The unanimous vote by Libya's eastern-based House of Representatives on 20 October to approve the maritime agreement with Turkiye was no ordinary parliamentary decision. It marked a major political and strategic reversal by the same legislature that rejected the agreement in 2020 and cut political ties with Ankara over its military support for the Tripoli government against Khalifa Haftar's forces.
Six years later, the former adversaries have found common ground over a maritime agreement that could reshape their regional alliances and strengthen Ankara's position against its Mediterranean rivals.
Haftar's reversal reflects a wider struggle over the eastern Mediterranean, where Ankara's maritime ambitions are colliding with those of Egypt, Greece, and Israel. The dispute also concerns control over offshore energy resources and the routes through which Mediterranean gas could reach European markets.
Saddam Haftar's Turkish connection
Turkiye and Libya's former Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, signed their maritime agreement on 27 November 2019, during Haftar's military offensive against Tripoli. Ankara's subsequent intervention, including the deployment of military advisers and drones, proved decisive in defeating the offensive and shifting the balance of power.
Yet the relationship between Ankara and eastern Libya gradually shifted. By 2025, Turkiye had begun opening channels with Haftar's camp, seeking to expand its influence beyond the western Libyan authorities it had long supported.
Saddam Haftar, one of Khalifa Haftar's sons and an increasingly influential figure in the eastern military establishment, visited Turkiye in April 2025. Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin followed in August with a visit to Benghazi, meeting Haftar and his sons as military and intelligence contacts gathered momentum.
BBC Monitoring highlighted Saddam's role in facilitating this rapprochement in November 2025. The following month, Poland's Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) identified securing eastern Libya's parliamentary approval of the maritime agreement as a major Turkish objective.
Haftar's influence in eastern Libya makes his rapprochement with Ankara politically significant, helping pave the way for the eastern parliament's shift on the maritime agreement.
It also serves the Haftar family's political ambitions. Closer relations with Ankara offer access to Turkish military technology, reconstruction contracts, and investment, while allowing Saddam to strengthen his standing in Libya's divided political and military landscape. They also provide the family with an alternative to its longstanding dependence on Cairo.
The improvement in Turkish–Egyptian relations since 2023 has made this realignment easier. Haftar's turn toward Ankara does not necessarily signal a rupture with Egypt, but it suggests he is no longer prepared to follow Cairo's regional priorities without question.
For Turkiye, meanwhile, the parliamentary vote removes a major political obstacle to its maritime ambitions and gives its agreement with Tripoli broader Libyan backing, even as the country's institutions remain divided.
Ankara's Blue Homeland takes shape
The 2019 agreement establishes a maritime boundary between the Turkish and Libyan coasts south of Crete, defining their respective claims to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Ankara regards the agreement as a central component of its Blue Homeland doctrine, or Mavi Vatan, which places control over surrounding waters at the heart of Turkish national security and economic strategy.
The doctrine seeks to protect Turkiye's maritime claims, secure access to offshore oil and gas resources, and challenge arrangements that Ankara believes are designed to exclude it from the eastern Mediterranean.
The agreement with Libya puts this strategy into practice. It strengthens Turkiye's position in maritime boundary disputes while supporting its ambition to become a regional hub for energy transportation, storage, and exports to Europe.
Ankara is pursuing similar arrangements with Syria.
On 31 December 2025, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that Ankara hoped to conclude a maritime agreement with Damascus this year, potentially opening the way for Turkish companies to explore offshore oil and gas resources.
Bayraktar acknowledged that a general framework had been discussed but that a specific agreement remained necessary.
The proposal therefore remains a negotiating objective rather than a completed maritime settlement.
Taken together, Ankara's initiatives in Libya and Syria reveal an effort to strengthen its position along the eastern Mediterranean coastline and prevent rival states from determining the region's maritime boundaries without Turkish participation.
The Greek islands blocking Ankara's ambitions
The confrontation between Turkiye and Greece has deep historical roots.
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne established the borders of the modern Turkish republic, while the 1947 Treaty of Paris transferred the Dodecanese islands, including Rhodes, Kos, and Kastellorizo, from Italy to Greece.
Greek islands extend along much of Turkiye's western and southern coastline, from Lesbos, Chios, and Samos to Rhodes, Karpathos, and Crete. Kastellorizo lies just 2.3 kilometers from the Turkish coast, making it particularly contentious in the dispute over maritime jurisdiction.
Athens maintains that its islands generate maritime entitlements under international law, including continental shelf and EEZ rights.
Ankara, however, argues that granting these islands full effect when drawing maritime boundaries would severely restrict the reach of the Turkish mainland coastline.
Under the international law of the sea, an EEZ may extend up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 kilometers, from a state's baselines. However, overlapping claims require delimitation, and international courts may take geographical circumstances and equitable principles into account when determining boundaries.
At the heart of the dispute is how much weight island entitlements should carry when they overlap with claims from neighboring mainland coastlines.
Greece argues that the Turkish–Libyan agreement disregards the maritime entitlements of Crete and other Greek islands. Turkiye maintains that those islands cannot be allowed to cut off the maritime projection of its southern coast.
Athens also disputes whether Turkiye and Libya possess opposite coastlines capable of supporting the boundary drawn under the agreement.
No final international judicial ruling has invalidated the 2019 memorandum. Its registration with the UN, however, does not amount to an endorsement of its legality or settle the competing claims of third countries.
Israel's Mediterranean axis
Israel views the eastern Mediterranean as a strategic arena for expanding its geopolitical influence, strengthening security partnerships, and securing energy exports to European markets.
Its growing alignment with Greece and Cyprus, backed by western political and commercial interests, has become an important part of this strategy.
Israeli and Turkish interests overlap in developing offshore gas resources and in accessing European markets. Yet they increasingly diverge over maritime boundaries, export routes, and the political arrangements governing the region.
Israel seeks to strengthen cooperation with Greece and Cyprus to reduce dependence on Turkiye and limit Ankara's influence over regional energy infrastructure.
A 2026 analysis by the TRT Research Centre describes the emerging Israeli–Greek–Cypriot alignment as a security axis aimed at containing Turkish influence. What began as energy cooperation has expanded into military coordination, intelligence cooperation, and joint security arrangements.
The Cradle has also documented how the trilateral partnership, supported by Washingtonthrough the 3+1 mechanism, has deepened its cooperation in energy, security, and infrastructure while opposing Turkish maritime claims.
Turkiye, for its part, rejects arrangements that exclude it from maritime negotiations or undermine what it considers its legitimate claims. Ankara increasingly views this alignment as an effort to encircle it strategically and restrict its influence across the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel's security calculations are shaped by its determination to prevent the emergence of regional forces capable of challenging its military superiority. Turkish ambitions, meanwhile, include expanding Ankara's influence over Syria's political and security future while safeguarding its strategic interests along the Syrian coastline.
Cairo refuses to surrender its maritime claims
Egypt's opposition to the Turkish–Libyan agreement is rooted in geography and sovereign interests, rather than simply solidarity with Greece.
The boundary claimed by Ankara and Tripoli passes south of Crete, through an area where Turkish, Libyan, Greek, and Egyptian maritime claims intersect.
Cairo believes the agreement infringes upon its rights to the continental shelf and EEZ, particularly in the western reaches of its Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction.
Egypt and Greece signed a partial maritime delimitation agreement on 6 August 2020, establishing their respective economic zones in an area overlapping with the claims advanced by Turkiye and Libya.
Cairo has consistently rejected the Turkish–Libyan memorandum, arguing that two states cannot conclude an agreement that diminishes the sovereign rights of a third.
Following the eastern Libyan parliament's October vote, Egypt's Foreign Ministry reiterated that the memorandum was null and void and that its approval carried no legal consequences for Egypt.
In a 4 November interview with Ahram Online, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki said Cairo had prepared a legal dossier documenting its objections and would take the necessary measures to defend its maritime boundaries.
Ankara has proposed a separate maritime arrangement with Egypt, arguing that Cairo could gain approximately 15,000 additional square kilometers of maritime jurisdiction compared with a delimitation based on Greek claims. Egypt has not accepted the proposal.
Zaki questioned where the additional area would come from and whether it would involve waters claimed by Libya, Greece, Cyprus, or other states.
Cairo insists that legal specialists examine the relevant maps and that all affected countries participate in any settlement.
Ankara is attempting to overcome Egyptian resistance through bilateral negotiations, while Cairo seeks assurances that any compromise will not undermine its existing maritime partnerships.
Despite these disagreements, contacts among Egypt, Turkiye, and Libya continue. Zaki acknowledged that recent diplomatic signals were encouraging but stressed that no immediate solution was in sight. Egypt's improving relations with Ankara have not altered its rejection of the maritime agreement.
The gas reserves behind the rival maps
A September 2025 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that approximately 80 trillion cubic feet of natural gas remained in the eastern Mediterranean.
A separate US Geological Survey assessment estimated the region's mean undiscovered, technically recoverable conventional gas resources at 286.2 trillion cubic feet. These figures describe different categories of resources and should not be treated as equivalent to commercially proven reserves.
Major discoveries include Israel's Leviathan and Tamar fields, Egypt's Zohr field, and Cyprus's Aphrodite field.
Syria, meanwhile, holds an estimated 8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to longstanding US energy data, although years of war have devastated its energy infrastructure and severely curtailed production.
Lebanon has yet to establish commercially proven offshore gas reserves despite the potential of its Mediterranean waters.
Three competing regional energy strategies have emerged around these resources.
Turkiye seeks to prevent its maritime exclusion while strengthening its position as an energy corridor connecting regional producers with Europe.
Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are pursuing cooperation to develop offshore fields and establish export connections with European markets.
Egypt aims to preserve its position as a regional gas processing and export hub through its liquefied natural gas facilities at Idku and Damietta.
These ambitions intersect with the commercial interests of major energy companies, including US firms Chevron and ExxonMobil, Italy's Eni, France's TotalEnergies, Greece's Energean, and QatarEnergy.
The expansion of American energy companies into Greek and Cypriot offshore exploration adds another layer to Ankara's concerns about arrangements that could leave Turkiye outside the region's emerging energy infrastructure.
The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, whose members include Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Italy, France, Jordan, and Palestine, reflects these competing interests.
Turkiye remains outside the organization amid its disputes with Cyprus and Greece over maritime boundaries and the wider controversy surrounding the 2019 agreement with Libya.
Beyond the region, Washington seeks to protect Israel's security, diversify Europe's energy supplies, and prevent disputes between NATO members Turkiye and Greece from escalating.
The EU supports Greece and Cyprus, while Russia seeks to preserve its influence in regional energy markets. China, meanwhile, remains interested in Mediterranean ports, infrastructure, and commercial connections.
Control over maritime boundaries, offshore resources, and export infrastructure will determine which regional powers secure access to European energy markets and which find themselves excluded.
Libya's sovereignty remains on the line
The eastern Libyan parliament's approval of the maritime agreement boosts Turkiye diplomatically and signals Haftar's openness to broader alliances. It puts Libya at the heart of a contest over eastern Mediterranean boundaries, energy, and influence.
Libya’s strategic location and potential offshore wealth have attracted competing foreign interests, raising concerns that agreements over its waters and resources could be shaped by external calculations while the country's political divisions persist.
The lack of unified national institutions and effective oversight of maritime and economic agreements leaves Libya vulnerable to such pressures. Rival governments and competing centers of authority have already weakened Libya's ability to negotiate from a position of strength.
Haftar's rapprochement with Ankara may strengthen his political standing, but Libya's long-term interests depend on its ability to exercise sovereign control over its maritime boundaries and resources. Without a unified national position, the country's geography will continue to serve the ambitions of foreign powers, while the costs of its divisions will fall on the Libyan people.