The first and most commonly cited obstacle is the Security Council’s five permanent veto-wielding members, or P5—the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. The P5 countries are wary of admitting rising powers as fellow veto wielders, as it would diminish their own influence in the body and make it more susceptible to deadlock.
However, without reform, the council’s legitimacy in the eyes of the global majority will deteriorate, rendering it more and more irrelevant. The P5 will be the biggest losers if the UNSC fades into insignificance, as they have the most to lose: their veto prerogatives. Consequently, the P5 are only likely to allow for reform when the council appears to be nearing the brink of collapse—a point that the world may soon approach if the P5 continue to wield their vetoes with impunity.
The second issue is the deadlock between the two main reform groupings: the G4 coalition of Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India, which favor enlarging the permanent membership of the UNSC to include themselves, and the Uniting for Consensus group, which favors only adding additional elected seats to the council. The uncompromising competition between these two blocs has prevented other proposals from gaining steam. However, Germany’s recent failed bid for a two-year term on the council has put into question the viability of its claim to a permanent seat—and the viability of the G4 proposal as a whole. This enables a possible shake-up that allows for the emergence of new and more creative reform ideas.
The third factor is that discussions over which reform model would best enhance the UNSC’s efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy has, to date, been largely speculative. Neither side has been able to predict with any meaningful accuracy the implications of their proposed reforms.
This, too, is now changing. Thanks to artificial intelligence, complex simulations can be conducted that calculate potential shifts in the council’s performance. We have conducted such a simulation to determine precisely what each proposal would achieve—and what it would risk. The simulation shows that the G4 model would dramatically increase gridlock over the next five decades. Council business would slow down as decision-making speed per resolution would grow from 28.5 days to 42.1 days, and veto use would grow by more than 60 percent. Despite giving them a seat at the table, the resulting paralysis would encourage leading powers to work outside the UNSC, defeating the purpose of reform entirely.
Yet while the Uniting for Consensus group’s proposal would limit the damage to the council’s efficiency and effectiveness, it fails to resolve its legitimacy deficit. The UNSC cannot effectively serve as a long-term custodian of the international order if Britain continues to enjoy a more privileged position than India—the world’s most populous country and likely soon to be its third-largest economy.
How, then, to resolve this conundrum? The AI simulation points to two mechanisms.
First, if more countries are to gain the veto, then this must be balanced by creating a veto override mechanism: for example, a veto wielder must secure one or two concurring negative votes among sitting council members, otherwise, a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly can overturn the veto.