[Salon] Lebanon’s government: buying time or building a state?




Cutting edge Middle East news analysis from ArabDigest.org

Lebanon’s government: buying time or building a state?

Summary: a new government promised positive change that would move Lebanon beyond sectarian stasis into a sustainable state but in reality little if any progress has been made.

We thank Nour Halabi for today’s newsletter. Nour is a Lebanese political scientist and journalist whose work focuses on Middle East politics with a particular interest in identity politics and sectarianism. She is a regular contributor to the newsletter. You can find her recent podcast Jordan’s dilemma here.

In April 2025, within hours of being put up along the road to Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport, banners promising “A New Era for Lebanon” were set on fire – an early sign of how hard realising that promise would be.

True, with the respective election and designation of President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam in early 2025, Lebanon had finally gotten out of its political purgatory. The prime minister introduced the government’s ministerial statement to the parliament, outlining a promise to “rescue, reform, and rebuild” the country.

Thus, almost two years on, now is the time to evaluate whether the government is keeping its promise. Is it building a state or managing one? By “managing” I mean containing or delaying, with outcomes that depend on others that can be easily reversed, and by “building” I mean creating institutions that can outlast the pressures that produced them. This distinction comes down to three questions: how much agency does the government have, how durable are its decisions, and do they strengthen the institutions responsible for delivering them?


Two advertising posters depicting a "new era for Lebanon" were set on fire on the road to Beirut airport, in the southern suburbs of the capital, on April 11, 2025.

The rescue agenda

Almost every file in the government’s “rescue” agenda hangs on a deadlock it does not control. The UN Security Council describes “competing sequencing demands:” Israel conditions withdrawal on Hezbollah’s disarmament, while Hezbollah conditions any discussion of its weapons on an end to Israeli violations and withdrawal. Beirut sits between the two. This leaves the government with limited leverage over the immediate security trajectory, but definitely not without responsibility.

While the government cannot independently determine Israeli withdrawal or Hezbollah’s position, it can still shape its diplomatic response, coordinate humanitarian assistance, as well as strengthen the institutions needed to manage the consequences of the conflict. Therefore, the government’s limited leverage should not be mistaken for complete helplessness.

Lebanon’s health ministry reports over 4,300 people killed by Israel since March while the displacement numbers also reveal the domestic consequences of the deadlock. At its peak, around 1.2 million people, approximately 18% of the population, were displaced. Roughly 970,000 have since returned to the south, according to the UN, but more than 300,000 remain displaced, and many returnees face damaged or destroyed homes and failing public services. The government, with support from humanitarian partners, has continued to provide shelter assistance and financial support to displaced households. However, the broader humanitarian response remains severely underfunded: the 2026 UN Flash Appeal received less than 52% of the $640 million initially requested.

Here, the government’s limitations are not entirely external. While the security situation determines when people can safely return, the state is still responsible for making sure that those who do return have access to basic services and assistance. Its ability to do so is restricted because of the same institutional and financial weaknesses that predate the war. The result is a government responding with short term efforts without necessarily building the capacity to address longer-term consequences.

In addition, the longer the delay the more costly the fix and with inflation standing at 17.53% year on year, the economic cost of waiting is equally significant.

The reform agenda

Here the government definitely has more agency, but the efforts aimed at reform are easier to undo: having the ability to pass legislation does not necessarily mean that the legislation will survive political resistance or translate into actual change.

One example: the Lebanese parliament passed an amended bank resolution law in August of this year, which the IMF welcomed as a major step. But President Aoun challenged Article 3, which sets out the law’s objectives, over its treatment of the Central Bank’s powers under the Code of Money and Credit. In October, the Constitutional Council unanimously annulled the article on procedural grounds, finding it - along with phrases in Articles 19 and 27 - had not secured the required parliamentary majority. The provisions now return to parliament with no timeline for a new vote.

The IMF still wants a financial gap law, a 2027 budget and a medium-term fiscal framework before the launch of a new programme of support. This raises a broader concern about the sustainability of reform. Assuming the requirements are met progress still depends primarily on IMF conditionality and external pressure. How likely is the financial gap law to survive once that external pressure eases?

And for Lebanese depositors, the significance of these reforms goes beyond securing an IMF programme. The banking crisis has left people unable to access much of their savings, while the absence of an agreed framework for distributing financial losses continues to extend the uncertainty. Unless there is a credible answer to the banking crisis, passing laws one at a time will amount to reform in name only.

Moreover, management is also partly a political choice. In March, parliament extended its own mandate by two years, by 76 votes to 41, postponing the May elections. Evidently, war would have made voting hard, if not impossible, but Lebanon’s habit of political delay is older than this crisis.

Granted there is a fair defence for the postponement. Keeping institutions running while under fire and avoiding internal strife with a heavily-armed Hezbollah may be the only responsible course. However, the broader question remains: can management be enough to achieve the build/rebuild that Lebanon badly needs?

The rebuild agenda

There is at least one file that has recently passed the test: Judge Tarek Bitar’s investigation into the 4 August 2020 Beirut port explosion that killed at least 235 and injured over 7000. The investigation needs no external approval and an indictment, trial and conviction are hard to undo.

It has also overcome obstruction: the new prosecutor general, Jamal Hajjar, lifted the ban on cooperating with Judge Bitar. The judge completed his investigation this spring, charging 70 people. On 4 November he also charged four retired army officers, including former Army Chief of Staff Walid Salman.

But the significance of the investigation is not just that it has progressed. It offers a rare example of a state institution attempting to function independently of the political interests that have historically striven to limit it.

Nonetheless, hope should be tempered with caution. Judicial sources say Judge Bitar intends to issue his indictment before the end of the year, but no date has been yet set.

The investigation into the Beirut port explosion offers a reminder that Lebanese institutions are capable of acting with a degree of independence even against significant political resistance. But whether that momentum can translate into wider institutional accountability remains to be seen.

In brief, it seems that the Lebanese government is prioritising short term stability over genuine change. While it is clear that the government inherited an extremely delicate political and security environment, the circumstances alone cannot explain the limited progress on reform. Ultimately, Lebanon needs a government with the political will and the courage capable of challenging the conditions that make each successive crisis so difficult to overcome.

Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.


follow us on Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook

Copyright © 2026 Arab Digest, All rights reserved.
You are receiving this email as you are subscribed to the Arab Digest.
Our mailing address is:
Arab Digest
3rd Floor
207 Regent Street
London, W1B 3HH
United Kingdom



 To unsubscribe from this list email editor@arabdigest.org



This archive was generated by a fusion of Pipermail (Mailman edition) and MHonArc.