[Salon] Pakistan and Afghanistan:  Strategic Blowback or Policy Failure






Recent tensions and an ‘open war’ between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the Taliban have taken many geopolitical analysts by surprise. Muhammad Idrees analyses the several strands of this complex relationship, and how Pakistan’s valuable and pragmatic ‘strategic depth’ with Afghanistan has turned into a liability.

*

Pakistan’s policy of instrumentalising the Taliban in Afghanistan for its own interests has backfired. The Taliban have increasingly been acting independently, in their own national interests, rather than for Pakistan’s strategic pursuits — nurturing their relations with China, India, Iran, and Russia. Pakistan’s hopes of any  ‘strategic depth’ are fading fast, especially in the face of the recent rapprochement between the Taliban and India, Pakistan’s neighbour and arch rival.   

A deadlock exists between Pakistan’s military establishment and the Taliban over terrorist activities in Pakistan allegedly sponsored by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan’s principal grievance is the Taliban in Afghanistan’s support for the TTP, and a refusal to halt the latter’s attacks against Pakistan’s military and its people. The Taliban denies these accusations, arguing instead that TTP attacks are in fact the outcome of Pakistan’s long-standing policies, and a matter of domestic internal security for which the Taliban in Afghanistan is not responsible. The Taliban do not see themselves as being responsible for the (re)emergence of TTP, nor its terrorist activities. At the same time (and as being suggested by several journalists, media professionals and think tanks) the Taliban are reluctant to take tough action against the TTP due to deep-rooted ethnic and ideological connections.

Many see this breakdown in relations as a strategic blowback for Islamabad, turning an erstwhile buffer (Islamabad’s policy of treating Afghanistan as a shield against India) into a security threat for itself. Pakistan’s earlier support of the Taliban (especially during the US–NATO led war in Afghanistan between 2001–21), including providing safe havens for the Taliban during their hard times, is now no longer acknowledged by the Taliban, leaving Islamabad annoyed.

*

The TTP has transformed itself from a tribal insurgency into a complex guerrilla army; it now uses more targeted asymmetric methods of warfare. The group is said to have acquired advanced military hardware through illegal supply chains (the ‘black’ market), and is equipped with advanced rifles, sniper gear and night-vision optics. Recent acquisitions also include quadcopter drones capable of carrying explosives and striking military targets. It has been a difficult task for Pakistan’s police and army to safeguard their border check posts against TTP drones entering via the rugged terrain of the border regions.  

Nowadays, TTP’s units are conducting guerrilla raids in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and northern Balochistan from nearby mountainous hideouts along the Pak-Afghan border. Attacks are becoming more sophisticated with increasing use of the digital domain (Umar Media is the official media production company of the TTP, producing media in Pashto and translated into English and Urdu) and AI localisation. The digital platforms create and push anti-Pakistan narratives, attracting youth in TTP strongholds, and more widely, to join their ranks.  

In 2025–26, the TTP launched some high-profile attacks:  in 2025,  they conducted over 1,000 violent attacks across Pakistan; Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICCS) recorded a rise of nearly 74 per cent in counterterrorism and militant fatalities. The provinces of KP and Balochistan are worst hit, with an overall of 96 per cent of fatalities and 93 per cent of all recorded violence happening there.  In 2026, due to an increase in (mostly TTP-sponsored) terrorism, the country is at the top of the most affected countries in the  Global Terrorism Index 2026.

Pakistan is facing a dual challenge from Afghanistan: the resurgence of a modernised and technologically advanced TTP, and  the Taliban government in Afghanistan’s non-cooperative and antagonistic behaviour. Pak-Afghan relations are at an all-time low, and Islamabad’s long-term engagement with the Taliban has not worked to Pakistan’s benefit.

*

As mentioned earlier, the Taliban has been diverting its economic and diplomatic engagements to other countries in the region, like India and Iran. Between 2021–24, trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan dropped from US$1.8 billion to US$600 million. The Taliban’s shift of interest toward Chabahar port (an Indo-Iranian venture) could motivate other Central Asian countries in that direction, undermining the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). If unchecked, this can have long-term economic and geopolitical consequences for Islamabad; the most direct will be delaying its ambition to become a hub of regional trade connectivity via CPEC.

The recent diplomatic reset between India and the Taliban government in Afghanistan — marked by the Afghan foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi and India’s commitment to reopen its embassy in Kabul — is a major policy blow to Islamabad. Though India has not formally recognised the Taliban as the de facto government of Afghanistan, the thawing of relations between New Delhi and Kabul is concerning for policymakers in Islamabad. Indian media have been reporting that  the Taliban are no longer a proxy of Pakistan, and that Pakistan has lost its so-called strategic depth in Afghanistan, now a strategic liability in the face of ever-increasing mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad.

Pakistan’s retaliatory actions (air strikes and ‘open war’, according to Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Muhammad Asif) against Afghanistan in recent months, especially after the deadlock over TTP, has further intensified the situation. Pakistan cannot accommodate TTP demands for autonomy in regions bordering with Afghanistan, nor its objection to the merger of ex-FATA into KP province. The TTP’s wider agenda includes overthrowing the Pakistan government and establishing a sharia-based political structure resembling the Emirate of Afghanistan. 

The issue is not straightforward, and should not be taken for granted: the Taliban uses TTP as a bargaining tool for both internal and external interests. They fear that if they put pressure on the TTP on Pakistan’s behalf, it could push them towards the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Taliban’s main domestic rival. On the other hand, Pakistan’s concern is managing TTP internally or relocating it whilst also stopping it from waging war against the country. Pakistan does not see the Afghan Taliban’s plan to help disarm TTP working effectively, who have strategic leverage to shape other issues, such as transit trade across the Durand Line.

Current Pak-Afghan tensions are benefitting the Taliban by attracting regional countries — including China, India, Iran, Russia (which has deepened diplomatic ties), and Central Asian states — to pledge investment and economic benefits. Some argue that this engagement is not benign, rather it is a necessary alignment to manage terrorism in their respective countries, and possible Taliban support for such recalcitrant groups; it is fear-based bargain facilitating diplomatic and economic engagement and recognition. The United Nations reports the presence of some 20–23 active terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Prominent examples include Al-Qaeda, TTP, ISKP, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)/Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Taliban claims that their domestic situation is under control; however, the bordering countries are conscious of cross-border security risks. ISKP alone is considered a major threat to Central Asian countries, which Russia believes undermines the Eurasian security architecture. China is wary of the active presence of TIP in Afghanistan, and India is coordinating efforts with Afghanistan to control cross border terrorism.

Negotiations facilitated by Qatar and Türkiye (in October–November 2025) after the start of the Pak-Afghan ‘open war’ and increasing casualties on both sides, failed. Pakistan blamed the Taliban for not being serious on the TTP, and Afghans blamed Pakistani delegates for walking out while talks were still underway. Due to tensions in the Middle East and the ongoing US–Iran war, the Pak-Afghan issue has been swept under the rug. But the situation remains highly volatile and could erupt anytime!

*

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the ‘South Asia @ LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy.

This blog is published under the Creative Commons License and may be reposted by anyone with the following Acknowledgement (including hyperlinks): ‘Originally published in ‘South Asia @ LSE’, the official blog of South Asia Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, on 9 November 2026.’

Please e-mail southasia@lse.ac.uk for queries.

Banner photograph © Hamayoon Pacha, Detail of ‘Afghan Soldier’, 2021, Unsplash.



  • About the author

Muhammad Idrees

Dr Muhammad Idrees is Charles Wallace Pakistan Trust Post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow 2026 at LSE South Asia Centre.



This archive was generated by a fusion of Pipermail (Mailman edition) and MHonArc.