[Salon] Netanyahu Won’t Die: Why Eisenkot’s Coalition Talks Change Nothing



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Netanyahu Won’t Die: Why Eisenkot’s Coalition Talks Change Nothing

Plus ça change in Israel’s apartheid politics - a conversation with Professor Leila Hudson

Nov 16
 
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I caught up with Professor Leila Hudson of the University of Arizona to discuss the latest machinations in the ongoing Israeli coalition talks, after Gadi Eisenkot was asked to form a new government. One thing was clear, nothing much will change either for Israeli politics or for the situation in Gaza.

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The coalition arithmetic that cannot be solved

Gadi Eisenkot has been asked to form Israel’s next government even though his party is not the largest. On paper this looks like a defeat for Benjamin Netanyahu. In practice it is more likely to become another chapter in Netanyahu’s remarkable talent for political survival. The numbers simply do not add up once the red lines are applied.

Eisenkot has made clear he will not sit with Netanyahu. He has also shown no willingness to bring in the 19 Knesset members from the two parties that represent Palestinian citizens of Israel. That leaves him trying to balance the ultra-Orthodox parties (who refuse military service) against hardliners who insist on broader conscription, while simultaneously satisfying his own stated conditions on Hamas and Gaza.

Professor Leila Hudson describes these as “almost unbalanceable forces.” Each potential partner vetoes the others. The result is hour-by-hour drama that moves two steps forward and three steps back.

Netanyahu’s quiet advantage

While Eisenkot struggles, Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister. For him, survival is the victory. He does not have to govern responsibly; he only has to wait. Hudson notes that the longer the interregnum lasts, the more Netanyahu benefits from watching someone else wrestle with the same structural constraints that have defined Israeli politics for years. He can even send emissaries to the Palestinian parties he publicly rejects, then deny it when exposed. The deadline can stretch toward the end of December. Every additional week is a win for the man who has made clinging to power an art form.

The continuity of exclusion

The most revealing feature of the talks is the determination across most of the Jewish parties to exclude the Palestinian lists. Hudson observes that this behaviour itself supplies fresh evidence for those who argue that Zionism operates as a form of structural racism. The mathematically easiest path to a government is precisely the one Eisenkot and the majority of the political system refuse to take.

Leaders such as Mansour Abbas have signalled pragmatism and willingness to work within Eisenkot’s four conditions. That is still not enough. Including them remains a political lightning rod that risks defections even from within Eisenkot’s own list. The system therefore defaults to some combination of the same exclusionary, militaristic mainstream that has governed for decades.

Policy continuity and the October 7 question

Eisenkot is a career military man associated with the Dahiya doctrine — the deliberate bombing of civilian neighbourhoods to pressure leadership targets. His platform still centres on Zionism and the dismantling of Hamas. The one genuine point of difference with a pure Netanyahu government is the possibility of a serious investigation into the failures (or worse) surrounding 7 October, including the application of the Hannibal Directive. That inquiry would be politically explosive inside Israel. It does not, however, resolve the coalition maths, nor does it alter the basic trajectory on Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria or Iran. Hudson’s assessment is blunt: the spectacle may change faces, but the underlying project does not.

Plus ça change

Israel currently faces multiple active fronts at once, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, West Bank and Iran. An Eisenkot government might seek limited off-ramps or a more pragmatic management of those fronts, but the structural refusal to engage Palestinian political representatives inside the Knesset, combined with the continuity of military doctrine, makes any fundamental shift improbable. Netanyahu understands this.

All he needs to do is survive the process. For everyone else — and especially for Palestinians — the outcome is likely to feel familiar: the same exclusion, the same wars, and the same refusal to confront the costs of the status quo.

You can watch the full video here:

Wherever you are in the world, whatever your nationality and religion, I wish you much peace.

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