Welcome to WarTalk, post-midterms edition. There’s fallout for everything we cover. We’re going to talk about the Iran war, the future of the Pentagon, Congress and defense, and whether we’ll still have a Secretary of War for the next two years. We’ve got the full gang here. We discuss:
Listen now on your favorite podcast app. Iran After the MidtermsJordan Schneider: What does this mean for the war in Iran? Bryan Clark: The war in Iran continues, though everybody seems to have forgotten it’s still happening, except for the political fallout. There are still two carriers there. The George H.W. Bush recently returned from its Thai vacation and is now conducting flight operations against the Iranians. The George Washington, which would normally be heading home to Japan, is still hanging out in the Arabian Sea. Add 15 or 16 destroyers performing various defensive missions or enforcing the blockade of Iran, plus ground forces ashore defending against drone attacks. It’s a massive operation, with tens of thousands of sailors, Marines, and soldiers, that seems to be doing very little except protecting some oil flows and keeping Iran from having a viable economy. Jordan Schneider: What do these election results do to how this gets resolved? Bryan Clark: The pressure is on to reach some kind of resolution. Inside the administration, JD Vance is already saying the war was the big reason they lost, and the president has even acknowledged it. So the escalation they threatened earlier is probably off the table. Now they’ll look for a way to get Iran to agree to something the White House can spin as victory. I don’t know how they’ll pull that off, because the Iranians have no motivation to give the White House any wins. But the administration will be desperate for a fig leaf soon. The blockade they thought would bring Iran to its knees isn’t doing it, and it’s too slow to deliver results on the administration’s timeline. They don’t want to go into the new Congress with this still going on, handing Congress an easy way to squeeze the White House. As long as the war continues, Congress won’t pass the NDAA or appropriations. We’ll be under continuing resolutions through the end of this year and into next. The White House wants its budget approved at some point, and that will require ending the war, because Democrats won’t sign off on any bill that gives tacit approval to the war continuing. Tony Stark: Are you telling me CENTCOM’s podcast isn’t going to solve this? Credit to Representative-elect Elaine Luria, who called out Brad Cooper — “I’ve known the man for twenty-five years” — and told him to read the room. Congress has no interest in continuing this war, or in enduring any more CENTCOM shenanigans. Jordan Schneider: How many comms people had to approve this? And it came out the day after the election! In what world do we want to hear about his fucking workout habits? I’m sorry — go end this war already. What are we doing here? It’s so much worse than the Paparo Time cover. Justin McIntosh: That wasn’t an outside reporter coming in and saying, “You’re the geographic combatant commander for one of the largest and most important theaters we operate in. Let’s interview you.” They made all of these choices internally. Bryan Clark: It was shot on a cell phone. Justin McIntosh: I want to go back to something we’ve discussed before: they never had a theory of victory. They never defined the strategic national interest in Iran. If they had, the election results wouldn’t matter much. They could say, “This is in the strategic national interest of the United States. Our domestic politics don’t change that.” Maybe they stop the strikes, but they keep strangling Iranian oil because they believe it’s a long-term strategic victory that will bring Tehran to heel. Instead, the worst of their instincts will come out: take whatever deal is available without any real thought to the second- and third-order effects. What we’ll necessarily end up with is something much worse than the JCPOA — which the first Trump administration tore up because it was terrible. Supposedly. Jordan Schneider: There’s precedent for presidents losing midterms and keeping the war going. In 2006, an antiwar protest vote brought a lot of Democrats into Congress, and Bush said, “Fuck it, I’m going to do a surge. I think it’s the right thing for the American people and the right thing for the Iraqi people.” Regardless of how you think it went, he could do that because he had a vision. Bryan Clark: And he convinced Congress to go along with it. Congress funded the surge and passed supplementals on top of that. Here, they have no theory of victory, so they can’t convince Congress that what they’re doing is a good idea. With no path to victory, Congress won’t fund it, and they’ll be in continuing-resolution limbo until the conflict is resolved. Tony Stark: Once again, you have to communicate with Congress. If this Congress — which was supposed to be far more favorable — didn’t like you, the next one certainly won’t. Bryan Clark: It’s not getting better. Tony Stark: If I’m a political operative in the White House with any sort of careerist mindset — meaning I didn’t hop into politics yesterday — I’m thinking about damage control. That means bringing in people who can actually talk to Congress, who can advocate, and who can find the party some kind of glide path to 2028. None of that involves the current crowd. Pete has to go one way or another: impeachment, resignation, or firing. Marco Rubio will probably exit stage left on his own, if I had to guess based on other reporting. That leaves the people who will sign any deal, like Steve Witkoff, who might stumble into the Secretary of State role if he survives congressional inquiries. Bryan Clark: There’s probably a side deal. Jordan Schneider: There’s no universe in which he gets confirmed, Tony. Justin McIntosh: No, but that’s how the end of the first Trump administration operated, too — a whole lot of acting officials. We’ve talked about the budgetary and statutory problems you run into with acting versus confirmed cabinet-level secretaries and deputies. There’s no way he gets confirmed. And I’d be hard-pressed to find anyone with a political future who would want to go in now and run one of these agencies, or the Pentagon. Jordan Schneider: Let’s close the loop on Iran before we get to the Pentagon. Trump did the first few weeks; there was a pause and maybe sort of a deal. He didn’t like it, and he started bombing again. We looked for a deal again; it wasn’t there, and now we’re in the blockade phase. As Bryan said, the Iranians have much more leverage now. But then they’re going to nuclearize, right? Bryan Clark: There appears to be greater public support in Iran for nuclear weapons, which is obviously counterproductive to what the administration wanted. But they’re still constrained. The economy is suffering, and they don’t really have the resources to follow through. The administration’s argument is: “We’ve largely reopened the strait, so traffic is flowing at pre-war rates” — protected at great cost — “and the blockade is squeezing Iran.” If they kept that up for another year, maybe they’d see the results they want. The question is whether anyone in Congress has enough confidence in that to fund it. No. And can you get anyone beyond the current team to lead it at the Pentagon? I don’t think so. There’s no world in which they can sustain it long enough to work. They’ll need an off-ramp, and you’re right: that puts Iran in the driver’s seat. Jordan Schneider: Justin, if you’re Iran, what are your big asks now? Justin McIntosh: I’d go straight to reparations — war damages, including for the atomic sites. I’d ask for a security guarantee for peaceful civilian nuclear energy. They may keep pushing for the toll on the strait. I could see a consortium — Iran and Qatar balancing Saudi Arabia and the UAE — controlling transit through the strait, with profit-sharing among the four. That’s basically a return to a pre-Islamic Revolution, OPEC-style arrangement in some shape or form. Realistically, they don’t have to give up much, because they think time is on their side. They’ve weathered the storm. If prices stay up — if they can get oil to $150 — I saw an economist argue that a return to $150 oil in the next several months could completely collapse the French economy. Think of the ripple effects. Iran holds a lot of geopolitical cards simply because it can drive up prices. They know that, Congress will be very quick to say “end this,” and it will be on the president to get it done. Bryan Clark: And God forbid anything else happen in the world, because half of the deployed, underway Navy is in the CENTCOM AOR — in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf. Justin McIntosh: Luckily, Brad Cooper’s doing wonderful workouts. Bryan Clark: He’s doing a bang-up job. You can’t keep half the deployed Navy there forever, and that’s the only way we’re keeping traffic flowing out of the strait and keeping the blockade on Iran. As soon as it lifts, Iran can start cutting off access to the strait again. Jordan Schneider: Bryan, when I play video games and a unit wins a battle, it gets a little star and becomes more powerful. That’s how it works, right? Bryan Clark: That’s right. We’re collecting coins and moving to the next stage of Donkey Kong. That’s about the degree of strategery going on here. The other thing people don’t talk about is that Iran is basically holding the Gulf countries hostage. If we escalate, Iran just starts attacking our Gulf allies again, and they have basically no missile defenses left. More of their infrastructure gets turned to rubble, and it becomes even harder to get oil out, because now the ports get hit on top of the refineries, which are basically already shut down. Rest in peace, NSA Bahrain. We’re never going back there. Tony Stark: On that point, I want to talk about the bases, because they’re significant congressional line items every year. Do we just stop funding them? Move them farther back? There’s going to be a fight in Congress over whether to keep a Middle East presence that just isn’t there, or to say, “We’re not doing this anymore. We’re out.” That will be the fight in next year’s NDAA. Bryan Clark: The new Congress will probably be less interested in building up infrastructure there. We’ll go back to the lighter footprint we had before OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) — most of NSA Bahrain was built during OIF. More will be done from sea, or from partner facilities in the UAE and Qatar, plus the existing Bahraini navy facility. The U.S. is no longer necessarily a big naval player in the Middle East. I don’t think the Navy or the Coast Guard has any intention of sending those ships back. The Coast Guard moved its six fast response cutters to Singapore, along with all the littoral combat ships. Every ship that was in the Persian Gulf is now in Singapore, operating in the South China Sea, which has been great for INDOPACOM in dealing with China’s gray-zone threat. Not so great for CENTCOM. Justin McIntosh: See? It was 4D chess all along. Tony Stark: Is this a lesson for the PLA? Will they conclude, “We found a way to get the U.S. to abandon its near-shore bases”? Or will they decide this was unique to the Trump administration? Bryan Clark: I’m not sure. One lesson they’re probably drawing is: if the Iranians can put up this kind of fight, what should we expect from Taiwan? If your target is as resilient as the Iranians turned out to be, what hope do you have of bringing them to heel short of a large-scale ground invasion? Jordan Schneider: My one note: it’s not about the absolute level of resilience. It’s about the relative change a society feels. Iranians have been through a lot of shit over the past fifteen years and the Taiwanese haven’t at all. Going from no shit to “my daily life has completely changed, and I’m living in a struggling wartime society” is very different from “this is just currency crisis number 14 and inflation crisis number 12, and my government has already shot seven of my friends three months ago.” It’s a different baseline for resilience. Justin McIntosh: The Iranians are Private Pyle in the bathroom in Full Metal Jacket: “I live in a world of shit.” The Taiwanese, not nearly as much. It’s very hard for China to apply this lesson. The forces we put in the Middle East were largely on a war footing during the GWOT, and then they were actively used in combat against Iran, so they became legitimate military targets. For U.S. bases in Asia to face the same threat, China would have to actively target bases in Japan, Okinawa, and down into the Philippines — almost preemptively. That would be escalatory. It would draw in not only the U.S. but all the allies currently sitting on the fence. It’s a much more nuanced geopolitical play for China, unless the U.S. started a massive preemptive war over Taiwan, which I don’t see happening. So it’s hard for them to take a one-for-one lesson. Hegseth, Impeachment, and the Lame DuckJordan Schneider: Back to the Pentagon. How many drinks do we think Pete Hegseth had on election night? Justin McIntosh: All of them? Tony Stark: Duffel Blog had a great article about this: because of Pentagon bureaucracy, Pete’s sobriety pledge only went through on election night, so he’s had the worst 48 hours of his life sober. But I suspect there’s been a lot of drinking in the last week. Justin McIntosh: He’s had a shitty week. Before the election, there were already stories about him reaching out to Marsha Blackburn to try to get appointed senator from Tennessee. Tony Stark: The only thing worse than “new phone, who dis” is “new phone, who dis,” posted on social media with “we are absolutely not talking to you.” Jordan Schneider: My favorite stories are the ones saying he wants to go out on a high note so he can run for president. Justin McIntosh: It’s not hard to go up from here. Bryan Clark: Yeah, build on the success. Maybe, like Brad Cooper, he needs his own Between Two Ferns podcast with Feinberg, where they talk about their workout routines, what podcasts they’re listening to, how many agents they’re running. Justin McIntosh: Can you imagine him and Feinberg actually having a conversation? Jordan Schneider: I really want the Feinberg truth-serum interview. From day two, he must have been thinking, “This fucking guy is not it. What am I doing here?” Feinberg spent 30 years being able to fire whoever the fuck he wants, and then all of a sudden he’s working for the worst cabinet secretary we’ve had in half a century. Bryan Clark: He’s working for a guy he wouldn’t have hired or kept on as an intern. Tony Stark: I told some folks last night that the true best guest for the CENTCOM podcast is Paparo, doing the John Mulaney bit: “Where’s my fucking money, man?” Justin McIntosh: Jordan, that’s an interesting take I hadn’t considered. Go back and read Liar’s Poker, or listen to Scott Galloway describe his early investment banking days: he slept in his office with an extra shirt, and people got reamed out and fired for minor grammatical errors in a memo. Everything is treated as the most important thing ever. Imagine going from being the boss of an organization like that — where you can say “You, punch him. You’re fired. You, jump out that window,” and people will do it — to being the deputy at the Pentagon. Jordan Schneider: He founded his firm at 32. For 30 years, his word went. And then all of a sudden, this. God bless him for lasting more than a month. Maybe he doesn’t deserve it. Bless your heart, Steve Feinberg. Bryan Clark: One thing that strikes me, to double back on Iran: everyone perceived this as the president and Netanyahu hatching a scheme and deciding to go in. But as it plays out, Hegseth and Cooper are all in. Brad Cooper is the one arguing we should escalate and hit them again. It’s shocking that the people who theoretically have the best information want to keep escalating, while Trump is the one vacillating. Whether or not they were willing participants at the beginning, they’re all in now, and this needs to blow back on them as much as on anyone else. Jordan Schneider: “Best information” is an interesting framework. They have valuable information we don’t: Iranian leadership intentions, the state of the Iranian economy, unrest monitoring. But the information that matters most is gas prices and poll numbers. If all you think about is where the troops are going, that’s not on your mind. The president, at least ostensibly, became president because he cared about those two things. So it’s not surprising that a more blinkered view of the war would make you more bullish on its prospects. Justin McIntosh: That’s the difference between a chief of staff like Ridgway, who was willing to push back and make political judgment calls grounded in his military advice to political appointees, and Dan Caine, who has said, “I don’t make political determinations. My job is only to offer the best military options.” You can’t get to a military victory without a policy objective you’re driving toward. Denying that, and trying to separate the two at those levels, is exactly what these guys are doing. Brad Cooper isn’t wrong: the U.S. could win a war with Iran. But that’s not the question. The question is whether we can do it without it costing us everything else. There’s never been a good answer, because nobody has determined what we’re willing to give up — because nobody has defined the strategic national interest. Bryan Clark: Exactly. We have no objective, so we can’t come up with a plan to achieve it. Jordan Schneider: The ostensible interest is them not getting a bomb, but that’s not compelling enough for the American people. That’s not a normative judgment about whether we should care. It’s just a revealed preference that we don’t. Tony Stark: If you’re in Brad Cooper’s seat, you’re an admiral who finally gets to command in wartime. It’s your campaign. You have the might of the fleet; you’ve stolen all of Paparo’s assets. You get to run this strike campaign and nothing else, and it will be your legacy. For years, everyone argued that if the American people felt the war, they’d care about it. It turned out to be the opposite. They felt the pain and asked, “Was this worth it? Perhaps we should reflect on the last 25 years.” The difference from the GWOT is that Americans didn’t feel economic pain then. Those who lost people certainly felt it, but that was confined to certain communities. If Afghanistan had driven oil to $150 in 2011, we would have been out of there. Justin McIntosh: The 2007 Iraq surge coincided with the 2008 housing crisis, which had substantial economic effects. The long tail was Obama getting elected and withdrawing from Iraq in 2011. People were mad about the war, but they were really mad about the economy, and the economy motivated them. These guys kept doubling down: “Gas prices don’t really matter. People will understand that Iran not getting a bomb is really important.” You have to suspend disbelief to get there. I’m not saying I want global proliferation, but you have to restate the theory of why Iran can’t be allowed a bomb. If the reason is just “we don’t want them to have one” — okay, comma, and…? Bryan Clark: I don’t see how the current campaign gets you to them not having a bomb. The idea, I guess, is to squeeze them until they agree not to pursue one — which they’d already more or less agreed to. Jordan Schneider: It was a regime-change play. It didn’t work, and now we’re stuck with the aftermath. Justin McIntosh: Exactly. If anything, we’ve reinvigorated the desire within the regime to push for a bomb. They can look at North Korea and think, “They’re leaving them alone. Maybe they’ll leave us alone.” Jordan Schneider: Can we do a history lesson? Mayorkas was impeached in 2024. Before that, you have to go back to 1876 and Secretary of War William Belknap, a Grant-era official brought down by corruption. He was famous for his extravagant parties and elegantly attired first and second wives, and many questioned how he managed such a grand lifestyle on an $8,000 government salary. As the evidence emerged, minutes before the House was scheduled to vote on articles of impeachment, Belknap raced to the White House, handed Grant his resignation, and burst into tears. How far does Pete want to push this? Tony Stark: Those impeachment articles are coming Monday, the second the gavel hits in the House. Thomas Massie has promised as much, which is why Mike Johnson has kept the House out of session. Political reporting suggests a pretty good margin for a yes vote. A lot of people who are now out of politics will say, “Pete cost me my job,” because the narrative within the GOP is explicitly that the war — whoever you blame for it — cost them the election. In the Senate, I don’t know if you get to two-thirds, but from talking to some folks, you’ll probably get at least half a dozen Republicans. The question is whether the White House wants to endure even more of that pain before the new Congress starts. Justin McIntosh: My big question is whether the Trump administration has lost enough Republicans that it can no longer assemble a coalition to back anything it wants, because it has fractured the party so badly. Tony Stark: The party split in two. Bryan Clark: In lame-duck sessions, a lot of members who lost don’t even come back. If you lose your election, you lose your physical office, so you have to operate out of other places. Many of them return for the bare minimum and then disappear. On the Republican side, you may not be able to assemble enough humans to vote to get anything done. Then there’s Massie’s discharge petition, which has to get voted on. They have to act on the Hegseth impeachment one way or the other if they’re going to do anything in the House. Tony Stark: Let’s be clear: the staff have given up, and the members have given up. Nobody is mounting real opposition to this. Jordan Schneider: If you’re Pete and you stay in office, I guess the government handles your legal bills for all the investigations. But you’re also a bigger target. Once you’re gone, you’re yesterday’s news, and it’s more exciting to do oversight on people who are still in office. Justin McIntosh: You get the Lindsey Graham defense: “We’re not here to litigate the past.” That works if you’re out. If you’re still in, you’re not the past. Bryan Clark: But he’s a nice lightning rod that draws attention away from everyone else, so maybe they want to keep him in as long as possible. Justin McIntosh: Like an aircraft carrier — everybody’s aiming at it, so everything else can slip by. Bryan Clark: I don’t know whether the administration actually wants anything out of Congress before the end of the year. They may be fine with stasis: pass a continuing resolution to keep the government open and let the wheels fall off everything else until Democratic leadership arrives in the new year. Then Democrats will have to deal with the Massie petition and do something about the Iran war before passing any defense legislation. The whole thing will grind to a halt, with a bunch of Republicans not showing up at all. I don’t see any activity on the Hill other than hearings beating up on the administration. Tony Stark: You’re going to see, in big bold print: “None of the funds in this bill may be used to continue operations in the CENTCOM AOR.” Bryan Clark: If you’re lucky, you get that, and they actually pass something. Some Democrats argue that any NDAA or appropriations bill supports the war, so they don’t want to further it, and they’ll use that to pin the blame on the administration. Justin McIntosh: And the Pentagon’s recent proclivity for moving money around doesn’t help. If the other side isn’t dealing in good faith and won’t execute what you put in the bill, why pass it? That’s the danger for Democrats: “We wrote all these provisions.” “Yes, but they’re not following the law, so why would they follow the provisions of this bill?” Bryan Clark: That’s also the original sin of the reconciliation bill. All that money was very broadly defined, in broad buckets of categories, so they’re moving it around to pay for whatever they need. Congress set this up by passing the reconciliation bill with such loose acquisition rules. Jordan Schneider: You know who had a really great election night? Raúl Castro. Justin McIntosh: You think Cuba’s off the menu now? Jordan Schneider: He was probably having a party. How can you do Cuba now? Bryan Clark: You still can. Jordan Schneider: Maybe. But if Rubio leaves, who’s going to drive it? Tony Stark: Only if you think it’ll be bloodless — if you think you’ve found an opposition figure who’ll handle it themselves. You certainly can’t do it with green suiters. That’s off the table. Justin McIntosh: I wonder if there’s a bay where we could land these opposition people. How would that work? Bryan Clark: A quiet sort of insertion and insurgency. Tony Stark: Justin, under Woke 3.0, the Bay of Pigs is now the Bay of Tofu. You cannot land there. Justin McIntosh: I was just wondering if there were any historical analogies of a bloodless coup attempt in Cuba going badly for the U.S. They’ll be good this time. Jordan Schneider: Don’t worry, Justin, we’ll send them with drones. They’ll have air cover — some Mavics. It’ll be great. Tony Stark: I have it on good authority that robots don’t bleed. Bryan Clark: As far as I can tell. But they do feel. The thing is, Florida is now the last bastion for Republicans. Do you want a humanitarian disaster ninety miles off the coast of your party’s last redoubt? Jordan Schneider: We’re relieving the disaster! They haven’t had power for four years. Justin McIntosh: Beautiful night skies, though. Bryan Clark: Except they’ll quickly make their way to Florida as part of the restitution we owe the Cuban people. Jordan Schneider: Didn’t you say the Coast Guard has nothing to do anymore because it can’t be in the Gulf? Bryan Clark: That’s true. You do have a lot of Coast Guard that can be freed up. Tony Stark: No disrespect to the Coast Guard. I love the Coast Guard. Feinberg’s Exit, Defense Tech, and SpaceXJordan Schneider: Let’s talk about Feinberg leaving, the OSC leaving, and the future of the Pentagon spending money and doing things. Justin McIntosh: Well before the election, there was good reporting that Feinberg had submitted a resignation letter and the White House rejected it — told him “please stay,” or whatever you say to convince someone with his background. Now there’s early reporting that he resubmitted it with more of an “I’m not asking” tone. He’s leaving as the champion of DAWG, the guy who was going to bring in VC money and right the ship on procurement — and who apparently also takes all the blame for failing to replenish the missile stocks we’ve expended. Jordan Schneider: I forgot about that. Justin McIntosh: He didn’t. He’s had a lot on his plate. So you have him going out, plus multiple discussions of people at the NSC and OSC all leaving very soon. The ship starts to look rudderless real quick. Tony Stark: Let’s talk about what Congress looks like from DoD’s perspective. A 260-seat Democratic majority is actually better for the defense budget than a 218-seat one. There’s usually a bloc of 20 to 30 members, split between the parties, who want to cut the budget by 10% — it comes up every year. A bigger majority gives leadership more room to maneuver to at least keep the budget flat. You probably won’t keep pace with inflation, so it will be a real-dollar cut, but I don’t expect a real cut across the board. Certain projects may get cut, and there will be more regulatory scrutiny over how things are awarded. On Feinberg as DAWG’s champion: the companies that matured to do all this and are now building things are in congressional districts. New members will learn very fast that they can’t just wipe the board. You’ll see more haggling than some commentators expect. More than budget cuts, you’ll see scrutiny of the deals that were made — who donated to what, certain renovations, et cetera. It won’t be a catastrophe. But the VC market might conclude that seed and Series A rounds for defense tech aren’t the best place to invest, and look for a new market for their ROI. Bryan Clark: I agree with a lot of that. We’ve seen procurement and contracting officials make decisions that include new defense tech companies connected to the administration or even the president’s family. It’s not necessarily that Don Jr. called and told them to buy from his company. It’s that they think, “My boss’s boss is tight with these people, and I don’t want to leave them out in the cold.” Most of these procurements have multiple winners, so they keep the politically connected companies in the mix, planning to winnow down later. That shapes contracting officers’ and acquisition officials’ decisions, because they know these companies will pressure their boss and their boss’s boss. So they keep them in as long as they can, which gives those companies government contracts they can use to raise money as “viable” companies. It’s a vicious cycle. That will fall off now, because these officials will be thinking, “I might have to explain my decisions to a Democratic Congress.” We’ll see real constriction at the action-officer level. You’ve got corruption at the political level, but the people who might be legally liable for these decisions will be watching their backs and probably making smarter choices. Jordan Schneider: Is now when we talk about the Elon of it all? What do you do about SpaceX? Tony Stark: The “nationalize it” commentary is dumb, but there will probably be a push to at least spin Starshield off as its own subsidiary that Elon can’t touch. Whether that’s supportable from an infrastructure standpoint, I have no idea — telecoms aren’t my expertise. But there will be a lot of investigation into who pressed the button and who turned it off, and a lot of government program managers will be happy to point the finger. Before the election, I was already hearing people openly complain about it. Justin McIntosh: That will be the biggest hang-up. They’ll definitely make demands on Starshield. It goes back to the Claude and Anthropic decisions. You can argue the department was somewhat directionally correct about Anthropic’s ability to throttle models. On deployed edge compute in top-secret or secret enclaves, they couldn’t reach in and throttle a model. But on unclassified systems, where the preponderance of military work happens, they showed they could reach into commercial customers’ systems and downgrade them without telling them. They did that when Fable was first released. That validated the Pentagon’s fear: “We don’t want to give a commercial company this much control over something we’re going to employ.” The exact same logic applies to Starshield. If it’s going to be a backbone for military communications — command and control, communications platforms, driving drones — there’s zero chance they’ll let a commercial company keep control of it. Then there’s the issue people have raised before: Elon Musk doesn’t have a security clearance. By the letter of the law, I’m not sure he’s even eligible for one, because he kind of openly does drugs — whatever — and there have been questions about his citizenship status. A man without a clearance sitting atop a system that conceivably transfers classified data is a problem if he’s the one giving directions on turning it on and off. It shows he has a hand in it beyond budgetary moves for the company — he has operational control. And who’s going to tell him no when he asks to see something? Those are hard questions, and they’ll get asked very quickly. Bryan Clark: I agree. There’s so much dependence on Starshield for the robotic and autonomous systems we’ve deployed — including in CENTCOM, where it’s the only comms network available. Having that depend on whatever Elon wants to do that day isn’t tenable. They’ll have to make SpaceX spin it off into a subsidiary managed differently from SpaceX overall. There will probably be changes in how the government acquires those services, and new governance structures at SpaceX, like other defense contractors that create subsidiaries with different rules from their commercial counterparts. Elon is also moving into mobile broadband, using the Boost Mobile spectrum he acquired from EchoStar to offer space-to-surface mobile phone service. That’s another capability DoD might want, and it will have to figure out how to manage it relative to SpaceX’s other offerings. The way DoD works with Iridium on the equivalent capability is tightly governed — not nationalized, but fairly regimented — and it will want the same for SpaceX’s service. Justin McIntosh: Stepping back to look at the defense tech neo-primes and startups more broadly: yesterday, Shield AI acquired a counter-UAS company. Shield has now made several acquisitions, and the strategy seems to be: buy relatively early companies at decent valuations to drive up our own valuation. The flip side is the PE- and VC-backed firms that started investing in defense tech three or four years ago, around the start of the Ukraine war, when defense began to commercialize. They’re now looking for profits, PE firms in particular. I worry we’re entering a phase with less funding for pre-seed, seed, and Series A rounds, and PE backing out. You’ll be left with a few heavily valued neo-primes snapping up little companies, recreating the primes of the past simply because they’re the only ones with cash. Boards will get anxious about less DAWG funding and fewer UAS purchases and start bailing on companies that would be profitable, just not at the multiples they were originally given. That would drive down both competition and innovation. As we discussed with Michael Kofman on this show — and Travis Metz talked about this too — DIU runs a drone competition every six months, while Ukraine sometimes iterates every six to twelve hours. Keeping up requires multiple players iterating and figuring out the next thing. Consolidation at this point would probably slow acquisition and delay getting capabilities into warfighters’ hands. Tony Stark: Adam Smith, soon to be HASC chair, has been around a long time and has done this before. He knows the difference between hunting for corruption and bad deals and supporting genuinely viable new robotic and autonomous systems — he’s on record valuing those. Managing all the new HASC members who don’t understand that distinction will be a hefty job for the PSMs. Managing the stray voltage will be the hardest part for staffers, because there will be so much people want to go after. Rebuilding Congressional StaffJustin McIntosh: Tony, do you want to talk about your recent piece, the how-to guide for staffers? It’s a good lead-in. Tony Stark: As a former House staffer, I finally wrote a piece called “How to Be a Good Staffer,” for two reasons. First, there’s a massive swing in new members — more than 100 on the House side, if I’m doing my math right — which means new staff in both chambers. The numbers just aren’t there to spin up and train them, especially given how many Democratic staffers fled the Hill over the last few years. A lot of new people will have to be brought in. I wanted to help them get accustomed to the Hill and get good at policy work. The office I worked in was a pressure cooker — you learned fast — and I drew on a lot of those ingrained lessons. Second, talking with former colleagues — and Politico had an article about this over the summer — staff quality has declined as the focus has shifted to comms, ideology, and posting over the actual work of legislating. The only way the republic turns back toward good is through good legislative processes. Congress has to reclaim its Article I powers, and that starts with staff and members who believe in the legislative process, who can actually do it, and who don’t just rely on Claude to do their job for them. Justin McIntosh: Wait, I thought Jordan wanted Claude doing more of the decision-making. Jordan Schneider: Relative to a 22-year-old, Claude can be an upgrade. But AIs haven’t completely superseded us — for now. Justin McIntosh: One point in particular: lobbyists exploit staffers’ time constraints and their inability to read bills fully. They come in saying, “This AI weapon system is biased, and we need to take it out.” You correctly point out that you have to ask: “Do you mean bias in how the weights and training work, or do you mean it targets people of color more?” They take three days to get back to you and say, “We meant the second one.” Bryan Clark: Or people without color. Jordan Schneider: Tony, what are you putting on the Democrats’ congressional reform agenda? I don’t think now is the moment to double everyone’s salary — the timing is always tricky. Tony Stark: On salaries, there’s been a lot of work over the last few years. Interns are paid now, which I know is a low bar. Staff salaries are decent — still low for DC, but you only need two roommates instead of ten. On the Democrats’ legislative priorities, it’ll be a lot of what we just discussed: regulatory reform for DoD and keeping the department honest. For staffers, there will be growing pains. DoD isn’t a mystical place. When Ike Harris was on the show with us, Jordan, we talked about this: the most important thing new staff can do is demystify DoD for themselves, so they don’t treat it as a magical place that either hands them answers or doesn’t. It’s a bureaucracy like any other. Bryan Clark: What I’ve been seeing recently is that the administration doesn’t want to share any information with Congress, and that comes from leadership on down — unless it’s about their workout routines or their Between Two Ferns podcast. Staffers tell me they can’t get anything out of DoD. It’s not magical or mystical; they just get zero. Everything is mediated by OLA and reduced to publicly releasable information, so they can hardly get a real answer. They come to think tanks and ask, “Can you explain what this is supposed to say and what the department is really trying to do?” That’s been a trend for a decade: less and less useful information flowing from the department, to staffers in particular. Members sometimes get good information, but staffers get surface-level, sometimes incoherent inputs. Junior staffers with no background can’t make sense of any of it, so think tankers end up having to help. Tony Stark: You heard it here, folks. If you’re a new staffer, call Bryan at 1-800-WAR-TALK for 24/7 support. Jordan Schneider: Sometimes he’s better than Claude. Bryan Clark: Just put it in the comments. Or just ask Claude. Justin McIntosh: When I was in, congressional staffers came out fairly regularly — CODELs visiting training, the unit, or us on deployment. How we handled them changed dramatically depending on who it was. For a CODEL, someone at the command would look at the staff list and say, “This person is on the congressman’s staff. What are you guys going to do?” “We’ll take him to the range, show him some vehicles, and talk about a couple of things.” “Perfect.” Glad-handing, photo ops. They got to shoot a gun, they left, and they said it was amazing. Then the PSMs — the professional staff — would come in, and it was very different. They’d say, “We need to discuss what you’re going to say.” They didn’t want to see any of that shit. They wanted a fulsome conversation about what was actually going on. They’d ask questions, and you’d better be ready. I forget the name of the lead PSM who used to come out to Syria pretty routinely. I wouldn’t say he ever yelled, but he definitely chewed a couple of officers’ asses pretty hard when they gave bullshit answers. He’d dig in, and you’d quickly realize this guy actually knew what he was talking about. Jordan Schneider: That’s the issue with pay. Over the past five to seven years, entry-level salaries went from basically poverty level to somewhat more functional. But that doesn’t change the calculus: once you want to buy a house or have a second kid, it becomes extremely hard to stay in Congress. That’s why there’s such a dramatic gap between the quality of members’ personal offices and on-committee staff. It would be great if PSMs felt they could stay a few more years, and if members’ offices had more knowledge and expertise. Often they don’t, because the people are 23 and haven’t had time to develop any. Bryan Clark: And they get pushed around. When the department comes over and gives them bullshit, or nothing substantive, or just publicly available information, they can’t recognize the snow job, and they can’t ask the right questions. I see a lot of that, especially under current leadership, which is using OLA to constrain the information available to Congress. Hopefully new leadership can break the logjam on the congressional side. Jordan Schneider: Spend the money, guys. It’s not that much. Tony Stark: One note: I’ve had this conversation with Democratic staffers and consultants over the last few years. The GOP, especially in foreign policy, built a pathway: here’s how you become a staffer, and we’ll train and educate you. Democrats were very good at training activists but very bad at training staff and subject-matter experts, particularly outside the NGO space. Going forward, the role for think tanks — and for WarTalk — is getting people smart again, as staffers, in a way that’s free and accessible. It used to be that you could do this, but unpaid, forty hours a week, with school on top. That structure no longer works for getting the right people in place. If you want smart staffers, and therefore smart members, you have to make education and training available to 22- and 23-year-olds, because at these salaries, that’s who you’ll get. I was a rarity, coming from an enlisted background into staff work. You have to find ways to train people and build those institutions. Justin McIntosh: The people who can afford to live in DC on what they’re paid while doing a master’s in public policy at Georgetown aren’t the salt of the earth. It’s not the guy who enlisted because his mom had him at seventeen and then spent ten years in the military. Jordan Schneider: The national security education and training I got was all right-wing coded, because that was the only thing that existed. Thank you, Mr. Hertog — the Hertog War Studies Program got me down this whole path. It comes with a defined conservative valence, which is fine, but it means there’s a gap. I guess it comes back to the donor base: if you’re into war, are you really a big Democratic donor? It’s understandable, but as Tony said, there’s a real gap in the upskilling that brings people into the field. Bryan Clark: That’s a good point. We do training like that at Hudson, and I’ve taught some of those sessions, though mine are very operationally focused. The rest are probably more conservatively coded, given Hudson’s institutional leaning. But there’s no countervailing program on the Democratic side. Find me the Democratic think tank with a really strong national security team — maybe Brookings. It just isn’t there. Maybe it’s incumbent on think tanks to be more ecumenical, especially in education. I know they see it as an opportunity to shape young minds, but feeding them the right-coded or left-coded material your institution’s donors prefer may not be for the best. Jordan Schneider: I’m sure this is Vietnam fallout. Why study war? We shouldn’t be fighting them. Bryan Clark: Right — war is bad. Justin McIntosh: Military history is very negatively coded in a lot of liberal academia. I wrote a military-focused master’s thesis, and even at a relatively small state school, it was hard to find professors who would talk about war specifically. They’d talk about Europe after 1949, West German Christian democracy, and so on. What they wouldn’t do is have a fulsome debate about the textures of the society that went into a war and how that shaped its decisions. That’s a hugely important part of history that doesn’t get absorbed into liberal thought, because it’s treated as separate and distinct. Tony Stark: I did my undergrad at American University, which is hardly a bastion of war thought. I had some excellent foreign policy professors — Shoon Murray and a few others. But there isn’t really space for someone to say, “I want to learn war. I don’t necessarily support war, but I want to understand it so I can make policy for it.” That’s been the gap for a long time. People have to understand the difference between studying something and endorsing it. Professors of genocide studies don’t endorse genocide. But for some reason, if you’re a professor of war studies, you must be a hawk, and it’s not necessarily a case. Jordan Schneider: Alright, thank you for being with us. We’ll have merch soon — Tony’s working on some mugs. And here’s to No-Pete November. You’re on the free list for ChinaTalk. Please consider supporting the newsletter and unlocking exclusive paywalled content by becoming a paying subscriber. © 2026 Jordan Schneider |