[Salon] India muddles through with multialignment




India muddles through with multialignment

Ian HallPublished: 12 November 2026
Leaders meet for the eighteenth BRICS summit in New Delhi, India, 13 September 2026 (Photo: Reuters/Latin America News Agency).

In Brief

Since the mid-2000s, India has partnered with the United States, China and Russia at once, joining groupings from the Quad to BRICS. Proponents present multialignment as a means of securing strategic autonomy, and India has pursued this by tilting towards different powers as circumstances change. It leaned towards fellow rising powers until the mid-2010s, then towards the United States and its allies as Beijing grew assertive. With Washington abandoning its tolerance of New Delhi’s choices and no major power offering an alliance, India has little option but to muddle through.

While Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi played host to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at the BRICS Summit in mid-September 2026, India’s armed forces and US troops were preparing to carry out a mock air assault near Auli in Uttarakhand, just around 50 kilometres from the disputed China–India frontier.

Such juxtapositions have become familiar. Once determinedly nonaligned, since the mid-2000s successive Indian governments have negotiated a series of strategic partnershipsand joined a string of regional and minilateral groupings, from BRICS and the Quad to the East Asia Summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This ‘multialignment’ means that — at least on the surface — India is now committed to working with the United States and Japan in some areas at varying levels and in multiple forums, and with China and Russia in others.

In New Delhi, it is often argued that this ‘multi-vector approach’ — as India’s External Affairs Minister and former top diplomat S Jaishankar called it in his 2024 book — is preparing the country to take its rightful place in an emerging multipolar world. It is perceived as pragmatic, unsentimental and clever. Multialignment allows India to have its ‘cake and eat it too’, proponents say, leveraging partnerships to build strategic autonomy while avoiding costly commitments.

Whether these arguments hold water is less evident than the proponents admit. What is clear is that India’s circumstances have deteriorated and several key relationships have become much more difficult to handle. Major power strategic competition, Chinese pressure on India along their contested frontier and rapid technological change have all caused New Delhi headaches.

To make matters worse, under President Donald Trump, the United States has abandoned its attitude of ‘strategic altruism’, which involved turning a blind eye to some of India’s choices, so that the two could develop their economic and security ties. Since 2025, India has been hit with high tariffs, threatened with further sanctions if it does not cease buying Russian oil and publicly criticised for its involvement in BRICS.

‘Rising powers’, Jaishankar observed in his 2024 book, ‘seek stability most of all’, but India has seen precious little stability for two decades. In response, it has multialigned, but not evenly. Instead, India has tilted this way and that, leaning into some relationships and out of others, demonstrating that multialignment does not entail equidistance.

From the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s, India sought closer ties with the United States but saw its long-term interests as more aligned with the rising and resurgent powers of China, Brazil, South Africa and Russia. Convinced that these states wanted what India wanted — a multipolar order in which they had a bigger say and the United States was less overbearing and interfering — New Delhi joined their efforts to ‘soft balance’ Washington with new minilaterals like BRICS and new agendas in global governance.

Since the mid-2010s, by contrast, as Beijing has grown more assertive, India has tilted more to the United States, Japan and Australia. At least until Trump’s return to office, India worked far more closely and enthusiastically with these partners than with others. India also used some of the forums of which China is a member to thwart and spoil Beijing’s agendas. Finally, New Delhi has worked hard to diversify its economic partnerships to hedge against possible downturns in relations with India’s two top trading partners, the United States and China, cutting new deals with the United Kingdom and the European Union.

As a result, New Delhi is now entangled in a web of partnerships and institutions. But whether these commitments enhance India’s strategic autonomy is moot. Some are clearly needed to manage dependencies like India’s reliance on Russian arms, to seek scarce goods like emerging technologies and to navigate powerful domestic business interests. Others, arguably including India’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation membership, may generate reputational costs that outweigh their benefits or, in the case of the Quad and China, signal evasiveness and unreliability. Together, they also add more work for India’s notoriously overstretched diplomats.

The problem here, as Jaishankar conceded in his 2020 book, is that India has ‘little choice’ but to multialign. He argued that this was due to the turbulence of contemporary world politics and the shift towards more nationalistic and transactional diplomacy.

Arguably the more fundamental problem is that India still lacks the geostrategic weight to demand something better. However unwise this view may prove in the longer term, the Trump administration has shown that there are influential figures in the United States who simply do not take India seriously. China regularly promises some kind of partnership, but New Delhi fears — with good reason — that this will involve subordination in a Beijing-dominated Asia. And Russia simply has too little to give, especially to India’s economy.

In this context, India must muddle through with multialignment, even if the strategy may not deliver what Indians need and want.

Ian Hall is Professor of International Relations and Acting Head of the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University.




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