[Salon] America's war with Iran won't end until Washington faces reality



America's war with Iran won't end until Washington faces realityRichard Broinowski

America's war with Iran won't end until Washington faces reality

November 16, 2026

The US war has battered Iran without eliminating its regional influence. Further escalation risks deepening the crisis, while diplomacy demands that Washington recognise Tehran as a power it must negotiate with.

The US mid-term elections drove home to President Trump how unpopular his war against Iran has been with the American public. But his enmity towards Iran may not have abated, and he has the capacity to double down on his most egregious fixations. The war might flare up again, not least because of Tehran’s refusal to meet US demands, including Trump’s insistence that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons.

The international media have treated the war as a Trump phenomenon. But before Trump, one of the legacies of the George W Bush years was the creation in the US of an image of Iran as a monster, a dangerous rogue state that sponsored world terror and was bent on acquiring nuclear weapons with which to attack Israel. That was built on Jimmy Carter’s response to Ayatollah Khomeini’s lock-down of the US embassy in 1979. Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, outlined a more sophisticated appraisal in his 2009 book The Devil We Know – dealing with the new Iranian Superpower.

Baer asserted that Iranians may hate the United States for occupying large swathes of Arab territory, and the CIA for overthrowing their only elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, but he claimed that American culture has always been popular, despite US support for the Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who fled with his family to exile in the US. Howard Conklin Baskerville, an American missionary teacher who was shot while trying to break a siege in Tabriz during the 1905–11 constitutional revolution, is a revered Iranian martyr. Among Iranian students, Oprah Winfrey’s television program is a favourite. Yet how many of them felt supported by the US when they resisted Tehran’s dictates about women’s head-covering? Or when, after Mossad and the CIA urged them to rise up against Ayatollah Khamenei, promised support turned into assassination of their head of state?

Iran is not a totalitarian state run by ‘Islamofascists’. Former President Ahmadinejad was a religious figurehead no more able to take Iran to war than Joseph McCarthy was able to take America to war against communism. Iran’s real leaders are rational, pragmatic, calculating clerics led by the recently assassinated Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Part mullah, part dictator, part mediator and part police chief, Khamenei governed more like a twelfth-century pope than an American president. He was certainly not a totalitarian fascist like Adolf Hitler. Until Khamenei’s successor, his son Mojtaba, sticks his head above the parapet and takes public control, we will not know whether he will rule as did his father, but he or those acting for him will likely fill a similar role.

Baer asserted that Iranian leaders were not after conventional territorial gains through marching in troops or flying flags over ‘captured’ territory, least of all in Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s demise. But they did have ambitions to exercise Iranian influence by proxy, and this has been singularly successful. Their first foray was into Lebanon before the American invasion of Iraq. Hezbollah, a Shia paramilitary organisation, was inspired by Khomeini and created by Iranian Revolutionary Guards who infiltrated Lebanon in direct response to the Israeli invasion of that country in 1982. Hezbollah successfully fought the invasion and became a significant and legitimate Lebanese political force. Its military wing was banned by the Lebanese government in March 2026, but it remains a major military and political presence on the ground.

In a prophetic speculation, Baer wrote that by concentrating rocket attacks on large vessels, Iran could easily close the Straits of Hormuz, thereby interrupting the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western markets with catastrophic results. It could also gain influence, if not outright control, of weak regimes along the southern coast of the Gulf. Bahrain, part of Iran for centuries until the Qajar Dynasty, and with 70 per cent of its 700,000 population Shia Muslims, would be the first sheikhdom to fall. The UAE is also vulnerable to any move by Iran against it. So is Doha.

Baer’s litany of weakness and fear surrounding Iran raises two questions: what are Iran’s motives in potentially expanding its influence so dramatically in its Middle East neighbourhood, and what if anything, could the United States do about it? To answer the second question first, not much. The Iranians want a promise that the US will neither militarily attack Iran again, nor meddle in its politics. A related third question that Baer does not ask is what will Israel make the US do about Iran?

Trump is in a bind, and may have to acknowledge Iran’s significant position in the Middle East. He cannot hope to invade the country, which would require approximately 500,000 troops and vast expense. He cannot continue to bomb targets with conventional explosives, a move that would add impetus to growing international repugnance, including among a growing number of citizens in America itself.

Short of the unthinkable alternative of using nuclear weapons, Trump should concede that he has lost the war that he and Israel so foolishly embarked on. He will likely camouflage his concession with risible claims that he has won the war, but any such claims would be met with contempt, another example of presidential lily-gilding.

Trump should also reflect on his disastrous decision in 2018 to walk away from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which, with Iran’s concurrence, introduced the most stringent IAEA inspections to the country’s nuclear facilities and all but stifled any plans the country might have to produce nuclear weapons. But he probably won’t.

And as to the first question, the Iranians want the United States to acknowledge their right to have a role in Middle East affairs, a role grounded in respectful acknowledgement of the history of the Persian Empire. This includes recognition of Iran’s long-term vital interest in stabilising Iraq so that chaos does not spill over its borders, and of the influence it has in Lebanon, Syria and Kurdish territories. They also would like to have international acknowledgement of Iran’s past ‘greatness’ as a citadel of Islam, something the Shah was trying to emphasise in his ostentatious 2500th celebrations of the Persian Empire held in Persepolis in 1971.

It would be wonderful if advisers surrounding Trump could persuade him to let them sit down with the Iranians, treat it as the Middle East power it has become, and without previous conditions or demands, see what it has to offer to regain regional stability. This could be a bitter pill for Trump to swallow, but would be infinitely better than the alternatives.


The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of P&I.

Richard Broinowski



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