many other anti-Soviet Ukrainians as war criminals,” he wrote. “Luckily the attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few far-seeing Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding.”

Wisner saved Bandera despite having access to eleven volumes of files from the OUN/Bandera that, according to an American prosecutor who reviewed them, “clearly show how most of its members worked for the Gestapo or SS as policemen, executioners, partisan hunters, and municipal officials. The OUN contribution to the German war effort was significant, including the raising of volunteers for several SS divisions. It was precisely because of its work for the Nazis that Wisner wanted to hire the OUN for its special forces.”

Stalin was also partial to violence. Ukrainian nationalists were among his favored targets. The first victim was Yevhen Konovalets, who founded the OUN in 1929 and became its principal leader; he was known to have a weakness for chocolates, so in 1938 the Soviet secret service designed a box of praline samples that exploded when he opened it. A decade later, Stalin came for Archbishop Theodore Romzha, a Ukrainian Catholic who was lobbying the Vatican to support a religious underground in Ukraine; his horse-drawn carriage was hit by a truck as he was returning from a parish visit, and he was taken to a nearby hospital, where a nurse working for the secret police injected him with poison. Then police and military units tracked down the notorious field commander of Bandera’s Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych. During World War II, Shukhevych had led a brigade of Ukrainians in Nazi uniforms, the Nachtigall Battalion, and then became hauptmann of Schutzmannschaft 201, a Nazi auxiliary police force that one scholar described as dedicated to “fighting partisans and killing Jews.” Shukhevych was killed when police closed in on his hideout near Lviv in 1950.

That left Bandera, who was living clandestinely in Munich, as the outstanding Ukrainian militant leader. He had blazed into the Ukrainian consciousness with his outspoken speeches while on trial in Lviv after carrying out his first assassination in 1934. His proclamation of the “Ukrainian State” in 1941 was the stuff of legend, even though the “state” lasted less than two weeks. He had helped build a partisan army unlike any the Soviets had ever faced, and it inflicted heavy casualties on the Red Army. No single leader ever united the endlessly factionalized Ukrainian opposition, but with the others gone, Bandera became preeminent. That put him at the top of the Kremlin’s list of Ukrainian enemies. The job of finding and “eliminating” him fell to Khrushchev. For years they played a deadly game of cat-and-mouse.

Khrushchev was born in a village in Kursk, a piece of western Russia that borders on today’s Ukraine. When he was a teenager, his father took the family westward to what is now the Ukrainian oblast (province) of Donetsk. His background there led Stalin to name him general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1938. During his decade in that job, crushing the nationalist insurgency was his main task. He helped direct the relentless military campaigns and secret police operations that ultimately defeated it.

American intelligence officers feigned ignorance of Bandera as they helped him avoid detection in Munich. They called this deception Operation Anyface, after a character in the Dick Tracy comic who could change his appearance at will. Its success made Bandera the one rebel leader Khrushchev never managed to catch.

Their enmity was personal as well as political. In 1949 an assassin presumably sent by Bandera killed one of Khrushchev’s most prominent allies, the anti-fascist journalist and playwright Yaroslav Halan. He was at his desk in Lviv, writing an article welcoming Ukraine’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, when the assassin struck him from behind with an axe. Halan had urged the Americans to extradite Bandera for trial in Moscow.

After Halan’s murder, Khrushchev resolved to bring this rivalry to an end. At his petition, the Soviet Supreme Court secretly sentenced Bandera to death in absentia. Then Khrushchev summoned Pavel Sudaplatov, an experienced KGB assassin who specialized in killing irredentist Ukrainians. Khrushchev gave him a simple order: make a plan for “liquidating the Bandera leadership of the Ukrainian fascist movement in Europe, which is arrogantly insulting the leadership of the Soviet Union.”

The US-Soviet confrontation had reached a frightening peak. As Khrushchev was ordering the assassination of Ukraine’s most radical nationalist, John Foster Dulles, who had become the chief Republican Party spokesman on foreign affairs, warned that “the enemies of human freedom are ever present and constantly looking for soft spots.” The only way for the United States to defend itself, Dulles concluded, was to adopt “a liberation policy which will try and give hope and a resistance mood within the Soviet empire.”

Fear of imminent apocalypse led the CIA to covert action around the world. No matter how widely it ranged, however, it never lost sight of its ultimate goal. The grand prize would be cutting off the head of the Communist monster. That meant operations within the Soviet Union itself—above all, in Ukraine. The purpose, as one officer put it, was “to harass and counter the Soviets by all special means—paramilitary, sabotage, black propaganda, political action—to turn loose among the chickens as many foxes as we could possibly get away with.”



2

A Top Priority Project

Clouds of smoke thickened the air at the unmarked New York City office where the CIA’s team of Ukrainian exiles worked during the Cold War. Heavy smoking—cigarettes, pipes, and an occasional cigar—was one of the habits they brought with them from their homeland. They also brought nationalist passion, hatred of all things Russian, and determination to devote their lives to political action. That made them ideal partners for the CIA.

This smoky office at 875 West End Avenue was the headquarters of a publishing company called Prolog. It was the world’s main gathering point for Ukrainian writers, editors, historians, and thinkers who were dedicated to promoting anti-Soviet resistance in their homeland. They worked zealously. Prolog produced books, pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines, mostly in Ukrainian and Russian. The main theme was Ukrainian nationalism. Pamphlets and articles portrayed Ukraine as a colonized nation suffering under Russia’s yoke. History books exalted the exploits of Ukrainian heroes, especially those who fought against Russia. Some were issued in miniature format so they could be smuggled into Ukraine. Others were disguised as letters and sent to random Ukrainians whose names and addresses had been culled from telephone directories. Thousands were dropped into Ukraine from gas balloons. Some were printed on paper that would dissolve in water so they could be flushed away in case of a police raid. One book, an account of anti-Russia guerrilla campaigns waged by past generations of Ukrainians, was concealed inside false covers to make it appear to be a history of Soviet victories.

Prolog was what the CIA calls a “proprietary”—an organization that appears independent but is in fact wholly owned, funded, and controlled by the CIA. This subterfuge did not fool the Soviets, who scorned Prolog’s propagandists as “tools of Western secret services.” Nonetheless Prolog remained active without interruption from 1952 to 1992. That made it one of the longest-running projects in CIA history.

Airdrops and clandestine infiltrations into Ukraine during the late 1940s and early ’50s produced little more than the death of most volunteers. As that effort was failing, the Red Army finally crushed the rebellion waged by die-hard Ukrainian partisans. Yet Frank Wisner and his boss at the CIA, Allen Dulles, were hardly ready to accept defeat. They still believed that undermining Soviet power was the CIA’s most important job and that Ukraine was the Soviet territory most open to American influence. That led them to reshape Aerodynamic. Rather than aiming at victory on the battlefield, they would fight for the minds of Ukrainians. This would be a long-term project, unusual at a time when the CIA was eager for quick results. It would substitute the soft power of subversive ideas for the hard power of warriors and weapons. That was the beginning of Prolog. An early CIA report on its activities emphasized the need to maintain its cover as an independent exile voice:

The premises of Prolog are located in a large residential apartment building in New York so that surveillance of the premises would be more difficult than if the offices were located in a private building. The cover activity of the group is such as to provide plausible cover for its clandestine activity. The group has been attacked by the Soviets for anti-Soviet activity, and its members have been attacked for being “lackies of Western intelligence organizations.” Recently a visiting Soviet citizen has even said he knew Prolog was supported by the CIA. To date there have been no official Soviet charges to this effect, and it is almost a certainty that no documentary proof of CIA support is available to the enemy.

The CIA needed a passionately dedicated Ukrainian to run Prolog. It turned to one of its favorites, Mykola Lebed, who had been a close comrade of the most famous Ukrainian nationalist, Stepan Bandera. Together they had organized the assassination of Poland’s interior minister in 1934. During World War II, both directed massacres of Poles and Jews. In the summer of 1943, while Lebed was a senior leader of the OUN/Bandera in the Volhynia region of Poland, his men burned hundreds of villages and killed tens of thousands of people in one of the most notorious mass murder campaigns in Polish history. One of the first references to him in an American document, an army intelligence report, described him as a “well-known sadist and collaborator of the Germans.”

“Wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Polish and Jews usually took place,” according to one scholarly account. “In all these actions, Lebed was one of the most important leaders. During the German occupation of Ukraine, Lebed and his terroristic group were known as ‘Special Defense Service.’ Their activities were directed by the Gestapo.”

Lebed wished not only to rid his homeland of Jews but also to “cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population” so that no future government of Poland would be able to claim regions that nationalists considered Ukrainian. A witness wrote in his diary that units commanded by Bandera and Lebed “are not discriminating about who they kill; they are gunning down the population of entire villages.… Since there are hardly any Jews left to kill, the Bandera gangs have turned on the Poles. They are literally hacking Poles to pieces. Every day … you can see the bodies of Poles, with wires around their necks, floating down the river.”

Like other veterans of Ukrainian terror squads, Lebed turned up in Munich after the war. He lived under cover because he feared assassination at the hands of Soviet agents, rivals inside the faction-ridden Ukrainian diaspora, or freelance killers seeking to avenge his victims. The CIA recognized him as a widely admired figure among Ukrainian nationalists. They began working together. In 1949 CIA officers decided that Lebed’s presence in Munich was no longer essential to Aerodynamic and that he could be more useful in the United States.

Lebed’s bloody history would certainly have led the Immigration and Naturalization Service to refuse him entry, but the CIA had another option: the 1949 law permitting the entry of up to a hundred exiles per year without review of their backgrounds. A CIA officer based in Munich reported that Lebed “has been rendering valuable assistance to this Agency in Europe.” The CIA’s chief security officer, Sheffield Edwards, added that “we are not in possession of any information indicating that he is engaged in any activities prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” That placed Lebed on the first list of otherwise ineligible exiles to be admitted to the United States. He arrived in October 1949 under an assumed name, Roman Turan. Ukrainian exiles immediately recognized him. Some embraced him. Others were appalled. An FBI informant reported that Lebed was known as a murderer, a bandit, and “no better than OUN leader Stephen Bandera.”

For Lebed, who had broken with Bandera, arrival in the United States completed a remarkable metamorphosis. During World War II, he had rampaged through Central Europe massacring civilians by the thousands. In 1944, he managed to bring various Ukrainian political and military factions into a single organization, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, known as UHVR. After the war, in Munich, he connected with the large CIA operating base and became the CIA’s favorite Ukrainian. Once in the United States, he rebranded his UHVR as ZP/UHVR, for “Foreign Representation/Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.”

Lebed, whose CIA code name was “Uncle Louie,” became a crown prince of Aerodynamic. He was the founding “president” of the Prolog publishing house and ran it for twenty-two years. In exchange, the CIA protected him from prosecution for war crimes by withholding what it knew about his background from other government agencies. When the CIA conceived the idea of sending him on trips abroad to build support in the Ukrainian diaspora, Allen Dulles personally intervened to ensure that he would not have trouble returning to the United States. In a letter to the commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Dulles wrote that Lebed was of “inestimable value to this Agency” and was involved in “operations of the first importance.”

Prolog staff members, who never totaled more than two dozen, along with many contributors, produced a flood of material aimed at shaping Ukrainian minds. Their newspaper Suchasnist (The Present) was polished and aimed at a sophisticated audience. Ukrainskyy Samostiynyk (Ukrainian Independent) featured political and historical essays. Informatsiyniy Byulletin (Information Bulletin) was produced specifically for clandestine distribution inside Ukraine. Prolog also published an English-language magazine, Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press. It opened offices in cities where Ukrainians lived or visited, including Istanbul, Athens, Rome, Naples, Paris, London, Helsinki, Stockholm, Edmonton, and Winnipeg. In 1957 alone, it reported producing 5,000 pamphlets and 200,000 newspaper copies, as well as 1,200 hours of tapes for radio broadcast. Prolog represented, as one of its organizers put it, a change “from forceful revolution to evolution in form and methods, but at the same time the struggle remained revolutionary in form and content.”

For years the effect of Prolog’s long propaganda campaign was unclear. It reached millions of Ukrainians and nurtured two generations of exiled intellectuals, but with what result? Only decades later was it possible to see its effect. Without it, the fire of Ukrainian nationalism might have dimmed. Prolog helped keep it burning, almost out of sight, for forty years.

Wisner and Dulles hoped that Prolog’s patient work would cement in Ukrainian minds the image of Russia as their oppressor, colonizer, and eternal enemy. Neither lived to see its success. The antipathy toward Russia that shapes Ukrainian nationalism stems from history and geopolitics. It is also a product of the quiet, patient, and ingeniously conceived CIA project called Prolog. No other seed that Aerodynamic planted bore such promising fruit.

* * *

In the spy business, no one is more tantalizing than a walk-in. He or she is an unexpected volunteer, one who has not been cultivated or seduced or blackmailed but simply appears at an embassy or base and offers information. Naturally these volunteers must be closely vetted, since some may be plants from enemy services. Several of the most productive spies in CIA history, however, have been walk-ins. Ignoring or rejecting them can mean losing great opportunities.

In 1949 a handful of Polish resistance fighters contacted the CIA station in London and introduced themselves as emissaries from the only serious underground network of anti-Communists in their country: Wolność i Niepodległość (Freedom and Independence), abbreviated as WiN. They reported that WiN had an active underground with five hundred committed members and the names of twenty thousand other patriots who were ready to rebel against their Soviet oppressors if given the means to do so. That propelled Frank Wisner into action. In 1950 he launched an air supply operation modeled on Aerodynamic. Over the next two years, cargo jets dropped weapons, radio transmitters, and more than $1 million in gold sovereigns to Wisner’s new Polish friends. They sent back reports of dramatically effective attacks on government targets, accompanied by photos showing destroyed buildings and wrecked army vehicles. Wisner imagined that he was on the brink of victory. At one point he even told aides that WiN needed only anti-tank weapons “to drive the Red Army out of Warsaw.”

That hope was dashed at the beginning of 1952, when Poland’s official radio network broadcast a two-hour documentary revealing that WiN had been infiltrated by—or perhaps invented by—the Polish security police. It served as a flytrap into which malcontents were lured. Nearly everything Wisner had air-dropped to his agents in Poland had fallen into enemy hands.

“With the arrest of the entire network, the security organs cut off at one blow the head of this newly formed espionage hydra,” the Polish newspaper Dziennik Zachodni reported. “A criminal trial has begun before the Military District Court in Katowice against a group of spies and traitors to the nation.”

No comparable trial was ever held in Ukraine. Many captured Aerodynamic operatives were executed, so evidence against them was never publicly presented. Yet because the CIA gave its Ukrainian agents equipment similar to what was dropped into Poland, and asked them to perform similar services, the trial in Poland shed indirect light on Aerodynamic.

According to prosecutors, the CIA asked its Polish agents to photograph military bases, survey mines and factories that could later be attacked or sabotaged, and recruit “individuals willing to be smuggled abroad to an intelligence school so that after completing it, they could be sent back to Poland in order to maintain contact between American intelligence and spy networks inside the country.” Tools of espionage displayed in the courtroom included code books, miniature cameras, “four magnifying glasses intended for reading intelligence bulletins,” compasses, and several rolls of microfilm that had been concealed in a cigarette pack. The combination of evidence and confessions, Dziennik Zachodni concluded, constituted “not only confirmation of the treason committed by the four accused” but also “fresh proof of the criminal face of American imperialism, striving by all available means to prepare its road to aggression.”

This setback—disaster would be a better word, considering the number of Polish lives it devastated—could not be hidden. Wisner’s project was publicly ridiculed across Europe. That might have led another spymaster to pause and reconsider. Wisner, however, believed that he was engaged in a battle for the future of humanity. Aerodynamic rolled on as if the WiN debacle had never happened.

“In Ukraine, it was less an outright hoax than … placing one’s internal enemies in a box and then assuring that all aspiring troublemakers from abroad fell into that same box,” the intelligence historian Scott Anderson wrote. “While it was true that a very large and powerful anti-Communist insurgency had fought Soviet forces in Ukraine to a near standstill, that had been in 1947. In the intervening years, the KGB and the Red Army had steadily annihilated the Ukrainian Insurgent Army through ambushes, infiltration schemes, and collective punishment search-and-destroy missions. In March 1950, with the UPA already decimated, the KGB had tracked down and killed its fugitive leader, leaving the group rudderless. This occurred ten months before Frank Wisner, heartened by reports of ever-expanding UPA activity and strength, declared Ukraine to be a top OPC priority and initiated Operation Aerodynamic.… Buoyed by Soviet disinformation, the CIA continued with Aerodynamic.”

Aerodynamic grew to become one of the largest CIA projects in Europe. Wisner’s planes crossed with impunity into Ukrainian airspace, where air defense was all but nonexistent. For three years they dropped weapons and supplies to what Wisner believed to be partisan fighters. According to a Red Army estimate dated 1952, however, the partisans numbered no more than three hundred, in a dozen scattered bands.

Decades later, a CIA review concluded that despite these losses, Aerodynamic had been worthwhile: “In the long run, the Agency’s efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain using Ukrainian agents was ill-fated and tragic. The air-drop operations did indeed prove the law of gravity. Nonetheless they were a necessary step in the evolutionary growth of America’s first peacetime intelligence agency.”

Wisner allowed himself to be captured by a fantasy of Ukraine. He saw it as a powder keg, believed that he could help ignite it, and imagined that the explosion would shake or even destroy the Soviet Union. In fact, as more sober analysis would have shown, Ukraine was under harshly repressive political and military rule that made organized rebellion impossible. Wisner nourished his fantasy as military and police units scooped up supplies that he thought he was dropping to partisan guerrillas.

By the time Americans went to the polls to choose a new president in November 1952, the terrifying Cold War narrative had come to dominate national life. Inevitably, it also shaped the political campaign. Republicans charged that Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were almost treasonably timid in their approach to the Soviet threat because they limited themselves to containing Communism, rather than seeking to roll it back. The Republican nominee, Dwight Eisenhower, committed himself to “liberating the captive peoples”—though in a couple of his speeches he changed the phrase “by any means” to “by any peaceful means.” His running mate, Richard Nixon, charged that Democrats treated the Cold War as a “nicey-nice little powder-puff duel” because they had been educated at “Dean Acheson’s College of Cowardly Communist Containment.” The Republican platform called containment “negative, futile, and immoral” because it “consigned countless human beings to despotism and Godless terrorism.” John Foster Dulles, the party’s leading spokesman on foreign policy, called for “a new policy of boldness” aimed at the “liberation” of peoples under Soviet rule.

“There is a moral or natural law not made by man which determines right and wrong,” Dulles wrote in Life magazine. “This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay.”

Ukrainian Americans cheered. Through a series of organizations based in the United States, most prominently the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, founded in 1931 by supporters of the nationalist OUN, they built a formidable lobby. In 1952 they held a conference at the Statler Hotel in New York that attracted 799 delegates from twenty-five states. Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, the featured speaker, told them what they wanted to hear.

“The Ukrainian tradition is completely in harmony with the American tradition,” he declared. “A thousand years ago, before the existence of the North American continent was known, the great Kingdom of Kiev was the political and cultural creation of the Ukrainian people, the easternmost bastion of Western culture. Still later, the rising princes of Moscovy came to assert their mastery. The independence of Kiev vanished, and there began a long period of foreign rule, which unhappily exists to this day. But at the heart of the Ukrainian tradition lies the significant fact that although political independence was destroyed, the great desire for independence did not die.”

By early 1953 Eisenhower was in the White House. John Foster Dulles, who kept a book of Stalin’s speeches on his desk to remind him of the peril America faced, was secretary of state. His younger brother Allen became director of central intelligence. Frank Wisner remained in his post as overseer of CIA covert action. All three saw themselves as frontline commanders in a life-or-death war against the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower believed that running the CIA took “a strange kind of genius” and that Allen Dulles embodied it. For nearly a decade—he served longer than any director in CIA history—Dulles bestrode the American intelligence apparatus like a colossus. He was an indifferent administrator and not a deep thinker. Anti-Communism was his guiding credo.

Like all Americans of their class and generation, the Dulles brothers, sons of a Presbyterian clergyman, grew up with a profound loathing for Communism. They spent years at the Wall Street law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, whose specialty was representing multinational corporations. Their careers were dedicated to the protection of global capitalism. They came of age in the era when the United States emerged as a global hegemon. That allowed them to see confrontation with Communism as a moral, economic, and strategic imperative.

Allen Dulles helped write the 1947 National Security Act that created the CIA. He joined in late 1950 as a consultant to the director, General Walter Bedell Smith. When Smith gave him his dream job—chief of covert action—six weeks later, he asked that the job title be changed. He thought “deputy director for operations” was too obvious. Dulles instead became “deputy director for plans.” That became Wisner’s title when Dulles was promoted to the Agency’s number-two job in 1951. These two intelligence officers guided American covert action around the world during the entire eight years of Eisenhower’s presidency.

In mid-1953, after Dulles had been director of central intelligence for only a few months, he commissioned what one of his senior officers, Richard Bissell, called an “internal, no-holds-barred study of techniques, procedures, that could be used to roll back the Communists in Europe.” Bissell and several other covert action officers “ranged around” through several meetings, he later reported, “ragging our brains and other people’s for ideas. The conclusions, I think, were essentially negative. There wasn’t any collection of gimmicks you could use.”

“Rollback” was a Republican pledge left over from Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign. It turned out to have been only a rhetorical device. By the mid-1950s, even at the action-oriented CIA, dreams that the “Soviet World” could be violently destroyed or broken apart were recognized as unrealistic.

That hardly meant, however, that the United States was ready to allow Soviet leaders to rule unmolested. Eisenhower rejected that option at a “Big Three” summit in Bermuda eight months after Stalin’s death in 1953. The new Soviet leader, Georgy Malenkov, sent a message asking that it be followed by a “Big Four” summit at which Russia would participate. The French and British leaders wanted to accept, but Secretary of State Dulles was unalterably opposed. “His bloody text is always the same: that nothing good can come from a meeting with Malenkov,” Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain complained afterward.

Rejecting the possibility of a new post-Stalin relationship with Moscow made covert action all the more urgent. Americans could not destroy the Soviet system, but the CIA had tools to disrupt it—and perhaps to sow political or military seeds for a more fruitful future.

Eisenhower presented his defense policy, which he called the “New Look,” as resting on two pillars: a smaller standing army and a stronger nuclear deterrent. No one knew it at the time, but the New Look also had a third pillar: covert action. Eisenhower believed passionately in its value. Unlike most Americans, he knew that clandestine operations had played a vital role during World War II. It was natural that he would want to use this weapon to confront the new Soviet enemy. To him it was a weapon short of war—even a kind of peace project, since quiet subversion might make war unnecessary. Eisenhower never asked for details about Wisner’s projects in Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe, partly because he was not good at lying in public. During his presidency, however, the CIA is not known to have launched any major covert operation without his consent. He almost certainly knew at least the outlines of Aerodynamic.

* * *

Ukrainians began hearing strange radio messages in the early 1950s. All legal stations were subject to the Communist authorities and required to celebrate the eternal friendship of Russians and Ukrainians. Suddenly a new station appeared, broadcasting in Ukrainian from somewhere unknown. Listeners heard provocative messages:

“Throughout Kyiv hang Ukrainian street and commercial signs, but Russian power and Russian culture rule under these Ukrainian signs.… Sovereign Ukraine does not have its own army.… What is the national language in Soviet Ukraine? What language does the Communist party in Ukraine use?… Moscow continues to force the Russification of Ukraine.… Why do all the letters in Ukraine carry Russian stamps? Why doesn’t Ukraine have its own postal stamps? Why must the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic priests come under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church? Why?”

These broadcasts were written and recorded by Ukrainians working for the CIA, and beamed into Ukraine from a secret transmitter in Germany. They were part of the “war of ideas” that replaced armed rebellion as the Agency’s chosen instrument of intervention in Ukraine. For four decades, radio was central to CIA “psychological operations” not only in Ukraine but in all Soviet-dominated territory.

The first network to appear was Radio Free Europe, founded in 1950 by the National Committee for a Free Europe with the mission of broadcasting into countries that had become satellites of the Soviet Union. In 1951 the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia launched a parallel service, Radio Liberation from Bolshevism, that broadcast into the Soviet Union itself. Both of the sponsoring organizations posed as assemblies of independent patriots. In fact, both were “proprietaries”—conceived, created, and directed by the CIA. They claimed to be financed from private donations, but in fact nearly all their funds came from the CIA, laundered through the cooperative Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations.

Ukraine was a prime target of Radio Liberation from Bolshevism, later renamed Radio Liberty. On August 14, 1954, it launched a Ukrainian-language service with a stirring call to anti-Communist solidarity: “Brothers and sisters! Ukrainians! We live abroad, but our hearts and minds are always with you. No iron curtain can separate us or stand in our way!”

This project got off to a slow start. The CIA built a recording studio inside a safe house in New York City, but it had trouble finding Ukrainians trained or experienced in the techniques of radio broadcast. CIA officers rejected some of the first scripts because they were too virulently anti-Russian. By the mid-1950s, though, Radio Liberty broadcasts were effectively penetrating into Ukraine.

Their reach was greatly extended when the CIA opened a second transmitting station. Its original one, in the German town Lampertheim, broadcast a signal that could be heard most strongly in Kyiv and western Ukraine. To reach listeners in Crimea and other eastern oblasts, the CIA opened a second transmitter, located in Greece and code-named Pyrex. The first known CIA document proposing this project, dated November 2, 1953, begins, “Project Aerodynamic/Ranter establishes a psychological radio broadcast directed against Soviet military and civilian population in the Ukraine, from the vicinity of Athens, Greece. Program preparation will be accomplished in a recording studio located within the U.S.” A month later, the CIA’s directorate for plans approved Aerodynamic/Ranter in extended detail.

1—The objective of this project is to utilize broadcast time available on the KUBARK [CIA] radio installation PYREX at Athens, Greece, for the broadcast of a series of programs to be directed to Soviet officialdom, Soviet military forces stationed in the Ukraine, the indigenous civilian population of the Ukraine, the underground movement and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

2—The tasks: (i) Furnish evidence of outside sympathy and understanding for the Ukrainian peoples. (ii) Intensify anti-regime disaffection by encouraging resentment, bitterness, and distrust of the Soviet regime and its personalities. (iii) Maintain national consciousness among the Ukrainians and urge them to maintain pride in the individuality and heritage of their culture. (iv) Create dissatisfaction among Ukrainian military personnel within the Soviet armed forces stationed in Ukraine …

This project is based upon the need to make a more significant propaganda impact on this strategic target audience.… It is proposed that the SR [Soviet Russia] Division be authorized to plan a psychological warfare campaign to be implemented initially over the PYREX radio station located in Athens, Greece. The transmission facilities of this station, operating under commercial cover in Greece, are already available to the SR Division.… This project will make use of a staff of recent emigres from the Ukraine.… A draft of themes to be implemented and a general policy guidance for the content of the radio scripts is being prepared.… The existing New York office of the study group will serve as an office-studio for preparing the scripts and recording the broadcast tapes. It will, however, become necessary to expand the facilities.

As repression in the Soviet Union eased following Stalin’s death in 1953, more Ukrainians tuned in to broadcasts generated by Aerodynamic/Ranter. The topics those broadcasts covered, the language they used, their overarching themes—all of this was determined by CIA officers trained in “psychological warfare.” Listeners inside Ukraine could not have known that, but it might not have mattered. Taking advantage of the thirst for news in a totalitarian state and fed by a network of exiles with contacts inside Ukraine, Radio Liberty provided a mix of information and propaganda, all aimed at promoting nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiment.

Aerodynamic/Ranter employed thousands of people, mostly Ukrainian exiles, over its forty-year life, at a cost that ran into tens of millions of dollars. This campaign, like the entire Aerodynamic project, could be seen as a cynical plot aimed at promoting discord in another country, or as an effort to keep the flame of freedom alive in a tyrannized land—or both. In any case, it proved highly effective.

Radio broadcasts into Ukraine nourished Ukrainian resentment of Moscow in ways that ultimately served what the CIA saw as American interests. In 1969 an internal CIA review called radio campaigns “the oldest, largest, most costly, and probably most successful covert action projects aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.” The Soviet journal Red Star agreed, calling them the “most strategic weapon in the global psychological war being carried out by the United States against the world socialist system.”

* * *

Long-secret CIA documents show intense interest in Aerodynamic throughout the early and mid-1950s. One sets out twin goals: “the encouragement in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of new and existing anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, Ukrainian nationalist sentiments” and “the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Ukraine and the USSR as a whole to satisfy United States needs.” Another, headed “Field Project Outline,” presents the goals in more detail: “The collection of positive and counter-intelligence from the Ukrainian SSR.… The accumulation of information on the proportions, activities and present and future capabilities of the Ukrainian underground movement.… The development through the use of Ukrainian underground personnel as couriers and radio operators of rapid communication.… The accumulation of information on the status of the Ukrainian underground movement.… Specific targets to be determined.” Wisner’s enthusiasm courses through these memos.

“In view of the extent and activity of the resistance network in Ukraine,” he wrote as his hopes were peaking, “we consider this to be a top priority project.”

Wisner’s superiors were dubious. They wanted to reorient covert action in Ukraine. Armed rebellion had failed. Repression prevented any coherent underground from emerging. The new approach—settling in for a long struggle—was summarized in a 1956 directive from the National Security Council: “US policy should be directed toward the weakening and eventual elimination of dominant Soviet power over these peoples.”

As the 1950s unfolded, the CIA grew to be as massive as it was ambitious. It had thousands of officers stationed around the world—four hundred in London alone. No one outside the Agency knew what they were doing. President Eisenhower wanted to hear only the outlines of its operations. Congress was even less interested.

In 1956 Senator Mike Mansfield proposed that “a joint Congressional committee be established for the purpose of making continued studies of the activities of the Agency.” Only by establishing such a committee and giving it power to subpoena CIA officers and documents, Mansfield told the Senate, would it be possible to determine whether the CIA was “staying within the limits established by law” or exceeding them and becoming “an instrument of policy.” Eisenhower was appalled. He told aides that Mansfield’s bill would pass “over my dead body,” and pressed co-sponsors to withdraw their support. The bill was defeated by a 59–27 margin.

Defenders of the CIA were relieved. “The difficulty with asking questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have,” Senator Leverett Saltonstall reasoned. His colleague Richard Russell agreed: “If there is one agency of the government in which we must take some matters on faith, I believe this agency is the CIA.”

That allowed the CIA to keep its many secrets hidden. One was its continuing campaign to stoke unrest in Ukraine. If Senators Saltonstall and Russell had known that such a campaign was underway, they would likely have agreed that it was one about which they wished to know nothing.

* * *

Evidence of Aerodynamic’s failure to penetrate Ukraine was clear. In 1951 one of its highest-ranking volunteers, Myron Matvieyko, who had been chief of security for the OUN/Bandera, was air-dropped into his homeland, disappeared for a while, and then gave a radio interview in Kyiv saying that he had been sent by Nazis who were tools of “capitalist intelligence services.” The last time the CIA received any communication from one of its commandoes inside Ukraine was the summer of 1953. A memo from 1954 reports that its most successful commando had been captured and “liquidated.” By 1955 the Ukrainian underground had ceased to operate. It had either faded away, been crushed, or gone quiet. That same year, the CIA finally stopped dropping commandoes into Ukraine.

The intense fear of Soviet attack that still gripped the United States, however, made it impossible for the CIA to consider ending covert action in Ukraine. It remained the only place in the Soviet Union where large groups of people had a long history of not only resenting Russian power but rebelling against it. Anything the CIA could do to encourage their rebelliousness was considered essential. President Eisenhower embraced this ethos. It was embodied in a report about covert action that he commissioned from General James Doolittle in 1954.

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated means than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

As the Americans settled in for a long struggle, their Soviet enemies did the same. They fully understood what Wisner and Dulles were doing. The Communist Party chairman in Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, made half-hearted efforts to prevent Ukrainians from receiving or reading material from Prolog, but they were unsuccessful. Aerodynamic agents dropped or smuggled thousands of pieces of Prolog literature into Ukraine each year. Visitors reported seeing Prolog pamphlets and magazines in Ukrainian homes. America’s message was reaching its intended audience.

By the mid-1950s, Khrushchev had moved from Ukraine to Moscow, been named first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and consolidated his position as the country’s top leader. His famous 1956 speech denouncing Stalin’s crimes attracted much attention in the West, but he also reshaped domestic policies. He took a special interest in the many Ukrainians who had been imprisoned or sent to internal exile during the Stalin era—which was also the era during which he was Stalin’s man in Ukraine. In 1955, at his bidding, the Supreme Soviet issued an amnesty for all Ukrainians who had fought alongside the Nazis. Over the next three years more than twenty-five thousand were allowed to return home, reclaim their confiscated properties, and find work. Some changed their surnames and biographies. A surprising number—by one estimate, one-third of the freed nationalists—joined government or Communist Party agencies. One of the most prominent, Vasyl Kuk, who had succeeded the mass murderer Roman Shukhevych as commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was given work at the Central State Historical Archive and then at the Institute of History of Ukraine at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

That strategy worked. Ukrainian nationalism survived decades of Communist rule because of the strength of its tradition and encouragement from the CIA. One other factor was less obvious. By the 1960s, many officials inside the governing apparatus were at least partly sympathetic to the nationalist cause. They did not crack down on it as harshly as some in Moscow would have wished.

“We displayed lack of discrimination at that time, freeing prisoners without examining their cases,” Khrushchev later wrote. He recalled visiting an army base in Ukraine and thinking, “What a lot of Bandera men who have changed their uniforms! And they’re getting fed, staying warm, and spying on us at the same time.”

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army had been crushed on Khrushchev’s watch, but his victory was incomplete. Mykola Lebed was beyond his reach in New York—the CIA and KGB had a tacit agreement not to carry out assassinations on each other’s soil. Stepan Bandera, however, was still plotting from his base in Munich.

* * *

From Washington at the height of the Cold War, the world looked terrifying. Two great powers seemed locked in mortal combat. Americans, especially at the CIA, feared that victory for the Soviet Union would mean not only the annihilation of the United States but the end of any possibility for meaningful human life on earth. Given those stakes, the loss of a few men, or even a few hundred, seemed an entirely reasonable price to pay. This was the ethos that propelled Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, and others in the American security elite through the height of the Cold War.

In the hearts of two CIA officers who had helped launch Aerodynamic, though, that resolve began to waver as the 1950s wore on. The first to reconsider was Michael Burke. He had directed some of the first airdrops of CIA-trained commandoes into Albania and Ukraine. Then he ran agents into Poland and Czechoslovakia. Most disappeared. From his base in Berlin, he lost confidence in Aerodynamic.

“Even if underground movements had succeeded in gaining enough strength in numbers and arms to rise up,” he mused in his memoir, “what Armies of the West would intervene to assure their success?”

The breaking point for Burke came after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was visiting Berlin, summoned him to a meeting on February 7, 1954. The only other people present were General Lucian Truscott, who oversaw CIA operations in Germany, and President Eisenhower’s “psychological warfare advisor,” C. D. Jackson, a former magazine publisher who had helped shape Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Burke arrived to find Dulles, who had unpleasant personal habits, tapping a lead pencil against his upper teeth, leaving small black dots. When he finished, he posed a startling question.

“Can you create a disturbance in East Berlin?” Dulles asked.

Subversion was officially the realm of Dulles’s younger brother Allen, but on occasions like these, he allowed himself to dip into the covert-action world. Dulles was attending a conference with the foreign ministers of the other three countries that occupied parts of German territory: France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. He told Burke that a staged riot in the Soviet-controlled East at that moment “would embarrass the Russians—demanding they get out.” Burke was taken aback. He had concluded that stirring up trouble inside the Soviet Union or its satellite states was cruel madness, since the United States was never going to come to the aid of people who would risk their lives by rebelling. After a pause, Dulles spoke again.

“What could you do?” he asked Burke.

“In what space of time, sir?”

“While the conference is on. While we’re sitting with the Soviets. Say, in the next two or three days.”

John Foster Dulles wanted a repeat of the riot that had broken out in East Berlin eight months earlier, on June 17, 1953—with encouragement from the CIA. Jackson, who during that uprising had urged Eisenhower to arm the protesters, thought the “disturbance” Dulles wanted to create would be a neat piece of trickery. Truscott, however, did not. He and Burke laid low until Dulles left town. There was no riot in East Berlin.

This episode convinced Burke that the Dulles brothers were determined to continue fomenting trouble inside the Soviet World. He had seen and felt the human toll of those operations and wanted no more to do with them. After more than a decade as an intelligence officer, he quit the CIA. He returned to the United States and went on to two other high-flying but less harrowing jobs: general manager of Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus and, beginning in 1966, president of the New York Yankees.

Soon afterward, another founder of Aerodynamic, Peter Sichel, also quit. Sichel had worked with Allen Dulles as a young intelligence officer in Switzerland during World War II and was transferred to Berlin when the war ended. He was one of the officers Wisner sent to interview refugees in displaced persons camps to see if any could be used as covert agents—while “staying away from all the walk-ins the Russians sent us from Ukrainian resistance groups.” He dispatched some of the CIA’s first air-dropped commandoes into Ukraine even before Aerodynamic was officially christened in 1951. That impressed Wisner. In 1953 he put Sichel, then thirty years old, in charge of all covert operations in Eastern Europe. It was a job for a tireless activist who wanted to wound the Soviets every day in every way. That description no longer fit Sichel. He had seen too much and was drifting toward cynicism. When a junior officer named William Sloane Coffin asked him about the Aerodynamic airdrops he had supervised, he replied that they were “a crime.”

“You’re sending people into Soviet-controlled areas—Poland or Ukraine or wherever—with the idea that they’re going to start resistance groups or meet up with ones already there,” Sichel told his startled colleague. “But it’s impossible that these resistance groups can exist under the Soviet security system. Look at Berlin—you can’t walk down the street without the Soviets counting your steps. And you’re going to go into the countryside and be part of a guerrilla group? It’s a dream. It can’t work. You’re just sending people to their deaths.”

That wasn’t the end of Sichel’s rant. The few CIA-sponsored resistance networks that had managed to survive in Ukraine and other Soviet-controlled regions, he said, were probably surviving because the KGB wanted them to. They served as “catchment basins in which the regime’s enemies, both internal and external, could be concentrated and safely confined until the state was ready to scoop them up.”

Pained by the executions of émigré fighters who had trusted him, disgusted—as a German-born Jew—by the CIA’s use of ex-Nazis, and increasingly persuaded that Aerodynamic was fatally compromised, Sichel followed Burke out of the CIA and back to the United States. He became a wine merchant and developed the Blue Nun label. His view of Aerodynamic never changed.

“I thought it was disgraceful because we were essentially lying to those people,” he said half a century later. “We were getting them to risk their lives for a lie.… It was a war. We all believed that. And like all wars, that one was dirty. And I was young. I was young and I still believed things that, even a few years later, I no longer believed.”

* * *

Frank Wisner never confessed to any such regrets. A different kind of malignancy was growing within him. As the 1950s wore on, Wisner began to sense that the grand mission of his life—destroying Soviet Communism—was failing. Worst of all was that he saw his own government as the guilty party. The United States had stood by while Romania’s independence was destroyed in 1948. Three years later, it did not respond when East Germans rose up against their Communist government. Then came an even larger-scale uprising that led Wisner to even greater disillusion.

Restiveness disturbed the civic peace in Eastern Europe during 1956. The first upheaval erupted in Poland, where workers staged violent protests that police repressed at the cost of several lives. Wisner directed Radio Free Europe not only to cover these events in great detail but to broadcast its accounts into other Soviet-dominated countries. He concentrated especially on Hungary, where his agents had been working assiduously and which he thought might be on the brink of an uprising. Hungarian-language broadcasts over Radio Free Europe used anti-Soviet vitriol to stir nationalist passion. To accompany them, Wisner ordered airdrops of propaganda leaflets denouncing Soviet crimes and listing the “Twelve Demands of the National Opposition Movement.” Neither the radio broadcasts nor the leaflets explicitly promised that the United States would come to Hungarians’ aid if they rebelled, but they implied it.

“Certain phrases take on different connotations in Hungarian ears,” a State Department officer who monitored Radio Free Europe wrote afterward. “They listened, and thought it all meant that the Americans would arrive.”

In October 1956, Hungarians erupted in a rebellion out of Wisner’s dreams. At the height of their protest, a crowd that may have numbered in the hundreds of thousands marched on Parliament. A statue of Stalin was torn down. Police officers abandoned their posts. Soldiers refused to fire on the protesters. A reformist prime minister took office and announced that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact, the Moscow-dominated military alliance in Eastern Europe, and then declare neutrality and hold free elections. That was too much for Moscow to bear. Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest on November 4, 1956. Hungarians violently resisted. Radio Free Europe covered the uprising with “saturation broadcasting.” Six thousand people, half of them civilians, fell dead.

The weekend after fighting broke out in Hungary, Allen Dulles drove to Frank Wisner’s estate on the Eastern Shore of Maryland to discuss how the CIA could respond. Both wished to take some kind of drastic action, but neither could imagine what it might be. They had dreamed of a rebellion like the one in Hungary. Once it broke out, though, they realized that they had no choice other than to leave Hungarians to the mercy of their Soviet masters. Eisenhower was hardly ready to send American troops to confront the Red Army in a Warsaw Pact country.

“Wisner was looking for daring solutions,” said a CIA officer who attended the Maryland meeting, but “we all knew direct intervention was not feasible.”

As Wisner was assimilating this shock—the United States again refusing to arm freedom fighters who rose up against a Communist dictatorship—another blow fell. The fiery Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged triumphant from the Suez Crisis; he had nationalized the Suez Canal and repelled an invasion by France, Britain, and Israel aimed at taking it back. Only seven months earlier, in March 1956, Eisenhower had approved a secret directive creating Operation Omega, a project aimed at weakening or deposing Nasser, who the CIA feared might lead the Arab world into the Soviet camp. Just as Omega was beginning to unfold, the Suez Crisis erupted. Nasser shot to superstardom in Egypt and across the Arab world. No Egyptian would now join a plot against him. Eisenhower realized this and ordered an end to Omega.

“The President said that an action of this kind could not be taken at the present time when there is as much hostility as present,” a notetaker wrote about the meeting in which Eisenhower gave the order to the Dulles brothers. “For a thing like this to be done without inflaming the Arab world, a time free from heated stress holding the world’s attention, as at present, would have to be chosen.”

Both of Eisenhower’s decisions in November 1956—not to intervene in support of protesters in Hungary and to abandon efforts to depose Nasser in Egypt—were prudent and, given global realities, almost unavoidable. For Wisner they were devastating. To him, they seemed a double surrender that was part of an even larger global surrender: an acceptance of the Soviet power that he had devoted his life to destroying. After his meeting with Dulles in Maryland, he flew to Vienna to be nearby as Hungary erupted. To his immense frustration, he could do nothing to help. His cables home, all urging one form of American intervention or another, went unanswered.

“Frank had gone out to the border and he had seen the Hungarians attempting to flee into Austria,” his colleague Richard Bissell later recalled. “People had been killed by the Russians there, in his sight. It was a profound emotional shock.… He felt the US Army should have gone in.”

At the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, things had seemed to be going Wisner’s way. He and his agents were active on every continent. His true passion, though, had always been for operations in the “Soviet World.” Watching Red Army soldiers violently subdue Hungary, as they had subdued his beloved Romania a decade earlier, made clear how little he had been able to accomplish. The chief of his Rome station, future director of central intelligence William Colby, saw him as “near a nervous breakdown.”

Wisner’s officers stationed near Hungary, Colby said, had been “fully prepared with arms, communication stocks and air resupply, to come to the aid of the freedom fighters. This was exactly the purpose for which the Agency’s paramilitary capacity was designed.” Eisenhower’s veto, however, not only left the Hungarians to their fate but, as Colby put it, “established once and for all that the United States, while firmly committed to the containment of the Soviets within their existing sphere of influence, was not going to attempt to liberate any of those areas within the sphere.”

Wisner found this disorienting and unbearable. He decided to strike out on his own. Foiled in his efforts to fight Soviet power in Hungary, he shifted his attention back to Ukraine.

In 1957 the CIA produced a meticulously detailed report, evidently the product of wide-ranging espionage and deep analysis, entitled Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas—Ukraine. Names are redacted in the declassified version, but since Wisner was directing all CIA operations worldwide—and since he had long sensed revolutionary potential in Ukraine—he was likely involved in commissioning this report.

More than a simple argument for invading Ukraine, it is a detailed plan for how a war there could be waged. The declassified version is 234 pages long. It includes descriptions of terrain, climate, vegetation, patterns of rural settlement, roads, rail lines, border crossings, rivers, bridges, and communication networks. Twenty-four maps are included, with titles like “Ethnic Composition,” “Density of Forest Cover,” “Power Plants and Transmission Lines,” “Resistance Activities 1945–1956,” and “Security Factors Affecting Special Forces Operations.” The text assesses regions of the country according to “possibilities for concealment and evasion” and “value to Special Forces.”

“Some Ukrainians are apparently only slightly aware of the differences which set them apart from Russians, and feel little national antagonism,” the report asserts. “Nevertheless, important grievances exist, and among other Ukrainians there is opposition to Soviet authority which often has assumed a nationalist form. Under favorable conditions, these people might be expected to assist American Special Forces in fighting against the regime.”

All of this leads to a concluding section headed “Resistance Activities.” It has not been declassified. Whatever it recommended, Eisenhower rejected. Once again, he made clear that he was not going to send troops to challenge the Soviets on their turf. That fed Wisner’s fury. So did an intensifying mental illness—what would today be called bipolar disorder.

“Because of the disease taking hold of him,” his biographer wrote, “his rational understanding of the Eisenhower administration’s response turned to burning rage at those limits.”

Wisner slid toward bitterness and instability. “I thought that he was wound up overtight, like a clock,” one of his friends said years later. “That he couldn’t stop ticking. He couldn’t stop thinking, whether it was about the Hungarians, whether it was about Suez, whether it was about the United States. That he was going around in these very tight, agitated circles. It was very hard to discuss it with him because he never stopped talking. That was one of the main problems. I think the combination of Hungary and Suez was too much for him. He was overwrought. I always thought this was part of his disease.”

In bursts of manic activity, Wisner dictated streams of rambling cables, incessantly flexed his muscles, and launched into excited rants. He called Maryland cattle farmers asking to buy their herds, and mused about greeting Marshal Tito in a Red Army uniform. Hospitalization for hepatitis left him overweight. He had trouble sleeping.

In 1957 Wisner launched a multipronged campaign against the neutralist Sukarno government in Indonesia. He set it in motion with typical élan, telling the chief of his Far East division, “I think it’s time to hold Sukarno’s feet to the fire.” Within a year the operation had collapsed, with a downed CIA pilot hanging from a coconut tree in Java as its main legacy. For Wisner it was another heavy blow.

As he was assimilating this defeat, his mental health continued to decline. He raved incoherently and flew into sudden rages. On August 1, 1958, he was persuaded to accept sick leave. Six weeks later, after rest and psychiatric treatment did not help—and at the urging of his closest friends and relatives—he agreed to be committed to Sheppard Pratt Hospital, a secure psychiatric clinic outside Baltimore.

Wisner was diagnosed as manic-depressive and treated with electroshock therapy. After several months he showed marked improvement. Allen Dulles brought him back to active duty as a “special assistant” and then gave him a plum overseas assignment: chief of the CIA station in London. There he returned to his grand-scale entertaining and seemed to enjoy himself. He even had a chance to work on one last covert operation, against Cheddi Jagan, the neutralist leader of Guyana, which was then emerging from British colonialism. Jagan fell, but Guyana collapsed into a long spiral of poverty and misrule.

“Frank never did anything less than 100 percent,” one of his operatives in the Guyana plot recalled. “He did everything 250 percent. He decided he had a sacred mission, and of course he worked himself into a frenzy.”

In the spring of 1962, Wisner and his wife returned from London to attend their son’s graduation from Princeton. During their stay, he began losing his grip again. By mutual agreement he left the CIA. Early retirement after a life lived so intensely did not suit him. From his farm in Maryland, he began writing long screeds, some promoting his theory that the Nazi war criminal Martin Bormann had escaped Berlin and was living in South America.

“He’d become too high again, everything was exaggerated,” his wife recalled. She directed the farm manager to collect and lock up all firearms on the property. He missed one, an ornately engraved 20-gauge shotgun that Wisner had bought in Austria a decade earlier and left in a closet.

On the afternoon of October 29, 1965, Wisner picked up that shotgun, loaded it, pointed it at his head, and, standing at the top of his staircase, pulled the trigger. The Washington Post reported that he had been “one of the half dozen most important men in Washington during his CIA career” and that he had spent his life confronting “the long, prepared challenge of the vast Stalinist intelligence and subversion net.” He was fifty-six years old. Among wreaths placed at his grave was one simply bearing the numeral 7. It was a tribute from his brothers in the secretive Seven Society that he had joined while at the University of Virginia.

* * *

By the late 1950s, hundreds of Ukrainian exiles had settled in Munich, where Project Aerodynamic had its headquarters. The most prominent among them was the legendary nationalist and mass murderer Stepan Bandera. He had fought the Soviets during World War II and continued to fight them for several years afterward, inspiring countless Ukrainian partisans. In Munich he was a marked man. He moved carefully and lived under an assumed name. Moscow aimed not only to punish him for a lifetime of anti-Russian violence, but also to put a final end to resistance in Ukraine.

On October 14, 1959, Bandera met over lunch with officers of the German intelligence service, which was then headed by his old patron, the former Nazi spymaster Reinhard Gehlen. Their discussion, by one account, was about “the expansion of operations in Ukraine.” That was confirmation, if any was needed, that Bandera was still looking for ways to fight Moscow.

The morning after Bandera met with German officers, he went shopping at a vegetable market. He returned home with a bag of green tomatoes. In the hallway of his building, he put the bag down and struggled with his key. A stranger was waiting near the elevator.

“Funktionert es nicht?” the stranger asked. Isn’t it working?

“Doch es funktioniert,” Bandera replied as the doorknob finally turned. It’s working now.

Those were Bandera’s last words. As he spoke them, the stranger raised a rolled-up newspaper. Inside was a specially designed pistol, fitted with two eight-inch barrels. He pulled the trigger. There was little noise, only what one report called “a soft pop.” A fine mist of hydrogen cyanide gas spread over Bandera’s face. He fell to the floor and died within seconds.

Soviet leaders hoped this assassination would finally finish the war that Ukrainian partisans had been waging against them for two decades. It did. Bandera’s murder marked the end of an era. Yet according to a leading Ukrainian American scholar, Serhii Plokhy, “the assassination achieved a result contrary to the one envisioned by its instigators. Instead of creating confusion in the ranks of the anti-regime forces and provoking a power struggle among the leaders of the most militant émigré organization, it removed a leader who was no longer popular or dangerous from the scene, turning him into a martyr and providing his supporters with a tool for mobilization that they had previously lacked.”

Passionate Ukrainian nationalism had propelled Bandera through a violent life. In death he was born again. His image would define the cleavage in Ukrainian society for generations.


Copyright © 2026 by Stephen Kinzer.




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